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Abstract 
“Before the Corridor of Shame: The African American Fight for Equal Education After 
Jim Crow” analyzes how African American public school students in South Carolina 
used direct action protest to demand the implementation of quality, desegregated public 
education in the 1970s. Students built off of the legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which empowered the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to withhold 
federal funds from school districts that practiced overt segregation and became the 
mechanism by which the federal government could force states to desegregate. As a 
result, most South Carolina schools desegregated by 1970 and technically met federal 
civil rights standards, retaining federal school funding. In reality, many white school 
district officials and communities found ways to manipulate or circumvent new federal 
regulations while maintaining racially discriminatory policies, and federal and state 
authorities did not have the laws, policies, or political gumption to adequately deal with 
post-desegregation obstructions. This dissertation examines the problems that the first 
generation of black students attending totally desegregated schools faced. School districts 
closed majority-black schools to achieve desegregation and enrolled black students into 
previously all-white institutions that disrespected the history and identity of former 
majority-black institutions. Districts compounded black student and community 
frustrations when they fired and demoted many black teachers, administrators, and 
coaches, frequently replacing them for less qualified white candidates. Southern school 
districts tracked black students into lower level academic classes, which promoted
iv 
 
segregated classrooms and racial isolation within newly desegregated schools, and 
subjected black students to harsher discipline policies. Many white residents in majority-
black school districts abandoned South Carolina’s desegregated schools launching a 
prolific private school movement in the state, but simultaneously worked to control 
majority-black school districts, often funneling public resources into private, segregation 
academies. In the face of white resistance, black South Carolinians, civil rights activists, 
and a myriad of civil rights organizations once again inherited the burden of ensuring that 
their local and state governments implemented federally mandated desegregation 
regulations. From 1969-1979, black student protests emerged in dozens of communities 
across the state. Students boycotted classes, presented grievances, and petitioned state 
and federal authorities to demand that local school districts provide better education to 
black students. This dissertation asserts that black activists took advantage of growing 
state and federal oversight, and contributed to new desegregation regulations by 
providing accounts of the post- problems and discrimination they faced in their 
communities. By the late 1970s, South Carolina legislation regulated almost every 
component of education previously left to the jurisdiction of local school boards and the 
federal government revised many of its desegregation regulations. African American 
students, parents, and activists of the 1970s built on the legacy of black civil rights 
activism, established from the early twentieth century in South Carolina and across the 
South, and employed direct action protest to demand quality, integrated public education 
in South Carolina. Black South Carolinians achieved some successes and also witnessed 
many setbacks, but they continued to fight, placing quality education at the center of that 
struggle. 
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Introduction: 
“Like a Heavy Thunderstorm in Full Force”: Collective Black Student Activism 
and the Battle for Quality Public Education After Jim Crow 
 
On April 23, 1951, black students at segregated Robert Russa Moton High School in 
the town of Farmville, Virginia, in Prince Edward County, walked out of school to 
protest the conditions of their education, placing the pursuit of quality public education at 
the core of their community’s civil rights movement. Using collective black student 
protest to pursue their aims, Moton students demanded an expanded curriculum, an end 
to overcrowding, and an increased local commitment to black education by the all-white 
school board and county council that controlled school funding. Attorneys from the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), impressed by 
student militancy at Moton and commitment to civil rights activism within the Farmville 
community, decided to involve the Moton students as plaintiffs in Virginia’s first suit 
against segregated education. Three years later, Davis v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County became one of the five cases that culminated into Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), a Supreme Court case that overturned the legality of segregated 
education in the United States. While Brown v. Board and federal civil rights legislation 
in the 1960s eventually contributed to the dismantling of Jim Crow laws and legal 
segregation across the American South, racial inequality in Southern education systems 
continued. More than twenty years after the Moton strike, during the period of mass 
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desegregation in the late 1960s and 1970s, another generation of black students continued 
to struggle for some of the same things as the Farmville students. Although their 
struggles did not receive as much attention from the public at large, they anchored 
another era of powerful movements to protest inadequate and unequal public education 
systems.
i
  
This dissertation is about the grassroots civil rights activism that emerged in 
communities across South Carolina that protested the lack of quality educational 
opportunities available for black children from 1965-1980. It examines the persistent 
local protest following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, and 
the importance of black activism in achieving quality public education for all students 
after the apex of the civil rights movement. While white resistance to desegregation in 
this period was less overtly violent and publicly defiant than the so-called “massive 
resistance” of the 1950s and early 1960s, it remained a potent force in South Carolina 
communities. In the face of post-Jim Crow obstructions, ordinary parents, students, and 
activists used shifting federal policies to assert their civil rights in the Palmetto State.  
In South Carolina, boycotts emerged in dozens of counties across the state following 
mass desegregation. Like Moton students, black students in the post-Jim Crow Era 
demanded better facilities, support from majority-white school boards and county 
councils, and more challenging and meaningful curriculums. Supported by local chapters 
of the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), black student movements ensured that 
legal victories achieved at the apex of the Civil Rights Movement would not be 
meaningless in schools and local communities across the state. Their story represents an 
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integral but virtually unknown component to civil rights activism in the post-Jim Crow 
Era, one that provides a deeper understanding of the role of African American activism in 
achieving Brown’s mandate.  
Despite a growing literature on the history of the civil rights movement and school 
desegregation, little scholarship examines how communities across the South 
implemented school desegregation and school policy in the post-Jim Crow Era South. 
While most Southern school districts met federal desegregation standards following 
1964, school boards and administrators manipulated federal policy, maintaining racially 
discriminatory policies and segregated learning in desegregated schools. Many historians 
have argued that after 1970, the American South’s schools became the most integrated in 
the nation.
ii
 But without looking into the hallways and classrooms of desegregated 
schools, and examining the policies of southern school boards and administrators, 
historians misconstrue the successes of desegregation in the South. 
Recent scholarship related to school desegregation and its implementation debates the 
national scope and magnitude of the Brown decision and focuses on the role of the 
federal court system in making Brown successful, the nature of white resistance to 
desegregation, and controversies over mandatory school busing and urban school 
desegregation plans. The limited historiography on post-Jim Crow desegregation efforts 
focuses on busing controversies and class and ethnic tensions inherent in urban school 
districts. The most scholarly attention has gone to Boston and Charlotte, with Charlotte 
portrayed as an example of successful cross-town busing and a symbol of effective 
desegregation in the New South, Boston a reminder of failures and violence.
iii
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A broader historiographical discussion emphasizes the changing social, political, and 
economic dynamics of the American South after World War II. Scholars examine the role 
of rising conservatism in American politics as a response to the civil rights movement 
and a rapidly shifting Southern economy and landscape. Focusing on the complex 
interactions of race, class, consumerism, and the politics of metropolitan space, historians 
argue that suburbanization was a reaction to desegregation, driven by color-blind 
arguments, individualism, and free-market consumerism at the grassroots. This 
historiography explores the expectations and demands of the mostly white, rising middle-
class suburban elite in the post-war era, and the arguments they used in struggles over 
school desegregation. While this work is important to understanding the trajectory of 
desegregation in the years following the major civil rights legislation of the 1960s, the 
larger discussion must involve clearer treatment of black responses to desegregation. In 
this way, historiography on school desegregation after 1965 remains too focused on white 
responses to desegregation, and the ways in which white community members defined 
desegregation.
iv
 
In addition, while historians emphasize the more visible school conflicts in southern 
cities, it is imperative that the analysis fully consider the roles of rural communities 
across the South.  Patterns of racism in the process of integration were often more 
pronounced in rural areas, where black people usually held less political power. As a 
result, blatant offenses to black students in the desegregation era, by all-white school 
boards and administrations, prompted many changes to federal and state education 
policy, specifically regarding school finance, discipline policy, teacher certification and 
qualification, and education standards. South Carolina’s school policy in the late 1970s 
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and early 1980s aimed to create a more equal learning environment for both minority and 
impoverished students, in large part because of civil rights activism and black student 
protest. 
 While general studies have explained the ways that the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations transformed federal education policy, serious questions remain about the 
changes those policies had on education at the local level, and the role of African 
American parents and students in that transformation. A growing historiography has also 
analyzed the ways in which public education shifted from 1965 through the present, but it 
tends to leave out local community influences on shifting national policy. An analysis of 
black student protest in public schools across South Carolina after 1965 shows the power 
of African American community activism in challenging policies regarding education 
funding, standardized testing, teaching and curriculum standards, and discipline.
v
 
Black student and community movements utilized collective power in the post-Jim 
Crow Era to achieve a foothold in local politics, particularly in control over education. 
The processes whereby students embraced philosophical strands of Black Power and 
merged them with civil rights organizing, contributes to a growing historiography that 
reassesses the ways that black power, in conjunction with civil rights activism, reshaped 
established definitions of American citizenship, identity, and democracy. By looking at 
the goals, identity, and protests of black students in the post-Jim Crow South, this paper 
will also consider the processes whereby black power and civil rights became part of a 
shifting struggle to secure equality and freedom during a period in which uniform laws 
against racial discrimination were instituted on a national level. Importantly, this study 
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also pushes the timeframe into the late 1970s, an era usually marked by growing 
conservatism, a decline in liberal activism, and a disappearing Black Power movement.
vi
  
A few important works examine the ways in which victories at the high tide of the 
civil rights movement transformed Southern communities, but not specifically on 
education. Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty is used as a lens to frame and understand 
the challenges and opportunities black Southerners faced during this transitional time 
period, and how Southern communities were transformed with regard to race, class, and 
citizenship. Black activism did not decline during this period and African Americans 
continued to challenge economic and housing discrimination in post-Jim Crow 
communities, particularly influenced by the rise of black power movements in Southern 
cities like New Orleans. Contributing to this historiography, I use school desegregation 
efforts as a lens to frame the transitions in Southern communities and examine how 
African Americans continued to challenge discrimination in public education.
vii
  
Ultimately, student activism across the state inspired direct action from parents, 
community leaders, and activists who embraced student struggles to challenge traditional 
school board electoral policies, to question the misuse of public school monies, to 
demand better instruction for students, and to contest unfair disciplinary measures. Black 
student activism formed a collective force that demanded those in power to listen. 
Students and parents used the federal, state, and local resources available to them, in the 
changing political environment of the post-Jim Crow era, to finally bring the promise of 
Brown to their communities.  
What follows, is not only a testament to the successes of those movements, but also 
the limitations faced by them. While students embraced new possibilities, they were still 
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hampered by the vestiges of Jim Crow and the constraints of a society so marred by racial 
segregation, white supremacy, and racial exploitation. The post-desegregation system 
witnessed soaring black suspension and expulsion rates, record numbers of black student 
dropouts, and lowered expectations for black student achievement. In 1954, Supreme 
Court Justice Earl Warren argued in the Brown decision that “To separate them [black 
children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”viii This is the story of how those 
children who remained separated and excluded from quality and integrated public school 
systems more than twenty years after the Brown decision carried on the fight for equal 
educational access and civil rights. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Not Separate But Not Equal: Black South Carolinians and Their Battle for 
Quality Desegregated Education After Jim Crow 
 
In 1969, black parents, supported by the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), appealed a decision by the United States Circuit Court in 
South Carolina that allowed Darlington and Greenville school districts to implement a 
Freedom of Choice desegregation plan for the 1969-1970 academic year. Freedom of 
Choice plans allowed black students in segregated school systems an opportunity to apply 
for transfer to majority-white schools and satisfied federal desegregation requirements in 
the immediate years following the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed racial 
segregation in public facilities. But in practice, Freedom of Choice plans perpetuated 
racially dual school systems by allowing only a small number of black student transfers. 
The United States Supreme Court declared ineffective Freedom of Choice Plans 
unconstitutional in Green v. New Kent County in 1968, but most school districts in South 
Carolina continued using Freedom of Choice plans to satisfy federal desegregation 
requirements until 1970. 
Sixteen years after the United States Supreme Court declared segregation 
unconstitutional in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision, five years 
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed school segregation, and a year 
after the United States Supreme Court declared ineffective Freedom of Choice plans 
unconstitutional in Green v. New Kent County (1968), Darlington County operated a 
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Freedom of Choice plan that only allowed 4 percent of its black students to attend 
desegregated schools; Greenville’s plan allowed 7 percent.ix Merely 26 percent of black 
students attended desegregated schools statewide.
x
 In response to appeals from black 
parents, on January 19, 1970 the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
the state’s nominal desegregation efforts and demanded the implementation of full and 
immediate school desegregation in Darlington and Greenville by February 9, 1970. The 
Court ordered all of South Carolina’s public school districts to follow by the start of the 
next academic year.
xi
  
When the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Darlington and Greenville 
school districts, it required them to implement desegregation plans created by federal 
officials from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), an organization 
that regulated southern school desegregation following the 1964 Civil Rights Act. While 
some protest emerged in Greenville, which had a 20 percent black student population, 
Darlington County’s white community violently protested HEW’s desegregation plan, 
which assigned a 47 percent black and 53 percent white student ratio in all of the 
district’s schools-- a percentage that accurately reflected the racial makeup of the 
county’s student population. As the February 9 deadline for total desegregation 
approached, white residents in Darlington enrolled their children in private academies 
and staged multiple Freedom of Choice rallies, including a Mothers March for Freedom 
of Choice. Once schools desegregated in early February, white parents in the town of 
Lamar acted in the tradition of southern massive resistance campaigns established after 
Brown and boycotted Darlington County’s public schools, refusing to go back until 
officials reinstated Freedom of Choice.
xii
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At the time of Darlington’s desegregation order, Lieutenant Governor John West, a 
Democrat and racial moderate, and his Republican opponent Congressman Albert 
Watson, the first Republican elected to congress from South Carolina since 
Reconstruction, were in the heat of South Carolina’s 1970 gubernatorial race. The Fourth 
Circuit Court’s controversial desegregation order quickly engulfed the candidate’s 
platforms, placing race and school integration as top issues in their campaigns. Watson, a 
staunch segregationist supported by President Richard Nixon and Strom Thurmond, a 
South Carolina senator who opposed civil rights legislation and left the Democratic Party 
after Democratic President Lyndon Johnson helped pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
vigorously denounced federal desegregation policy and accused West of sacrificing local 
control and states’ rights for the benefits of black bloc voting in the wake of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act. West insisted that South Carolina had to follow federal law and honor 
federal desegregation policy, portraying himself as “a good man,” and a New South 
Democrat who endorsed interracial cooperation, moderation, and responsibility.
xiii
  
In late February of 1970, amidst widespread community backlash towards 
desegregation, Albert Watson gave a campaign speech at a “Freedom of Choice” rally in 
Lamar, a small agricultural community located in Darlington County. Watson called for 
Lamar citizens to defy court orders and fight school integration at all costs. He compared 
the fight of Lamar segregationists to the revolutionaries in the American Revolutionary 
War, and said that the nation’s forbears “were men who did not give up without 
fighting.”xiv Watson quoted the South Carolina state motto, Dum Spiro Spero (While I 
breathe I hope.), and criticized the federal government for getting involved in what he 
considered a states’ rights issue. He assured the crowd that he was working with them to 
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end the federal intrusion of the South. “Every section of this state is in for it,” warned 
Watson, “unless you stand up and use every means at your disposal to defend against 
what I consider an illegal order of the Circuit Court of the United States…right is on your 
side.”xv 
A few days later, on March 3, a mob of 200 white residents in Lamar, mostly farmers 
and factory workers, blocked the path of two school busses carrying 32 black elementary 
and high school students to the newly desegregated Lamar High School. After stopping 
the buses, the white mob attacked it with axe handles, chains, bricks, and sharpened 
screw drivers. Women in the crowd pulled wires loose from the engine while men rocked 
the bus and turned it over. They threw bricks through the windows, injuring several black 
children, and pummeled the outside of the bus with clubs. School officials worked to get 
all of the students off of the bus before the crowd overturned it, but several children 
received injuries, including bruises, cuts, and some had glass in their eyes.
xvi
  
Several United States marshals at the scene of the riot took no action to protect the 
black children attacked because “they were there as observers.”xvii State police from 
South Carolina’s Law Enforcement Division (SLED) on the scene initially avoided 
involvement in the attack because they wanted to circumvent a violent confrontation with 
the angry mob, but eventually intervened. Tense moments passed and each side leveled 
guns at one another. Lamar High School’s principal said that “for about 35 minutes it was 
hotter out there on that school ground than in Vietnam.”xviii One white Lamar resident 
fired a shot, and several rioters struck South Carolina officers with rocks. SLED officers 
eventually used tear gas to disperse the crowd.
xix
 Darlington school district officials 
cancelled Lamar’s schools for three days following the riot and Governor McNair 
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remarked that the incident was “unspeakable.”xx When schools reopened, state national 
guardsmen, helicopters, and 125 police officers with shotguns turned back another 55 
white protesters marching toward the school after classes started.
xxi
 State police arrested 
15 men following the Lamar riots and a Darlington County jury eventually convicted 3 
men for inciting the riot.
xxii
 
In the aftermath of the violence in Lamar, Democratic Governor Robert McNair and 
Lieutenant Governor West blamed Watson, who McNair argued “helped create the type 
of dangerous and inflammatory public attitude which makes such an act possible.”xxiii 
McNair accused Thurmond and Watson, along with other newly aligned Republicans 
who abandoned the Democratic Party in the aftermath of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, of 
disrespecting law and authority and threatening the stability and progress of South 
Carolina. Watson rebutted by blaming the riot on the frustrations of white parents whose 
concerns went unheard by the McNair administration. As the gubernatorial race neared 
its end, the South Carolina Democrats fashioned themselves as the party who enforced 
federal mandates and embraced an interracial New South agenda, while the Republicans 
launched the last overtly segregationist campaign for the governor’s mansion in South 
Carolina’s history.xxiv  
A majority of African Americans in South Carolina supported state Democrats as 
their best option for political leadership, but events during McNair’s governorship, 
namely the Orangeburg Massacre, indicated that racial discrimination still permeated the 
state’s legal and political systems. In 1968, nine South Carolina Highway Patrol officers 
in Orangeburg fired into a crowd of peaceful black student protesters at South Carolina 
State College, a historically black institution, killing three unarmed black students and 
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injuring twenty-eight more. After the incident, officials in the state government, including 
Governor McNair, denied state responsibility and promulgated false information about 
the massacre, insisting that black students had weapons and fired on SLED officers 
prompting the attack. A South Carolina federal grand jury acquitted the state troopers 
charged with shooting the students, and nobody ever accepted responsibility for killing 
three innocent black students in Orangeburg.
xxv
Instead, authorities charged and convicted 
a black South Carolina native and activist with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), Cleveland Sellers, for inciting a riot.
xxvi
  
As Robert McNair’s governorship came to an end, South Carolinians elected 
Lieutenant Governor John West as his predecessor. West captured 51.7 percent of the 
vote statewide, but received 90 percent of votes cast by African Americans, who 
represented 25 percent of the total number of votes cast in the state. Albert Watson 
received 58 percent of the white vote but no notable African American support. West and 
his supporters viewed his 1970 gubernatorial victory as a repudiation of divisive, racial 
politics, and believed his election symbolized a turning point in South Carolina history 
and race relations. In his inaugural address, January 19, 1971, West declared, “―we can, 
and we shall, in the next four years eliminate from our government any vestige of 
discrimination because of race, creed, sex, religion, or any other barriers to fairness for all 
citizens. We pledge minority groups no special status other than full-fledged 
responsibility in a government that is totally color-blind.”xxvii West promised that his 
administration would eliminate hunger, improve housing and health care for all South 
Carolinians, no matter their race. To help fulfill this promise he created the state‘s Human 
Affairs Commission, which sought to “to promote harmonious relationships among the 
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citizens of this state,” and also became the first South Carolina governor in over a century 
to appoint an African-American to an official state position when he named James E. 
Clyburn assistant to the governor for Human Resource Development.
xxviii
  
On the surface, the 1970s held great promise for African Americans in South 
Carolina. For the first time in the state’s history, all of South Carolina’s public schools 
opened on a totally desegregated basis in the Fall of 1970. South Carolina’s governor 
promised to end racial discrimination in the government, and African Americans 
harnessed substantial voting power for the first time since Reconstruction. But South 
Carolina’s recent past, including The Orangeburg Massacre, the riot in Lamar, and white 
resistance to desegregation in every South Carolina school district in the state, indicated 
that deep-seated attitudes of white supremacy were so hardwired and embedded into the 
state’ attitudes, practices, and identity that vestiges of Jim Crow remained firmly 
entrenched in South Carolina’s political and social systems. While desegregation 
occurred across the state, racial equality would be much harder for African Americans to 
achieve.  
John West’s victory did not signal the end of massive resistance to desegregation by 
white South Carolinians, but instead served as a testament to the transformative power of 
1960s federal civil rights legislation, achieved at the apex of America’s civil rights 
movement, on communities across the South.
xxix
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proved to 
be the most important piece of federal legislation for advancing the desegregation of 
public schools; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act empowered the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to withhold federal funds from school districts that 
practiced overt segregation and became the mechanism by which the federal government 
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could force states to desegregate. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 opened the doors for 
black voting and political power in the state by prohibiting racial discrimination in voting 
practices by the federal, state, and local governments and specifically banned the use of 
literacy tests and poll tax registrations. The Act also provided federal registrars in many 
communities across the South to enforce new federal voting rights for blacks and other 
minorities. In South Carolina, African American voter registration jumped 37.2 percent 
because of the Voting Rights Act. In 1958 South Carolina only registered 58,000 black 
voters, but by 1967 the state registered over 220,000.
xxx
 Before 1965, only 37.3 percent 
of black citizens registered to vote, compared to 76 percent of whites, but by the 1988, 56 
percent of blacks registered compared to 61 percent of whites.
xxxi
   
The Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act equipped black South Carolinians with 
the tools needed to more effectively engage white segregationists, but by no means 
signaled that the battle for racial equality and access to public education was over. 
Desegregation in the state, particularly in public schools, did not occur easily and the 
state’s public schools quickly emerged as a battleground in the post-Jim Crow era 
between white communities who worked to maintain South Carolina’s dual education 
system, and black communities who relentlessly fought for educational access. Even 
though most school districts in the state met federal civil rights standards and retained 
federal funding, many white school district officials found ways to manipulate or 
circumvent new federal regulations. Federal and state authorities were not prepared to 
handle the many problems that emerged in South Carolina’s schools following 
desegregation, and did not have the laws, policies, or political gumption to adequately 
deal with post-desegregation obstructions.  
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The first generation of black students attending totally desegregated schools faced 
numerous difficulties. Most school districts in South Carolina closed majority-black 
schools to achieve desegregation and enrolled black students into previously all-white 
institutions that disrespected the history and identity of former majority-black 
institutions. Desegregated schools often kept mascots and school colors of historically 
white institutions, which embittered many black students who felt discounted and 
unsupported in the desegregated system. Extra-curricular activities and student councils 
often excluded black students, and student homecoming courts, often appointed by school 
administrations after total school desegregation, were frequently all-white, even in 
majority-black schools. Districts compounded black student and community frustrations 
when they fired and demoted scores of black teachers, administrators, and coaches, 
replacing them for less qualified white candidates.  From 1967-1969, South Carolina 
experienced a loss of 221 black teaches, approximately 20 percent of black teachers in 
the state, but gained 366 white educators.
xxxii
  In addition, desegregated districts often had 
few black counselors to help black students adjust to the changes that total desegregation 
produced. 
Southern school districts tracked black students into lower level academic classes, 
which promoted segregated classrooms and racial isolation within newly desegregated 
schools. HEW allowed racially identifiable classrooms if districts used standardized test 
scores to validate student placements. Edgefield County school district, home to Strom 
Thurmond, even tried to create an “experimental school” for students with low 
standardized test scores for the 1970—1971 academic year. The district, which enrolled a 
65 percent black student population, assigned 1300 students to the special school, all of 
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which were black. When HEW rejected the plan, the school revised its design so that 
only 75 percent of the 1300 students assigned were black, which HEW accepted. 
Throughout the ordeal, black parents advised their students to refuse any standardized 
test given to them by the district, and despite school district claims of below average 
black standardized test scores, only 19 percent of black students in the district ever took 
the test. To prevent the implementation of the experimental school, black parents initiated 
a school walkout and subsequent boycott that was 100 percent effective in the black 
community. Only when the school district agreed to abandon plans for the remedial 
school did the black community end their boycott.
xxxiii
  
 Black students endured harsher discipline policies in desegregated public schools. 
Black suspensions and expulsions dominated post-Jim Crow school discipline procedures 
so much so that the South Carolina legislature had to pass the 1973 School Discipline 
Law to regulate this post-desegregation phenomenon. In 1973, the Children’s Defense 
Fund, a national child advocacy organization, found that black secondary students were 
suspended more than three times as often as white students after desegregation, and that 
black females were suspended four times as often as white females. The same study 
found that 13 percent of black students in South Carolina were suspended at least once 
during the 1973-74 school year, compared to 8 percent of white students. South Carolina 
students lost 147,202 days of school during the 1973-1974 academic year because of 
suspensions and expulsions, and students affected were not allowed to makeup missed 
academic coursework, including exams.
xxxiv
 
A private school movement also took root in South Carolina following desegregation. 
Many white students in majority-black school districts abandoned South Carolina’s 
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desegregated schools. Before 1964, South Carolina had 15 private schools, mostly 
parochial, with just over 15,000 students. Between 1964 and 1974, 134 private academies 
opened in South Carolina, 131 of them segregated, and private enrollment jumped to over 
47,000 students. In 1979, approximately 54,000 students, 8 percent of South Carolina’s 
school aged population, attended private schools.
xxxv
 Despite the abandonment of public 
schools by many white residents across the state, white school boards maintained control 
of the state’s schools. In 1970, of the 388 members of county school boards in South 
Carolina, 12 were black.
xxxvi
 White school boards often funneled public resources into 
newly established all-white private segregation academies and misused school resources 
and federal funds intended to help the desegregation process. Majority-white school 
boards of majority-black student districts neglected their district schools, were less likely 
to establish Parent Teacher Committees, enforce Compulsory Attendance Laws, provide 
free breakfast programs for their students, and more likely to misuse federal funds 
granted to impoverished districts through the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act.
xxxvii
   
These injustices signaled to many black residents that though great victories had been 
achieved through civil rights activism in previous decades, that the battle to achieve equal 
educational opportunity and civil rights for African Americans was far from over. In the 
face of white resistance, black South Carolinians, civil rights activists, and a myriad of 
civil rights organizations once again inherited the burden of ensuring that their local and 
state governments implemented federally mandated desegregation regulations. From 
1969-1979, black student protests emerged in communities across the state, including 
Columbia, Charleston, Rock Hill, Fort Mill, Greenwood, Ridgeville, Calhoun, Bowman, 
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Laurens, Greenville, Williston, Hartsville, Florence, Marion, Union, Newberry, Sumter, 
and Lexington, among others. Students worked through various civil rights organizations 
including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC) and boycotted classes for periods lasting from a few days to 
several months, presented grievances to their school boards, filed letters of complaint 
with the Office of Civil Rights and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
wrote letters to the Governor and South Carolina General Assembly, and used local, state, 
and national media outlets to demand that school boards meet their grievances.  
School desegregation and continued civil rights protest in South Carolina’s public 
schools emerged at a time when South Carolina legislators and politicians put great 
emphasis on improving its public schools in order to protect its economic future. But 
when West took office, the state had chronically high drop-out rates; on average, 50 
percent of students who started school in the 1950s and 1960s never graduated high 
school. In 1970, over 20,000 black adults and 13,500 whites in the state over 25 had 
never even been to school. Twelve percent of the state’s adult population in 1970 
received less than five years of schooling, ranking South Carolina 48th in the nation for 
its educational reach.
xxxviii
 Per pupil expenditure and teacher salaries in South Carolina 
ranked below most states and were 25 percent under the national average.
xxxix
  
West worked hard to expand the state’s economy, build industry, and improve public 
education, arguing that education reform and expansion of educational opportunity were 
essential steps for the South’s post-civil rights growth. But white resistance to 
desegregation hindered West’s efforts to improve the state’s schools. While many white 
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students fled the state’s schools, black dropout levels soared. In 1970 alone, the state 
witnessed 25,000 student dropouts, 90 percent of which were black.
xl
 Boycotts waged by 
black students also took students out of classrooms, deterring their learning opportunities. 
As school boards around the state seemed to be falling short of their responsibilities to 
provide quality education to all of their students, state involvement increased as never 
before in local school district policy. By the late 1970s, South Carolina legislation 
regulated almost every component of education previously left to the jurisdiction of local 
school boards. The Educator Improvement Act of 1979 set new standards for teacher 
evaluation and certification, the Basic Skills Assessment Act of 1979 set new state 
curriculum standards, the Student Discipline Law of 1973 regulated school district 
discipline policy, and the Human Affairs Commission required those school boards 
whose students protested to publish their standards and policies. The Education Finance 
Act 1977 also transformed the state’s school funding policy.xli 
 The Federal government’s reach also expanded following the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which set new federal standards for southern school systems by outlawing racial 
discrimination in any activity or program that received financial support from the Federal 
Government. In addition, the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA), and Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), both of which channeled large 
amounts of federal funds to Southern school districts to aid in the desegregation process, 
greatly increased the power of federal oversight in local school district policy. The 
federal government used federal aid funds to implement federal oversight into school 
policy that before 1970 had only been regulated by individual school boards.  
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Black community activism and local civil rights organizations took advantage of 
growing state and federal oversight, and contributed to new policies by providing 
accounts of the post-Jim Crow problems and discriminatory policies they faced on the 
ground. Often, black South Carolinians worked through advocacy groups, such as the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organization that promoted civil 
rights activism and social justice, to communicate post-desegregation impediments with 
state and federal organizations. Federal oversight committees and organizations also 
evaluated desegregation policies based on the experiences of local black communities, 
and revised policies and procedures to ensure that local school districts met the desired 
intentions of those regulations. HEW altered their desegregation guidelines in response to 
white resistance in 1966, and Congress changed its guidelines for receiving ESEA and 
ESAA funds in the early 1970s after many districts received funds while manipulating 
federal desegregation policy. HEW’s Office of Civil Rights also reconfigured policies to 
block federal funds from districts that used discriminatory discipline policies after the full 
force of black suspension and expulsion numbers came to light. 
Civil rights victories secured through the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting 
Rights Act equipped African Americans with the resources to fight racial discrimination 
and Jim Crow, but by no means ended the struggle for civil rights and equal educational 
access in South Carolina. The arduous and necessary struggles of black students, parents, 
and community activists in the aftermath of 1960s civil rights legislation are a vital 
component to American and civil rights history, but in many ways, have been 
overshadowed by the victories achieved in the apex of America’s civil rights movement. 
Civil rights activists transformed post-Jim Crow society in the American South, 
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particularly public education, by asserting pressure on local school boards, the South 
Carolina Department of Education and General Assembly, and federal organizations such 
as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to not only meet federal mandates, 
but develop new ones to combat emerging post-desegregation discriminatory trends. 
African American students, parents, and activists of the 1970s built on the legacy of black 
civil rights activism, established from the early twentieth century in South Carolina and 
across the South, and employed direct action protest and organizing, waged court battles, 
risked their jobs, and put their academic futures on the line, all to demand quality, 
integrated public education in South Carolina. Black South Carolinians achieved some 
successes and also witnessed many setbacks, but they continued to fight, placing quality 
education at the center of that struggle. 
 
Background 
On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren delivered the 
unanimous ruling in the landmark civil rights case Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka Kansas, which held that state-sanctioned segregation in public schools violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and declared segregated 
education unconstitutional. This historic decision overturned the legality of the "separate 
but equal" doctrine, established by the 1896 Supreme Court decision, Plessy v. Ferguson. 
The NAACP constructed Brown from five separate school equality cases that originated 
throughout the South and its bordering states, including Briggs v. Elliot (1952), which 
began in Clarendon County, South Carolina. At the time of the suit, South Carolina 
public schools spent three times as much on white students than on black students, and 
23 
 
ten of forty-six counties in South Carolina had no accredited high schools for African 
Americans. Three in four black South Carolinians received less than an elementary 
education and 62 percent of African Americans in the state were totally or functionally 
illiterate.
xlii
 
Within months after the Brown ruling, the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) sponsored petitions around the South demanding that 
previously all-white schools admit black students. In June of 1955, NAACP leaders met 
in Atlanta and authorized local activists and branches to file petitions and suits against 
school districts that refused to enroll black students. The South Carolina NAACP and the 
all-black Palmetto Teachers Association mobilized to support those suits, raising money, 
providing legal services, and demanding that school officials initiate the process of 
school desegregation. South Carolina lawyers, including Matthew Perry, the NAACP’s 
leading attorney in the state, drafted petitions throughout the state’s school systems 
demanding that local school districts desegregate.
xliii
  
Petitions for school desegregation evoked great hostility in white communities across 
the South. Many black petitioners lost jobs, saw credit vanish at local banks and lenders, 
and faced violence and terror. In reaction to black organizing for school desegregation 
and voter registration, white Southerners launched campaigns of violence and terror 
towards African Americans. In Mississippi, white residents killed four black men in the 
summer of 1955, including one in broad daylight on a courthouse lawn, with no 
repercussions or convictions. In August of 1955, two white men in Mississippi also 
brutally murdered fourteen-year old Emmett Till for allegedly whistling at a white 
woman. Though they admitted abducting Till, an all-white jury found them “not-guilty.” 
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This atmosphere of violence set the stage for organized massive resistance to 
desegregation and growing civil rights activism across the South and fashioned a political 
mood ripe for the formation of White Citizens’ Councils (WCC).xliv  
Initially established in Mississippi in July of 1954, Citizens’ Councils stormed the 
South in reaction to Brown. WCC chapters formed a loose confederation based in 
Mississippi called the Citizens’ Councils of America (CCA), and distributed Council 
propaganda, produced and disseminated a radio program to stations throughout the South, 
and arranged for pro-segregation speakers to attend rallies in Southern communities. The 
Councils provided a respectable organization and framework for white protests in South 
Carolina, whose first branch was established in Orangeburg County in August of 1955, 
following a school desegregation petition launched by black parents. Councils soon 
spread to almost every community in the state.
xlv
 
White Citizens’ Councils received wide support from South Carolina’s political elite 
including state politicians, Lieutenant Governor Ernest Hollings, and business leaders. A 
series of front page editorials in the Charleston News and Courier, written by Thomas R. 
Waring, called on all white South Carolinians to lend their support to the Citizens’ 
Councils and engage in mass protest against forced desegregation from the federal 
government. Waring portrayed Council Members as respectable and prestigious citizens 
who endorsed law and order, unlike members of other white supremacy organizations 
such as the Ku Klux Klan. Despite their claims, violence towards African Americans 
increased in the state as WCC membership grew. In addition, the WCC applied fierce 
economic reprisals against anyone who supported the civil rights movement, the 
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NAACP, or school desegregation, particularly those who signed school desegregation 
petitions.
xlvi
 
Not only did African Americans have to face white resistance to school desegregation 
in the form of Citizens’ Councils, they also had to battle new South Carolina laws 
established to obstruct desegregation by its General Assembly. Reacting to Brown, in 
March of 1955, the General Assembly repealed the state’s compulsory attendance law, 
providing white parents the authority to keep their children out of desegregated public 
schools. The following month, the Assembly passed a law to revoke state funding from 
any school that desegregated and ended the practice of automatically rehiring teachers for 
the next academic year. In 1956, the Assembly passed the Pupil Placement Act, giving 
districts the authority to assign students to their respective schools, and established a 
complex system of appeal procedure for anyone wishing to appeal a student’s placement. 
Only after all procedures had been exhausted could anyone file suit against a district.
xlvii
  
The result of newly passed South Carolina laws placed more power in the hands of 
local white officials and limited the effectiveness of black activism and newly interpreted 
federal desegregation standards. The changes in teacher employment rules gave school 
boards around the state more control over who taught in their districts’ classrooms, and 
the state’s threat to revoke funding ensured that whites would blame integration-minded 
white moderates and African Americans if their local school closed because of a lack of 
money. In addition, state officials and local officials targeted teachers, students, and 
college professors that supported desegregation.   
Though Brown set off a chain of massive resistance to desegregation around the 
South, African American students, parents, and civil rights leaders continued to fight for 
26 
 
equal educational opportunities. In South Carolina, teachers lost their jobs when they 
refused to repudiate the NAACP and its desegregation efforts. In the early 1960s, 
NAACP activists continued to file school desegregation petitions across the state, 
including appeals to colleges and universities. In May 1962, black parents filed suits to 
desegregate Charleston and Darlington Counties, followed by one to desegregate 
Greenville School District in 1963.  
 By 1963, Charleston’s desegregation suit progressed through federal courts, and 
Judge Robert Martin of the United States Fourth Circuit Court ordered that all eleven 
students whose parents filed the suit be accepted immediately for the start of the 1963-
1964 academic year. On September 3, 1963, Charleston School District 20 became the 
first school district in the state to desegregate.
xlviii
 The following year, Martin also 
ordered Greenville County to desegregate.
xlix
 By 1965, eleven South Carolina school 
districts allowed token desegregation in their school districts and approximately 200 
black students attended previously all-white schools. In addition, in January of 1963, the 
United States Fourth Circuit Court ordered Clemson College to accept Harvey Gantt, 
making Clemson the first segregated public college or university in the state, and federal 
courts ordered the University of South Carolina to admit three black students the 
following semester.
l
 
In 1964, the Civil Rights Act provided great impetus to the efforts of black activists 
and parents working to desegregate South Carolina schools. The legislation created new 
federal standards for southern school systems by outlawing racial discrimination in any 
activity or program that received financial support from the Federal Government. Title VI 
of the legislation mandated that school districts eliminate discrimination from 
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classrooms, services to pupils, educational facilities, and the hiring and assignment of 
faculty. The Civil Rights Act also gave the Justice Department power to bring federal 
desegregation suits against school districts and empowered the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to terminate federal funds if districts maintained segregated 
facilities. The latter provision gained further strength with the passage of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, which channeled large amounts of federal funds to 
Southern school districts. In 1965, the federal government granted the State of South 
Carolina over four million dollars ($4,003,400) to fund education programs throughout 
the state. By 1968, the amount had swelled to just under forty million ($39,182,372).
li
    
HEW worked to regulate federal desegregation policies in local Southern school 
districts, pressuring them to meet new federal guidelines for public education. In April 
1965, HEW published its first set of desegregation guidelines for the 1965-1966 year, 
called the General Statement of Policies, which set minimum standards for desegregation 
plans of schools applying for federal financial aid.
lii
   
The General Statement of Policies allowed three types of desegregation plans: 
plans providing for freedom of choice, plans creating geographic attendance areas, or 
plans that combined both. Freedom of Choice plans usually provided that students could 
choose any school within their system, while Geographic Attendance areas zoned 
students according to the proximity of the closest grade-appropriate school. The General 
Statement also required that school districts take steps toward the elimination of teacher 
and staff segregation. In addition, desegregation plans had to stop discrimination in 
transportation facilities, activities, and programs sponsored by affiliated school programs. 
HEW urged school boards to take actions to prepare teachers and students for 
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desegregation, and required school districts to publish desegregation plans in a 
conspicuous manner in local newspapers and media outlets.
liii
 
Yet, the Office of Education, which was part of HEW at the time and not a 
separate Cabinet agency until 1980, was ill-equipped to oversee and enforce 
desegregation efforts throughout the South. In April 1965, the Office of Education had 
the massive task of determining whether almost five thousand school districts in the 
South alone, each unique, were in compliance with the standards adopted in Title VI. 
With only seventy-five employees, the Office of Education evaluated assurances of 
compliance, judged the accessibility of desegregation plans, and determined if each 
district was meeting its regulations. In addition, HEW had the major task of persuading 
many resisting districts to comply with standards.  HEW preferred to achieve compliance 
without terminating funds. The staff of the Office of Education worked tirelessly to bring 
resistant districts in accordance with federal law, and as a result, by January 3, 1966, 98 
percent of the 4,941 districts in the south met desegregation standards on paper. Yet, 
HEW accepted many orders and plans as compliant, without any field investigations, 
basing their conclusions solely on information provided by school boards and 
administrators.
liv
 
Many Southern school districts applied Freedom of Choice plans to their districts, 
which automatically registered students in the schools that they attended under the 
segregated system. Students could choose to attend the school of their choice within their 
specific school district, provided that their parents specifically requested a transfer. 
Allowing students to attend the school of their choice created the potential for successful 
desegregation, but the stipulation that parents specifically request a transfer meant that 
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black parents once again inherited the burden of challenging a white-dominated system. 
In addition, many school districts made attaining transfer status difficult. Districts 
purposely made requesting transfer confusing and intimidating, and often did not 
publicize the transfer process. School districts only accepted transfers for a limited time 
period, and even when parents sent in requests according to regulation, they were often 
denied by school boards.
lv
 
In March 1966, in response to minimally successful desegregation efforts around 
the South, HEW issued new desegregation regulations for Southern school districts, 
called the Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These regulations replaced the initial set of HEW 
guidelines, and federal officials hoped these revised standards would promote a more 
effective desegregation process. The Revised Guidelines stated that Freedom of Choice 
plans had to be meaningful and had to result in higher percentages of desegregation. In 
addition, desegregation in Southern school districts now required faculty desegregation, 
which had only been recommended in the previous guidelines. Lastly, the school district 
could not deny a black student transfer to a white school, unless the school faced 
overcrowding. If a chosen school was over capacity in enrollment, then the District was 
obligated to zone all students who wanted to go to the school by proximity to the school, 
not race.
lvi
   
Specific federal desegregation regulations developed by HEW ensured that 
federal courts had precise requirements and regulations to battle school districts resistant 
to desegregation. In the first three years following the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme 
Court stayed surprisingly silent on the law’s implementation, but starting in 1968, the 
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Supreme Court embarked on a series of decisions that extended the reach of new federal 
regulations and also placed more of the burden of achieving desegregation on local 
school boards. In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled in Green v. School Board of New Kent 
County that Freedom of Choice plans would no longer satisfy federal desegregation 
standards.  Instead, desegregation plans would be judged by their outcome, which shifted 
federal compliance standards from simply providing a plan "to ensur[ing] racial balance 
in schools." In this way, the US Supreme Court Justices, which included chief justice Earl 
Warren, who presided over Brown v. Board, and Thurgood Marshall, who represented the 
NAACP in Brown, aligned with HEW’s 1966 Revised Guidelines. The "Green" factors 
used to determine whether a desegregation plan met federal standards included the ratio 
of black to white students and faculty, absolute equality in facilities, transportation, and 
extracurricular activities. In the Green ruling, The Supreme Court insisted on 
immediately destroying segregated schools "root and branch," which also hastened the 
pace of change.
lvii
  
Building off of Green’s momentum, in 1969, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected a request from the Justice Department and HEW to allow extensions for 
desegregation in 33 Mississippi school districts. In Alexander v. Holmes, Justice Hugo 
Black wrote that "'all deliberate speed' has turned out to be only a soft euphemism for 
delay." He therefore stated that "there is no longer the slightest excuse, reason, or 
justification for further postponement of the time when every public school system in the 
United States will be a unitary one, receiving and teaching students without 
discrimination on the basis of their race or color." This 1969 decision later buttressed the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s 1970 desegregation order for South Carolina.lviii 
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The Private School Movement 
Federally enforced desegregation in South Carolina’s public schools prompted a 
large private school movement by white residents across the state. Between 1964 and 
1972, 134 new private schools opened in South Carolina and private enrollment increased 
by more than 30,000 students. All but 3 of the 134 private schools that opened after 1964 
only allowed white students. Urban centers like Charleston and Columbia, in addition to 
many rural, majority-black districts in South Carolina’s cotton belt, experienced great 
losses in white student enrollment. Fifty percent of Charleston District 20’s white student 
population abandoned its public schools after desegregation. Between 1965 and 1975, 10 
percent of Columbia’s student population left its public schools for private, and the 
community of Columbia opened 8 additional private schools.
lix
 The rural Summerton 
School District 1, located in Clarendon County and home of the landmark Briggs v. Elliot 
(1952) suit, enrolled an 88.6 percent black student population in 1969 on the eve of 
desegregation. By the 1971-1972 academic year, the district was 99.6 percent black, 
leaving exactly one white student in the entire district. Darlington County, home to 
Lamar, enrolled a 47 percent black student population in 1969, but the black student 
population reached 54.3 percent by 1971. In Lee County, a rural county that stretched 
along the I-95 corridor, the black student population was 73 percent in 1969 but rose to 
84 percent by 1971.
lx
 
Students leaving the public school system in the state transferred to several 
different types of private academies, which varied greatly in terms of their facilities and 
the quality of education offered. Some prosperous post-integration private schools had 
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college preparatory classes and put great emphasis on small classes and individualized 
learning. The Wade Hampton Academy in Orangeburg, for example, received generous 
support from business leaders in Orangeburg and had a ten acre campus. Approximately 
600 students attended Wade Hampton in 1970, enjoying a $300,000 facility for only $300 
a year in tuition. Local churches supported many other private academies in the state. The 
segregated private school in Summerton 1, for example, had about 100 students who 
attended classes split between the education building of the First Baptist Church of 
Summerton, a nearby mobile home, and a private residence near the church. The school’s 
limited budget meant that students in 12 grades had to attend classes with only 11 full 
time teachers.
lxi
  
The South Carolina Department of Education had no real power to govern private 
school enrollment, though they argued that the General Assembly should pass a set of 
minimum standards for private and public schools in the state.  The South Carolina 
Superintendent of Education during the desegregation process, Cyril Busbee, once joked, 
“All you have to do to open a private school in South Carolina is to have a spare 
stable.”lxii In 1974, the state of South Carolina reinstated its Compulsory Attendance 
Law, which the General Assembly had revoked in 1955 to provide white parents the 
authority to keep their children out of desegregated public schools following the Brown 
decision. The reestablished Compulsory Attendance Law allowed the South Carolina 
Department of Education minimal power to determine if a child met compulsory 
attendance standards in private schools, but granted no regulatory power over private 
schools. No system of mandatory communication existed between private schools and the 
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state department. In fact, the state department sometimes wrote to public school district 
superintendents in order to get information on area private schools.
lxiii
 
The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), the regional 
accreditation agency for South Carolina’s public schools, only accredited 8 private 
schools in South Carolina, all of which were established prior to 1964. The segregationist 
South Carolina Independent School Association (SCISA) quickly became the leading 
private school association and accreditation agency for South Carolina following 
desegregation, which mandated a rudimentary library program, basic math, science, an 
arts program, and required all teachers had to have 2 years of college experience. SCISA 
had its own team that traveled around the country evaluating and inspecting member 
schools. Founded on August 10, 1965 with 7 member academies, by 1969, SCISA had 15 
accredited private schools, and by 1976, the Association had 70 member schools.
lxiv
 Only 
1 of the 8 schools accredited by SACS was a member of the SCISA. Some other smaller 
regulatory agencies in South Carolina included the Southern Association of Independent 
Schools and South Carolina Association of Christian Schools.
lxv
  
Many private segregationist schools initially received tax-exempt or 
eleemosynary status, granted by the United States Internal Revenue Service. By 
qualifying as an eleemosynary institution, private schools paid no federal tax, and 
corporate and private donors of the school could contribute donations to the school on a 
tax-deductible status. The IRS required only a statement of non-discrimination to qualify, 
with no regard to the actual racial composition of the school applying. As early as 1967, 
the Civil Rights Commission, a bipartisan, independent commission of the U.S. federal 
government, argued that tax-exempt benefits to segregationist schools were a violation of 
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a violation of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, which required institutions receiving tax-exempt status to be of general benefit to 
the public.  
Despite increased pressure by civil rights advocates to better regulate federal tax-
exempt benefits, the IRS rarely revoked eleemosynary status. An IRS spokesman in 
Atlanta admitted “The problem is in keeping track of all the tax-exempt organizations. 
…We know there are schools for whites only, which still have their exemptions, but we 
act only when we receive a formal complaint about them.”lxvi  In 1971, the Supreme 
Court put pressure on the IRS to more efficiently and purposely regulate segregationist 
institutions in Green v Connally, by ruling that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service code 
did not grant tax-exempt status or allow for tax deductible contributions to private 
schools that practiced racial discrimination. By 1972, the IRS issued guidelines that 
established record keeping requirements to determine whether or not a school operated on 
a segregated basis and began more seriously policing private segregationist academies.
lxvii
  
In late 1971, the IRS launched a federal investigation into 19 SCISA schools and 
advised them to open up their facilities to all racial backgrounds to prevent losing their 
tax-exempt status. Many private segregationist academies established after 1971 in South 
Carolina, like Darlington and Lake Swamp Academy, declined application for tax-
exempt status as a result. Many who initially applied for tax-exempt status also 
considered voluntarily dropping the privilege, to prevent “federal intrusion” into the 
regulation of their school.
lxviii
 In 1971, private school supporters from several 
communities including Beaufort, Florence, and Orangeburg, and state Senator George 
Grice of Charleston, traveled to Washington D.C. to consult with Harry S. Dent, former 
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political strategist for Strom Thurmond and presidential aide to Richard Nixon. The 
group discussed the problem of tax-exempt status facing segregated private schools in 
South Carolina. Parents also met with Johnnie Walters, the Greenville native who headed 
the IRS, about the best strategy for private schools seeking to maintain segregated 
standards.
lxix
 
Despite their lobbying efforts, the IRS pursued its investigation of SCISA 
schools. Senator Marion Gressette, who led the South Carolina General Assembly in its 
efforts to preserve segregated education in the state, chairing the state’s Segregation 
Committee from 1951 to 1966, and president pro-tempore of the Senate, provided legal 
representation to the schools in a private capacity throughout the ordeal. Despite private 
school support from powerful members of the state and federal government, 19 schools 
affiliated with the SCISA lost tax-exempt status on March 1, 1972. Notwithstanding their 
revoked status, in 1973, almost thirty private segregationist academies in South Carolina 
still claimed eleemosynary status, but did not maintain full compliance with IRS 
standards.
lxx
 Only 2 of the 19 schools who had their eleemosynary status revoked in 1972 
closed as a result.
lxxi
 
Most private segregationist schools received continued tax-exempt status from the 
state and local governments in South Carolina in the 1970s. In 1971, more than 10,000 
tax exempt or eleemosynary corporations existed in South Carolina, with very little 
regulation by the South Carolina Tax Commission. Once organizations filed tax-exempt 
status, the state required no continuing documentation to maintain their status. In 1972, 
for example, state officials discovered a topless nightclub in Columbia, known as the 
Green Olive, had been operating under tax-exempt status from 1968-1971.
lxxii
 After 
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growing concern that many non-profits were abusing their standing, the General 
Assembly passed a law in 1973 that required eleemosynary organizations to file an 
annual report accompanied by a $10 licensing fee, but less than 10 percent of 
eleemosynary organizations complied, and the state did little to enforce the statute.
lxxiii
  
Segregation academies also usually escaped county property taxes. According to 
state law, when an institution sought county tax exempt status, the state had to grant a 
special statute to specifically exempt the corporation in question. A handful of private 
schools established county tax exempt status through such statutes, but most private 
schools paid no property taxes at all, even when statutes had not been issued. Local tax 
assessors and county tax boards, responsible for enforcing local private school tax, did 
very little to monitor local tax regulations. Heyward Belser, tax attorney and member of 
the South Carolina House of Representatives, argued that South Carolina’s collection of 
local property taxes remained the most “conspicuously underdeveloped and glaringly 
abused element in the South Carolina revenue system.”lxxivAn AFSC investigator, for 
example, found that the board responsible for regulating tax-exemptions in Orangeburg 
existed in name only.
lxxv
 South Carolina based local school district funds on local 
property tax revenue, so when county governments exempted private schools, local 
public school systems suffered. In some counties, the revenue missed from private 
academies was considerable. For instance, John Calhoun Academy in Colleton County 
owned and operated portions of residential subdivisions in addition to its school and 
neglected to pay taxes on both.
lxxvi
  
The private school movement in South Carolina had significant support from 
federal legislators, politicians, and businessmen. Frederick B. Dent, Secretary of 
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Commerce for President Richard Nixon, served on the board of the Spartanburg Day 
School in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Johnnie Walters, a Greenville native, served as 
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service and urged private school supporters in 
South Carolina to sign papers stating they maintained tax-exempt status, insinuating it 
would most likely never be checked.  J. Fred Buzhardt, former aide to Senator Strom 
Thurmond who later served as General Counsel for the Defense Department under 
Nixon, served on the board of Cambridge Academy in Greenwood, and Lester Maddox, 
former Georgia governor, participated in the opening ceremonies at Calvary Christian 
School in Greer, South Carolina. He also served on the board of trustees at Bob Jones 
University (Academy and Elementary).
lxxvii
  
The private school movement also had powerful protectors in South Carolina’s 
General Assembly. In January 1963, just weeks after federal courts ordered Clemson 
College to desegregate by accepting Harvey Gantt, legislators presented a bill to provide 
tuition grants to public school students who decided to withdraw from public schools and 
enroll in private institutions. The bill proposed that the state give parents the amount 
South Carolina spent per pupil in 1963-- $225 dollars a year for elementary school 
students and $250 for high school students.
lxxviii
  The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals eventually found the Tuition Grants Act of 1963 illegal, but the bill emphasized 
the great support for private schools in the General Assembly
lxxix
 In late 1969, the South 
Carolina legislature also approved a ten-mill school tax refund to residents of Calhoun 
County’s District 2, home to Senator Marion Gressette. Proponents of the tax refund 
argued that since all white students had withdrawn from the district’s school system, that 
the school needed fewer funds.
lxxx
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As the 1970s progressed, some members of South Carolina’s House of 
Representatives initiated laws to protect South Carolina’s public schools. Representative 
Harold Breazeale of Pickens County, became known as an advocate for public schools 
and initiated a number of bills to protect public schools and minority students, including 
the Student Discipline Law of 1973.  Despite his efforts, the Senate Education Committee 
blocked or altered many of the House’s education bills. In the 1970s, Senator James P. 
Spot Mozingo of Darlington County headed the Senate Education Committee. Darlington 
had more rural segregated private schools than any other county in the state, including 
Lamar Academy; Marion Gressette served as first vice-chairman of the Senate Education 
Committee. Ralph Gasque also served on the Committee, and was a large donor and 
contributor to the Pee Dee Academy; Gasque’s law partner was President of the Pee Dee 
Academy, outside of Marion, South Carolina.
lxxxi
 
In 1971, for instance, Breazeale introduced a measure that forbade the sale of 
public school buildings or their use by private schools for five years after their date of 
sale. The bill passed the House but never received final approval by the General 
Assembly, largely because the Senate Education Committee altered the bill to allow local 
Board of Trustees to sell buildings when they deemed it necessary, with no restraints. The 
House also proposed the Proprietary School Act in 1971, which stated that if a private 
school was not a parochial, non-profit, or denominational church school, that the 
institution would come under the control of the State Board of Education for licensing 
and supervision. The Senate Education Committee altered the list to include members of 
the South Carolina Independent Schools Association.
lxxxii
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Black residents watched public schools suffer following increased white private 
school enrollment and many worried that majority-white school boards did not have their 
children’s best interests in mind. In many South Carolina school districts, black residents 
did not even have the opportunity to elect black representatives on their county’s boards. 
South Carolina legislators often chose their district’s legislative delegations, who then 
selected their county’s school boards and controlled school district finances and millage 
rates. In 1973, of 38 South Carolina counties with “substantial” black populations, only 7 
actually had publicly elected school boards. Even if members of legislative delegations 
did not have direct involvement in the private school movement, if they lived in 
communities with large private school support, they were subject to heavy pressures from 
white residents who adamantly opposed millage increases that were not spent on their 
children.
lxxxiii
  
Hayes Mizell, director of the South Carolina Community Relations Program, 
established by the American Friends Service Committee in 1966 to advocate for minority 
students in the state’s public schools, wrote Governor John West about his concern over 
majority-white school boards supporting private schools. According to South Carolina 
law, West technically had the last say in the appointments of county delegations and had 
to approve and confirm all county legislative delegations and county school board 
members. Mizell argued that West should remove any members participating in the 
private school movement, but Governor West argued he did not have the legal authority. 
“School board members should have no interest in any private school nor should they 
send their children to private schools,” he told Mizell, but he had no choice but to appoint 
such individuals to school board posts if they were recommended by their county’s 
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legislative delegation.
lxxxiv
 Mizell, angered by West’s response, continued to file 
complaints regarding unethical private school activity to the Office of Civil Rights, 
including the sale of public school buildings to private school boards, the use of public 
school resources and equipment by private schools, and the hiring of public school 
teachers and administrators who sent their children to private schools.
lxxxv
 
When majority-white boards controlled majority-black public systems, theft and 
misuse of public facilities by private students often occurred. A number of districts 
reported the transfer of buildings and real-estate from public schools to private, in 
addition to transfers of books, audiovisual equipment, and athletic equipment. In 
Clarendon 1, Orangeburg 2, Sumter 2, and Dorchester 3, audiovisual aids and other 
instrumental devices disappeared and later turned up at their respective community’s 
private school. A black teacher in Holy Hill reported that Holy Hill Academy used 
exercise mats and a number of books from the county’s high school, but school 
authorities claimed that the materials were donated by white residents before 
desegregation, and therefore did not belong to the public school system. Two black 
janitors in Bowman delivered two trucks of equipment from the public high school to the 
town’s private academy, though they were not told what materials the trucks 
contained.
lxxxvi
 
Another post-desegregation phenomenon involved the transfer of public school 
buildings to private organizations, churches, and community groups who used the schools 
to operate private, segregated academies. Dillon 2 sold a school building to a private 
group to help establish a private school, and Lake Swamp Baptist Church in Darlington 
County purchased a public school building to operate its private school. Sumter 2 simply 
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gave Bethel Baptist Church sixty-five acres and a school in the late 1960s. In Bowman, 
South Carolina, the Southern Methodist Church purchased a two-story brick school for 
$1000 from the school district while two members of the public school board also 
represented the private academy’s board.  
In addition, in the late 1950s and 1960s, a number of abandoned school buildings 
were sold to incorporated community groups for the purpose of establishing community 
centers, under a law that provided that abandoned schools could be disposed of in this 
manner. During the desegregation process, the Attorney General of South Carolina stated 
that any school building sold to community groups for this purpose, and then used to 
facilitate a private academy, would be reverted back to the public school, but he never 
enforced his statute. Community centers used old public school buildings to operate 
private schools across the state, including Thomas Sumter Academy, operated by 
Hillcrest Community Center, and Roy Hudgens Academy operated by the Sherwood 
Center, both located in Sumter.
lxxxvii
  
Reports from black parents also surfaced that private schools used public 
facilities, often at the expense of public school students. For instance, in Dorchester 3, 
private academy students at Mims Academy used the high school’s basketball court on 
Monday nights, at which time authorities did not allow black students to enter. Colleton 
County schools allowed private students to access their music facilities, and Charleston 
County schools allowed private school students to use its recreational facilities on a 
regular basis. Rising private school enrollment drained many teachers and administrators 
from the public system, and of those who remained in the public schools, many enrolled 
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their children in private schools, leaving many black parents to feel that their children’s 
teachers and administrators did not have their children’s best interest at heart.lxxxviii  
Majority-black school districts controlled by majority-white legislative 
delegations and school boards who supported the private school movement also refused 
to raise taxes to support the needs of its public schools. Throughout the pre-desegregation 
period in South Carolina, white school districts generally had lower property tax rates. 
Predominantly black school districts, which in general had less property-wealth than 
white districts, exerted a higher tax rate than white districts to overcome the revenue 
deficiencies caused by property wealth. Community leaders taxed more heavily because 
funds supported the segregated system. As gradual desegregation began to occur, this 
relationship reversed. Beginning in 1967-1968, higher tax rates shifted to districts with 
higher populations of white students. Despite lower levels of property-wealth, authorities 
in predominantly black districts stopped exerting above-average tax rates. Instead, they 
kept tax rates relatively constant, while tax rates in more heavily white districts increased. 
After 1970, differences in tax rates between black and white districts became strikingly 
pronounced; rates in predominantly white districts increased by over 20 mills, while tax 
rates in majority black districts increased by only 7.5 mills. By 1979, majority-white 
districts taxed at a rate of approximately 28 mills more than majority-black districts.
lxxxix
 
Decreased enrollment also diminished the funds available to local districts 
because federal and state education departments based school district funding on average 
daily student attendance. Many school boards in majority-black school districts, like 
those in Bowman, Dorchester, and Calhoun counties, often supported all-white private 
schools in their communities and neglected their own public schools. The loss of public 
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school support among affluent white residents in communities across the state proved 
detrimental. In 1970, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) completed a 
study that found a definitive correlation between majority-black school districts in South 
Carolina run by school officials supporting the private school movement and districts that 
scored poorly in state accreditation. These districts provided poor individually guided and 
special education opportunities, usually had no PTA affiliation, and failed to implement 
compulsory attendance laws, contributing to reductions in daily average attendance 
funds.
xc
 
Black communities, angered by the establishment of South Carolina’s new dual 
education system following 1970, and by their exclusion from public school leadership, 
worked to gain a larger voice in their student’s schools. Protests emerged throughout the 
state regarding the hiring of white teachers who placed their children in private, 
segregated academies. In Kingstree, SC, after a successful black community protest, the 
school district dismissed two teachers because they enrolled their children in a local 
segregation academy. Black parents also pressured the school board to adopt a policy that 
prevented the hiring of any new teachers that enrolled their children in private schools.
xci
 
Boycotts in Bowman and Calhoun Counties produced similar results. Civil rights 
organizations and black communities also worked to reform how districts selected 
legislative delegations and county school board members. Some counties shifted to public 
elected county councils in the mid-1970s. These councils replaced legislative delegations 
and controlled the dispersal of public school funds and millage rates. Despite their 
efforts, black residents often remained locked out of community and school leadership. 
Lee County, for example, shifted to the county council system, but school administrators 
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complained in 1973 that their schools desperately needed millage rate increases, but the 
county council refused to grant the increase. Three of the seven county council members 
had children in private schools and two others were sympathetic to the private school 
movement.
xcii
 
 
School Discipline in the Aftermath of Desegregation 
Desegregation altered perceptions of school discipline for black and white 
parents, and many argued that desegregation contributed to a breakdown in public school 
discipline. In 1975, the South Carolina Department of Education polled white and black 
residents about the state’s schools and found that 71 percent of white South Carolinians 
and 53 percent of black felt that public schools were worse than they were in 1970, on the 
eve of desegregation.
xciii
 A 1980 Gallup Poll on education identified discipline as the 
most important problem facing the nation’s public schools, and most people polled 
identified desegregation as the point in which discipline broke down.
xciv
 For many 
educators who faced this perceived crisis of turmoil in the public schools, student 
suspensions and expulsions became a popular method of reestablishing authority and 
order, particularly in the turbulent decade following federally mandated desegregation, 
which witnessed a growth of student protests against discriminatory school policies and 
Vietnam.  
Before 1965, South Carolina school districts rarely assigned suspensions and 
expulsions, and no local, state, or national organization monitored punitive statistics in 
education. In the post-desegregated system, however, suspension and expulsion rates 
reached astronomical numbers, particularly for minority students. As early as the late 
1960s, civil rights organizations began receiving reports that black and minority students 
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received harsher disciplinary sanctions from school administrators and teachers, often 
without any due process or opportunity to defend themselves. In 1971, field workers for 
the American Friends Service Committee in Alabama reported that “We have knowledge 
of suspensions and expulsions that occur almost always without due process or proper 
hearing.”xcv  
As the phenomenon developed in school districts across the nation, the Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) under HEW had no policies or regulations to adequately address the 
problem. Many districts that suspended and expelled black and minority students at 
highly disproportionate rates continued to receive federal funding and were not perceived 
as being out of compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under pressure from civil 
rights organizations, the OCR began collecting preliminary data on suspensions and 
expulsions in 1972 through its Elementary and Secondary Education Act compliance 
forms, often known as “101” and “102” forms. The OCR continued collecting data 
through the 1970s, but many activists argued that districts underreported their true 
disciplinary statistics.
xcvi
  
 In January 1975, the AFSC published the first report of suspensions for students 
in South Carolina public schools following desegregation, using data from the Office of 
Civil Rights for the 1973-1974 academic year. The report showed that 46,000 elementary 
and secondary students in the state public school system missed 147,000 days of school 
due to suspensions, ranking South Carolina as 6
th
 in the nation for its use of the 
disciplinary measure. South Carolina districts lost over $220,000 in financial aid as a 
consequence.
xcvii
 Some South Carolina counties, such as Anderson 2 and Lexington 2 
suspended 27% of their black students in the 1973-1974 school year. Suspensions of 
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black students in high schools and middle schools across the state were actually much 
higher than reflected by OCR reports, because elementary school students rarely received 
suspensions but were considered in overall statistical reports.
xcviii
 
In 1974, the AFSC also participated with the Children’s Defense Fund (CDF) to 
further investigate the problem of suspensions and expulsions across the country. 
Researchers visited more than 8,000 districts in urban census tracts and parts of rural 
counties around the country and surveyed households, school officials, and community 
leaders about their schools’ disciplinary policies. The result, Children out of School in 
America, found that black secondary students were suspended more than three times as 
often as white students, and that black females were suspended four times as often as 
white females. Close to 40 percent of students who were suspended received the 
punishment more than once in the same academic year. Of those children suspended, 43 
percent were from female headed households, 17 percent had parents with less than 6 
years of education, and 26 percent had parents with only 7-9 years of education. 41 
percent of suspended children had brothers or sisters who had been suspended, expelled, 
or dropped out of school.
xcix
  
The CDF argued that numbers reported on suspensions and expulsions to the 
OCR substantially underestimated the extent to which suspensions were used, because 
many districts failed to maintain and report accurate suspension data. In addition, some 
districts used alternate names for suspensions to lower their suspension statistics. In 
Baltimore, Maryland, for instance, school districts did not report suspensions less than 10 
days because they were called “temporary dismissals.”c Often, schools threatened a 
student with expulsion unless they withdrew, which also greatly reduced suspension and 
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expulsion numbers for school districts. One principal in Maine admitted that formal 
suspension and expulsions served as a black mark on the school’s record, so he very 
seldom formally suspended a child, but often worked to push delinquent children out 
through the withdrawal method.
ci
 
Prior to 1973, South Carolina had no standard discipline policy.
cii
 Often, few 
standards or rules existed on the district level either. In some districts teachers assumed 
the right of suspension with little regulation or unified policy. Common reasons provided 
for suspension and expulsion included tardiness and truancy, disruptive behavior, and 
inappropriate dress. School boards and administrators often denied students who received 
suspension and expulsion any chance of due process, and many times students and 
parents did not even receive formal notice of their dismissal. One Sumter County 2 
administrator charged and suspended a black student with the possession of a weapon 
because he carried a metal hair pick.
ciii
 Once suspended, students received marks on their 
permanent records that followed them throughout the remainder of their elementary and 
secondary education.
civ
 
Racially discriminatory discipline policies ran much deeper than just the actual 
use of suspensions in many South Carolina school districts. High suspension and 
expulsion rates served as an indicator for underlying racially discriminatory environments 
and policies in school communities. Not only did they reflect unfair treatment from 
administrators and teachers in disciplinary judgment, but hostile school environments 
could also contribute to perceptions of black student misbehavior. Excluding black 
students from extracurricular activities, racial polarization, academic tracking by race, 
and the dismissal of beloved black coaches, all contributed to black student misbehavior 
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as students worked through disillusionment brought on by racial isolation and exclusion 
under the desegregation process. Black students often reacted by organizing students 
walkouts and direct action protest, which resulted in their suspension or expulsion.  
In 1971, over 200 black students in Sumter 17 initiated a protest when 
administrators appointed a white coach as head of the football staff, passing over a 
beloved black coach, Dill Gamble. Prior to the protest, four black high school coaches in 
Sumter presented a list of grievances to the Sumter school board, asking them to stop 
racial discrimination in the hiring and promotional practices of the district, but grievances 
went unheard. Students involved in the protest smashed over $800 dollars in windows 
and contributed to other property damages. As a result of the incident, school authorities 
permanently suspended 22 black students from the district and suspended 110 students 
for the remainder of the school year.
cv
 Similar protests emerged around the state, and 
many black students lost days, weeks, and even years of educational opportunities as a 
result. 
Suspended students not only suffered because they fell behind in school work, 
sometimes irreparably, but also because they often developed reputations as trouble 
makers and deviants, which stayed with them throughout their entire school experience. 
The AFSC worked on transforming disciplinary approaches in public schools, 
particularly for black students, throughout the 1970s. Hayes Mizell, who believed 
suspension was “an educational cop-out,” developed a reputation in South Carolina as an 
advocate for black students, and parents often wrote to Mizell when they felt their 
children had been unfairly punished. Mizell worked with individual students across the 
state and retained attorney Herbert Buhl to represent students that were unfairly expelled 
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or suspended. Field staff for the AFSC across the South also represented students at their 
suspension and expulsion hearings, and worked to get students readmitted to schools.
cvi
  
In June 1973, amidst a national movement to reduce expulsions and suspensions 
in public schools, and under growing protests against discriminatory discipline measures 
in black communities across the state, South Carolina passed its 1973 Discipline Law. 
Proposed by Representative Breazeale of Pickens County, the law standardized and 
codified discipline measures in the state’s schools. While it legally gave school districts 
the right to suspend and expel students, which the AFSC and South Carolina chapter of 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) opposed, the law did outline standard rights 
that South Carolina school boards and administrators had to grant to parents and students 
when assigning suspensions. Under the new law, districts could not suspend students for 
more than 10 days at a time, and no student could be suspended for more than 30 days 
total in any given school year. The law required school districts to notify parents of 
student suspensions in writing, providing the reason for suspension, and also required that 
school districts meet with parents within three days of an assigned suspension. In 
addition, the law required school boards to provide parents with opportunities for 
hearings with counsel if they disagreed with the suspension or expulsion assigned.
cvii
 
In the wake of the General Assembly’s new discipline law, Mizell gathered 
information on individual school districts to ensure that districts in the state complied 
with the new state discipline requirements. In April 1974, Mizell found that out of 93 
South Carolina school districts, only 7 school districts were in compliance with South 
Carolina code. In addition, even those in compliance used overly confusing and 
complicated language when writing their district codes, making it hard for parents and 
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students to fully understand discipline provisions. Mizell found that in several districts, 
student handbooks published by individual schools contained stipulations that were in 
direct conflict with South Carolina’s 1973 law. Mizell published his findings in his 
publication, Your Schools, listing each individual school district and the ways in which 
they were out of compliance. He also listed the districts that refused to cooperate with the 
study.
cviii
  
In order to educate South Carolina students about their rights under state law, 
Mizell worked with the South Carolina chapter of the ACLU to publish the “South 
Carolina Handbook of Students’ Rights and Responsibilities.” Published in 1972, the 
handbook served as the first statewide publication specifically for students, which 
informed them in simple language of their rights and responsibilities under South 
Carolina law. Many students around the state contributed to the handbook’s illustrations, 
and the AFSC published the handbook in a comic format, using cartoons and illustrations 
to provide students with factual information. Mizell sent almost 20,000 copies of the 
guide to youth advisory councils around the state to distribute to fellow students.
cix
  
Topics in the handbook included steps to follow “If You’re Suspended or 
Expelled,” and common sense solutions to achieve due process. The handbook informed 
students if they could not access a lawyer once suspended, to bring a parent, relative, or 
sibling to their suspension hearing with the school board, and encouraged children to 
defend themselves if wrongfully accused. One illustration in bold declared, “Cut this out 
and keep it…you may need it one day,” with a comic under it explaining due process 
procedure. The book also informed students they could wear their hair any way they 
chose, had a right to view their own permanent school records, and provided local names 
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and numbers for students to call if they needed help in disciplinary procedures. Civil 
rights groups around the nation applauded the South Carolina student handbook and 
many asked Mizell to assist in creating handbooks in their own respective states.
cx
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Illustration from South Carolina Handbook of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities 
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Figure 1.2 Illustration from South Carolina Handbook of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities 
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Figure 1.3 Illustration from South Carolina Handbook of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities 
 
 
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court for the first time considered the issues 
arising from student discipline procedures in public schools. In Goss v. Lopez, the Court 
ruled that the suspensions of nine black students in Columbus, Ohio, who had been 
suspended for 10 days from their schools in 1971, were unconstitutional because students 
did not receive due process. Administrators suspended students following widespread 
racial tension and unrest due to the cancellation of Black History Week by school 
administrators, but some of the suspended students maintained they were only bystanders 
to demonstrations, and had done nothing wrong. At the time, the state of Ohio permitted 
10 day suspensions and required no hearing procedures. By a 5-4 decision, the Court 
ruled that students were entitled to due process rights, even in cases of short suspensions. 
At the very minimum, the court said, a student "must be given some kind of notice and 
54 
 
afforded some kind of hearing."  In cases of suspensions lasting ten days or less, the 
student must be "given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies 
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present 
his side of the story." Justice Byron White, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
argued that the policy was “less than a fair-minded principal would impose upon himself 
in order to avoid unfair suspension.”cxi   
Despite the Goss v. Lopez decision, the federal government did little to monitor 
discriminatory disciplinary policies. The Office of Civil Rights under HEW proposed a 
regulatory discipline manual in 1975 following the Goss decision, but many teaching 
advocate organizations such as the National School Board Association, opposed federal 
disciplinary regulations; they viewed increased regulation from the Office of Civil Rights 
as an intrusion on their own rights as educators.
cxii
 Mizell, outraged by the lack of federal 
involvement on discipline standards, lobbied the HEW for increased regulation and 
asserted continued pressure on the OCR to follow through on its policy manual, arguing 
that discipline regulations should be considered part of Civil Rights Act compliance. 
Mizell also encouraged HEW to use ESAA funds to regulate school discipline and 
promoted alternative methods to suspension, including in-school suspension policies.
cxiii
 
From the mid to late 1970s, Mizell worked closely with the HEW Assistant Secretary for 
Education, Peter Relic, even assisting OCR in the development of a suspension 
committee to address suspension abuse and research alternatives to out-of-school 
disciplinary responses.
cxiv
  
Mizell also worked tirelessly to educate schools, teachers, and administrators on 
the harmful effects of suspensions and expulsions. He delivered papers for conferences 
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held by the Federal General Assistance Center (formerly Title VI Centers) in Virginia, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and 
Oklahoma, and spoke to conferences and or consulted with groups of school officials in 
New York, Georgia, Washington, and California on designing and implementing 
effective in-school alternatives to suspension. Because this issue affected many minority 
students nationwide, in 1977, the AFSC also initiated the Ad Hoc Discipline Coalition 
made up of Advocates for Children of New York, Center for Law and Education, 
Chicano Education Project, Children’s Advocacy Center, Children’s Defense Fund, 
Citizen’s Council for Ohio Schools, Designs for Change, Massachusetts Advocacy 
Center, Parents Union for Public Schools in Philadelphia, Statewide Youth Advocacy, 
and the Student Advocacy Center. The group advocated for minority students in federal 
and state governments and encouraged the implementation of alternatives to suspension 
and expulsion.
cxv
  
In South Carolina, the AFSC and Mizell also formed the Citizens for Creative 
Discipline in 1975 to discourage suspensions and expulsions. The group included black 
and white businessmen and educators and held open hearings across the state for parents, 
teachers, students, and administrators. The group spoke with teachers, produced 
television courses for state educators on topics such as “Human Relations and School 
Discipline,” and “What is Discipline Anyway?” and published a newspaper which 
spotlighted successfully implemented disciplinary alternatives to suspension used by 
public schools across the nation.
cxvi
 
The Office of Civil Rights finally implemented a definitive policy on discipline in 
the Fall of 1979, “The Investigation Handbook for Conducting Discipline Reviews in 
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Elementary and Secondary Level Education Institutions,” which outlined federal 
discipline regulations required to maintain Title VI compliance and ESEA funds. 
According to the new regulations, schools could not provide unequal punishment for 
minority students, or adopt school rules only enforceable against students of a particular 
racial or national minority group. The report specifically prohibited the use of suspension 
and expulsion to punish students for nonattendance and argued that schools could only 
suspend or expel students if their behavior disrupted the school environment. New 
regulations required schools to supply due process procedures to all students and parents 
using written and oral notice, and guaranteed suspended students an opportunity for 
hearing before an independent hearing examiner. School districts had to inform students 
about right to counsel and right to summon and cross-examine witnesses, and provide 
parents with a written hearing decision that explained the appeals process if parents 
disagreed with the hearing decision. Regulations in 1979 also prohibited the use of 
suspension for punishable offenses that related to issues of poverty, including failure to 
buy workbooks, gym suits, or pay activity fees.
cxvii
 Sixteen years after South Carolina 
schools started the process of school desegregation, the federal government developed the 
tools and resources necessary to protect black students from racially discriminatory 
discipline policies. 
Title I and ESAA Federal Funds 
In the wake of the Civil Rights Act, Congress passed the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (1965) to support school districts with high levels of poverty 
and the Emergency School Aid Act (1970) to aid Southern school districts following 
desegregation. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) provided 
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financial assistance to schools with high percentages of children from low-income 
families and reinforced Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by providing federal funds only 
to school districts who met federal desegregation standards.  
Federal Title I coordinators encouraged school districts from ESEA’s inception to 
involve parents of children eligible for Title I funds in decision making processes and the 
implementation of Title I programs. Federal director of Title I, Richard Fairley, told 
districts that “both objective and subjective evidence demonstrates that parental 
involvement can make a difference in student achievement.”cxviii Yet, few school districts 
in South Carolina initiated Title I Parent Advisory Councils (PAC) in the first wave of 
Title I grants. In August of 1967, Hayes Mizell testified before the United States Senate’s 
Subcommittee on Education, Labor, and Public Welfare, arguing that the parents of the 
children who should have benefited from Title I  programs had absolutely no 
representation or oversight of those funds. He maintained that the government should 
require schools to create PACs to give parents more power in their local school 
districts.
cxix
  
In the fall of 1971, the federal government set new requirements for Title I and 
required local school districts to establish PACs. Under the 1971 guidelines, school 
districts should have included PACs in the planning, development, operation, and 
evaluation of Title 1 projects. Despite this regulation, school districts often excluded 
parental advisory councils. In 1972, an AFSC survey of South Carolina’s school districts 
indicated that 98 percent of school officials felt that Title I parents should not elect their 
own representatives to Title I Councils. Thirty-eight South Carolina districts allowed no 
community input in the appointment of members for Title I PACs and nine districts 
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allowed input only from civic clubs. In Aiken, the district’s County Board of Education 
selected parents for Aiken County’s PAC and only allowed five parents to reside. The 
district serviced thousands of Title I students. In Calhoun County, the school board 
initially allowed parents to elects PAC members, but school officials later informed 
parents they were no longer needed. School district officials often made Title I decisions 
behind closed doors and failed to give parents the dates of Title I meetings.
cxx
 South 
Carolina’s Title I coordinator, Jack Seurynck, was supposed to monitor Title I funds in 
the state, but when asked how the he determined how local Title I programs were meeting 
the needs of educationally disadvantaged children, he replied that “the local officials who 
were closest to the problems know what their students need, so their decisions concerning 
use of Title I funds are accepted without question.”cxxi  
In Florence, the local NAACP reported misuse of Title I funds in their district to 
the South Carolina Title I Coordinator, Jack Seurynck. The organization alleged that 
Florence County school officials used Title I funds to finance education of all students, 
rather than using the special funds to advance the education of disadvantaged students. 
The NAACP also claimed that the school district built a school planetarium with Title I 
funds, did not provide parents any concrete data listing how Title I teachers and assistants 
worked to help Title 1 students, and did not improve the education of disadvantaged 
students. NAACP officials also argued that administrators grouped Title I students in a 
way that created racially isolated classrooms. Seurynck defended Florence and claimed 
that he found no evidence that Florence officials committed any violations in their use of 
Title I funds.
cxxii
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The Florence NAACP petitioned HEW when Seurynck dismissed their 
grievances, and in a letter to Fairley asserted, “We find it appalling that neither the state 
Title I officials or Florence 1 officials find anything wrong with the fact that only 75 
percent of our 4,892 Title I students will be reading at the 7
th
 grade level, and doing math 
on the 4
th
 grade level after twelve years of schooling.” They also complained that 
Seurynck’s investigation was inadequate. Florence parents cited an ESEA audit, which 
stated that “Florence 1 officials do not know what Title I funds are to be used for,” and 
found that Florence 1 spent 166,432 dollars of Title I funds on ineligible schools in the 
fiscal years of 1969 and 1970. The NAACP also complained that the school allowed no 
meaningful parent involvement in Title I decisions.
cxxiii
 
Complaints about the misuse of Title I funds emerged across the state. Black 
parents in Barnwell, Calhoun, Moncks Corners, Clarendon 1, Dorchester 1, Orangeburg 
3, Beaufort, Berkeley, and Jasper all filed complaints with HEW when Seurynck ignored 
their claims. Other communities launched school boycotts and demanded that their school 
districts correctly implement Title I funds in conjunction with Title I PACs before they 
returned. In 1979, HEW officials placed Berekely County on probation for misuse of 
Title I funds and threatened that if district officials committed any more violations of 
Title I funds, they would have to pay back all of the Title I funds accepted, totaling 
approximately $1,532, 570.
cxxiv
 
The Emergency School Aid Act of 1970, passed under the Nixon administration, 
also granted large amounts of federal monies to southern school districts to aid in the 
implementation of desegregation. Like Title I, problems quickly emerged with the 
disbursement and regulation of ESAA. Before Congress constructed substantive 
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legislation for ESAA in 1970, Congress and the Nixon administration granted temporary 
ESAA funding to HEW in August of 1970, with no red tape, to provide emergency aid 
for the Fall of 1970. Local officials threw together plans to get ESAA funds before 
schools opened, and under strong White House pressure to disburse money by 
September, HEW allowed its staff only thirty-six hours to examine a district’s 
application. HEW’s staff approved almost all applications submitted and granted millions 
of dollars within just a few months of ESAA’s passage. The “frenzy to send dollars 
South” resulted in many decisions to send money to districts implementing blatant 
violations of the Civil Rights Act. HEW, for instance, granted 1.3 million dollars to 
Jackson Mississippi, four days before it even received the city’s formal application.  Civil 
rights organizations reported that more than half the districts examined continued illegal 
practices of segregation. The General Accounting Office, Congress’s auditing and 
investigatory arm, found that applications for funding did not explain how the money 
would be spent and did not relate the new funds to integration. Often the program became 
little more than a form of general aid, operating in favor of the most segregated systems 
in the country.
cxxv
 
Pressures brought to bear by civil rights organizations and members of congress 
provoked a major reorganization of HEW’s procedure in making ESAA grants. Senator 
Walter Mondale presided over a series of hearings that exposed problems with initial 
ESAA procedures and provided the basis for a newly written version of ESAA. The 
revised 1972 Act, clearly provided incentives for integration, reserved money for specific 
purposes recommended by desegregation experts and civil rights organizations, and 
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incorporated strict standards of eligibility. As a result, many Southern Districts stopped 
applying.
cxxvi
 
Hayes Mizell worked with the AFSC to educate black parents on pressuring 
districts around the State to apply for ESAA after 1972. He explained to parents that 
ESAA funds could be used by local school districts to provide in-service training for 
teachers, to improve curriculums, to develop programs for underachievers, to sponsor 
human relations workshops, and to improve school-community relations. Mizell told 
parents in 1975, “Since all applications for ESAA funds must be cleared by HEW’s 
Office of Civil Rights, many district have been unwilling to apply for funds because they 
don’t want OCR to have an excuse to look into policies and practices in their respective 
school districts.”cxxvii Black boycotts pressured school officials into applying for ESAA 
funds in Bowman and Calhoun County, but many school districts lost out on federal 
monies to avoid compliance with the OCR.
cxxviii
 For instance, federal officials used 
ESAA funds to discourage unfair discipline policies after it published its 1979 
regulations. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for instance, an ESAA on-site review showed 
that Philadelphia did not maintain any discipline records and temporarily terminated 
funds until data collection began. OCR also terminated ESAA funds in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana after an on-site review revealed that the district suspended large proportions of 
its black students. In Corsicana, Texas; Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; and Waterloo, Iowa 
officials revoked ESAA funds for discriminatory discipline procedures, particularly 
suspensions and expulsions.
cxxix
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Conclusion 
In December of 1969, Hayes Mizell stated that “One of the quiet tragedies of 
Southern School desegregation has been that it has revealed another aspect of white 
racism. Overt brutality—the kind that produces broken heads—it is no longer the primary 
manifestation of racism in South Carolina. Black people are now the victims of an 
institutionalized system of violence which produces broken spirits and bruised pride.”cxxx 
His predictions all too accurately reflected the many barriers that arose for the first 
generations of black students who desegregated schools in South Carolina, who 
combatted new manifestations of old Jim Crow practices. Many black students, 
unprotected by inefficient federal desegregation regulations, and battered by white state 
and local power structures determined to maintain white authority and segregation in the 
state’s education system, dropped out of school or were pushed out by white 
administrators using unfair discipline policies. Many more black students around the state 
failed to receive the educational tools and curriculum they needed to successfully move 
on to colleges and universities, many never learning to read and write on more than an 
elementary level. 
In spite of the barriers they faced, black students and parents, community and 
religious leaders, and civil rights organizations continued to assert their citizenship. Black 
South Carolinians in the post-Civil Rights Act generation recognized new opportunities 
for advancement and applied old civil rights tactics to new problems in desegregated 
schools. As the following chapters will show, pressures brought to bear on school 
administrations across the state by black student and community direct action protests, 
which in some cases virtually shut down South Carolina school districts, demanded the 
63 
 
attention of state and federal authorities who in the face of growing state and federal 
regulations, could no longer deny or ignore civil rights violations. These struggles 
signaled continued black activism and liberalism in the 1970s in communities across the 
South and once again placed the achievement of quality education at the center of 
America’s civil rights movement. 
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Chapter 2 
“If You Can Keep a Man From Getting an Education: You Can Manage Him”: 
Victoria DeLee and Desegregating Schools for African and Native American 
Students in Dorchester, South Carolina 
The Four Holes School was a four-room concrete building in rural Dorchester 
County, South Carolina that served as the “Indian School” for all children in Dorchester’s 
isolated Four Holes community, named after the nearby Four Holes Swamp. On August 
16, 1969, as the summer neared its end and a new school year began, 37 formally dressed 
children, along with their parents and local civil rights activist Victoria DeLee, crowded 
into several cars in the school parking lot. These children, known in Dorchester County 
as the “Brass Ankle” children, had descended from a diverse lineage that included Native 
Americans, Africans, and Europeans. Their families had lived in the remote community 
of Four Holes for many generations, and they considered themselves part of the Natchez-
Kussoo people, although the federal government did not recognize their tribal status. On 
this unusually cool morning in South Carolina’s lowcountry, those parents and children 
left on a three-mile journey to Ridgeville, South Carolina to demand that school officials 
enroll their children at Ridgeville Elementary School, an all-brick, majority-white school 
with twenty classrooms, twenty certified teachers, and an enriched curriculum with art 
and music.
cxxxi
 Their journey began a half-decade long struggle which revealed that 
national laws and court rulings prohibiting legal segregation did not end Jim Crow 
policies in communities across the South. In Dorchester County, Jim Crow legacies 
simply took new forms. 
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Figure 2.1 Four Holes School Children Gathered in the Four Holes Community, 
Courtesy of John Reynolds 
 
When the Four Holes’ residents arrived at Ridgeville Elementary on August 19, 
they saw Dorchester School District 3 Superintendent Richard W. DeTreville, along with 
several faculty members, standing in the school entranceway holding signs directing “all 
Indians to the gymnasium.”cxxxii After teachers and administrators channeled Native 
American parents and students to the gymnasium, DeTreville informed them that 
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Ridgeville Elementary School could not accept any other students due to overcrowded 
facilities. “The kids at Ridgeville,” he claimed, “are packed in there like sardines in a 
can.” Furthermore, DeTreville asserted, overcrowding a classroom “violates all the 
principles of good education.”cxxxiii At the beginning of the 1969 school year, the Four 
Holes School averaged thirty-seven students per room, with three grades being taught in 
each room. The Ridgeville School, which had one teacher per grade, had about 27 
students per classroom. After refusing their enrollment at Ridgeville, DeTreville asked 
the Four Holes students and parents, along with DeLee, to leave the premises 
immediately. As school officials escorted them out of the building, parents gathered all of 
the “brass ankle” children on the school house steps while DeLee led them in singing 
“We Shall Overcome.”cxxxiv  While gathered there, they vowed to fight the District until 
Native American students gained enrollment at Ridgeville Elementary.
cxxxv
   
Civil rights activism in Dorchester County, galvanized by the Civil Rights Act 
(1964) and Voting Rights Act (1965), persisted throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, as 
black and American Indian residents worked to bring federal civil rights standards to the 
rural South Carolina community, particularly to the public school system. Understanding 
the struggle and sacrifice of the first generation of parents and students who went through 
this era of robust school desegregation in the American South, is vital to understanding 
the full impact and trajectory of civil rights activism in American history. Many African 
Americans and American Indians in Dorchester protested and demonstrated, enduring 
physical violence, emotional abuse, and terror in order to ensure that civil rights laws and 
court rulings established by the federal government in mid-1960 would be recognized in 
rural South Carolina. Local activists demanded that the federal government, South 
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Carolina government, and the local white school board meet new federal civil rights 
standards and achieved many victories through their activism including total school 
desegregation and gains in voting and political power. But in many ways, the legacy of 
Jim Crow haunted Dorchester even after legal segregation ended. Social, economic, and 
political barriers remained, and many local white authorities succeeded in maintaining a 
system of white supremacy in the years following 1965. The failure of Dorchester 
activists to attain racial equality in the years following the Civil Rights Act exposed the 
deep roots of Jim Crow in American society and demonstrated that their battle was far 
from over. 
Although Dorchester County’s American Indian community had little experience 
in civil rights activism, the black community in Dorchester, under the leadership of 
veteran civil rights organizer Victoria DeLee, maintained a rich history of direct action 
protest and activism. African Americans in Dorchester County worked to claim basic 
civil rights through voter registration drives in the 1950s and 1960s. After the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act, black parents in Dorchester Districts 2 and 3, including parents from 
a remote area of Dorchester called Club House, launched several court battles to achieve 
school integration in their community. By Fall 1969, court cases launched by black 
parents culminated in a U.S. District Court order to end Freedom of Choice plans and 
implement full desegregation in all Dorchester school districts for the 1970-1971 school 
year. Dorchester’s full desegregation order took place before the U.S. Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ordered the immediate desegregation of Darlington and Greenville 
Schools, which set the precedent for total school desegregation in South Carolina.
cxxxvi
 
But, while Dorchester 3’s court-ordered desegregation plan demanded that the school 
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district close the Four Holes School for the 1970 school year, District 3 officials zoned all 
Four Holes community residents to their traditional school for Fall 1969, angering many 
Four Holes parents and goading their 1969 protest movement.
cxxxvii
 
Determined to secure a quality education for their children for the 1969-1970 
school year, Four Holes residents and African American civil rights leaders in Dorchester 
launched a five-month boycott of the Four Holes School. To garner statewide support for 
the movement, Victoria DeLee, local civil rights activist and President of the Dorchester 
chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, spoke to 
three different activist groups at the University of South Carolina, including Aware, The 
South Carolina Revolutionary Youth Movement, and the Students for a Democratic 
Society.
cxxxviii
 She requested help from the national and local offices of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Council, and spoke to national and state media outlets including the 
The Washington Post and The State.
cxxxix
 Though harassed by the Ridgeville police, 
American Indian and African American parents, students from the University of South 
Carolina, and members of the Charleston office of the SCLC launched multiple marches 
from the Four Holes School to Ridgeville, and rallies in front of both schools, receiving 
jail time for their protests.
cxl
 Under the leadership of SCLC leader John Reynolds, 
protestors also initiated an economic boycott of white businesses in Ridgeville and 
secured favorable coverage on NBC Nightly News.
cxli
 NAACP lawyers Matthew Perry, 
Mordecai Johnson, and Fred Moore represented the activists, while the American Friends 
Service Committee provided funds to American Indians when local authorities terminated 
their welfare checks as a result of their activism.
cxlii
 Because of massive resistance by 
white residents in Ridgeville, only fifteen Four Holes students secured enrollment at 
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Ridgeville Elementary in the 1969-1970 school year, but activists from SCLC and the 
University of South Carolina created a Freedom School for the remaining Four Holes 
children locked out of the mainstream public education system.
cxliii
 
 
Background  
Dorchester County, South Carolina is located just north of Charleston County, 
South Carolina. The county seat, St. George, is about fifty miles north of the city of 
Charleston; Ridgeville is twenty miles closer. In 1960, around 24,000 people lived in 
Dorchester County with less than fifteen percent of county residents living in urban areas 
including the cities of St. George and Summerville. African Americans made up 
approximately 49 percent of the county population, but most areas were predominantly 
black. According to the 1960 U.S. census, white residents constituted a majority 
population only in the Summerville Division.
cxliv
  
 
Table 2.1 Dorchester County Census Divisions in 1960 
Dorchester County Census Divisions in 1960: 
    Total  White  Black 
Harleyville Division  4,297  1,880  2,417 
Reeseville Division  2350  1029  1321 
Ridgeville Division  2674  1173  1501 
St. George Division  4296  1833  2463 
Summerville Division  10764  6565  4190 
Urban areas (1000 or over) 
St. George   1833  1149  683 
Pinehurst-Sheppard Park  1708  419  1289 
Summerville   3633  2466  1161 
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Virtually all of the American Indian population in the county, around 275 people, 
resided in the Ridgeville District in Four Holes. Most of the residents of the 75 acre 
community lived in abject poverty, and worked as tenant farmers and laborers. Though 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not recognize the Four Holes community as a tribe, the 
citizens of Four Holes considered themselves American Indian, and identified with the 
Edisto tribes of the Nattchez-Kusso Peoples. The exact heritage of the community is 
unknown because 19th century census data left indigenous residents off as “Indians not 
taxed,” and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the community became a 
diverse racial and cultural community.  In 1965, as the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) began to regulate racial zoning in Southern school districts under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Department officials designated Four Holes students as 
“white.”cxlv  The Four Holes community, completely surrounded by woods and isolated 
from the rest of Dorchester County, supported the Church of God, had one small grocery 
store, two bars, and the last segregated American Indian school in the American 
South.
cxlvi
   
Before 1963, District 2 had not allowed Four Holes students to attend public 
schools, yet had no educational provisions within the Four Holes Community. After 
community members requested admittance to District 2 schools in 1963, District 2 built 
the Four Holes School, a large cement building with four large rooms.
cxlvii
 The District 
designed the school to teach all children through eighth grade, making no provision for 
education of students once they reached high school age. When District 2 constructed 
Four Holes in 1964, the South Carolina Department of Education passed a law allowing 
the District to hire teachers for Four Holes School that had not attended college.
cxlviii
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None of the three teachers hired at Four Holes for the 1969-1970 school year had a 
college degree. Most students graduating from Four Holes School could not read or even 
write their own names.
cxlix
 
From the close of World War II, the rural community of Dorchester County 
struggled to find a place in the increasingly industrialized New South. Almost 1000 farms 
closed from 1950-1960, with little industrial or economic growth to offset the loss of 
agricultural opportunities.
cl
 Most residents in the county earned modest incomes. While 
only 19 percent of families in the United States had incomes below the federal poverty 
level of less than $3,000 per year in 1960, the median income in Dorchester County was 
around $3,031, putting most county residents well under the national median of $5,260 a 
year. By 1964, 1050 farms continued to operate in the district, most consisting of less 
than 10 acres. Tenant workers farmed about 13 percent of available farmland.
cli
  
The average educational level achieved for people 25 and older in Dorchester 
County was eighth grade, and less than 30 percent of Dorchester’s residents had 
completed high school or higher.
clii
 The black population in Dorchester suffered from 
even greater poverty and lack of education. In 1966, 86 percent of the black community 
lived under the national poverty line, earning less than $1,500 a year. Most members of 
the black community never received an education higher than the fifth grade.
cliii
 
Though Dorchester school districts have since been reorganized, in the 1960s and 
1970s, Dorchester operated three school districts. Those districts included St. George 
School District 1, which encompassed the central region of the county; Summerville 
School District 2, which comprised the southeastern part of the county, and Harleyville-
Ridgeville School District 3, which included the northern part of the county. Prior to the 
72 
 
1964 Civil Rights Act, all three school districts remained completely segregated with 
segregated school facilities, segregated faculty, and segregated busing systems.
cliv
While 
Dorchester 1 and 2 operated a dual school system, Dorchester 3 maintained three separate 
school systems for its black, white, and American Indian students. Four Holes students 
lived close enough to their school that they required no transportation.
clv
 
. 
School Desegregation Efforts, 1964-1969 
In 1964, the Civil Rights Act set new standards for southern school systems by 
outlawing racial discrimination in any activity or program that received financial support 
from the federal government. Revised federal regulations following the Civil Rights Act 
did not root out racial segregation and discrimination on the local level, but new policies 
did create space for minorities to fight for educational access in their communities. The 
battle waged between 1965 and 1969 in Dorchester set the stage for the Four Holes 
School Boycott and continued civil rights activism because it divulged the extent to 
which the white school board and Dorchester school administration would manipulate 
federal standards to maintain racially exclusionary policies in Dorchester’s schools. 
Black and American Indian residents quickly realized that their children would only have 
a chance at quality education if they appealed to an authority outside of the Dorchester 
community through continued civil rights protest. 
In order to meet desegregation compliance under the Civil Rights Act, many 
Southern school boards applied Freedom of Choice policies to their districts, including all 
3 Dorchester school districts, which automatically registered students in the schools that 
they attended under the segregated system. Students could choose to attend the school of 
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their choice within the specific school district, provided that their parents specifically 
requested a transfer. Allowing students to attend the school of their choice created the 
potential for successful desegregation, but the stipulation that parents specifically request 
a transfer meant that black parents once again inherited the burden of challenging a white 
dominated system. In addition, many school districts made attaining transfer status 
difficult. Districts purposely made requesting transfer confusing and intimidating, and 
often did not publicize the transfer process. School districts only accepted transfers for a 
limited time period, and even when parents sent in requests according to regulation, they 
could still be, and often were, denied by school boards.
clvi
 
Of the 3 Dorchester School Districts, District 1, on the surface, complied most 
willingly to federal desegregation regulations in the mid-1960s. During the 1965-1966 
school year, District 1 accepted about 9 percent of its black students into previously all-
white schools through a Freedom of Choice plan.
clvii
 But soon after the year began, black 
students complained of harassment, intimidation, and unfair treatment.
clviii
 Many white 
teachers insisted on maintaining segregation in the desegregated classroom, separating 
white and black students. In some cases, teachers forced black students to sit with their 
backs turned away from the class and refused to help them. Black students complained 
that they were cursed, called names, pushed into the corridors at school, tripped, and spit 
on. Students cited teachers for calling them “niggers,” only allowing white students to 
answer questions, standing with their backs to black students during instruction, and 
making black students sit where they could not see the blackboard. District 1 faculty and 
administration excluded black students from some sports. In fact, the town of St. George 
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transformed some school sports into community sports, which excluded all black 
students.
clix
 
 In the Spring of 1966 after the Office of Education, under HEW, received 
complaints of racial discrimination, they launched an investigation of Dorchester District 
1. As a result, Gordon Rubin, representative of the Office of Education, feared that black 
students in the previously all-white schools, with little support from teachers, students, or 
administrators, would fail academically. He also worried that black students would no 
longer apply for transfer under Freedom of Choice because students, teachers, and 
administrators treated them so poorly. Yet, District 1 technically met all federal standards 
mandated by HEW guidelines and the Office of Education had no grounds for official 
charges against the District.
clx
 Local civil rights advocacy organizations, like the 
American Friends Service Committee, organized to provide black students tutoring and 
emotional support, but black students still endured harsh conditions throughout the 
desegregation process.
clxi
 
In 1965, neighboring Dorchester School District 2 and 3 officials resisted HEW 
regulations much more overtly. After HEW threatened to stop federal funds to both 
districts in 1965, the school boards submitted Freedom of Choice plans that provided 
assurances of desegregation. Yet, while legally meeting federal desegregation standards, 
both districts worked to maintain their dual school systems. During the 1965-1966 school 
year, HEW determined that 4,611 students attended schools in District 2: 2,936 white and 
1,675 black. Only 3 black students transferred to its all-white schools, yet the District 
retained its federal funding and technically met desegregation regulations set by HEW.
clxii
  
District 3 accepted 29 black students, only 3 percent of the black student population, into 
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previously all-white schools. During this year, no faculty desegregation occurred in any 
Dorchester school district.
clxiii
 
As a result of the manipulation by Southern school districts in Fall 1965, HEW 
officials revised many of its desegregation rules and regulations to promote a more 
effective desegregation process. The Office of Education, under HEW, announced 
forthcoming changes in February 1966 and published the Revised Statement of Policies 
for School Desegregation Plans Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in March 
1966. Stanley Kruger, of the Office of Education, toured the country in the wake of the 
Revised Guidelines, launching conferences with educators, school boards, and 
administrators, and holding meetings with parents, in order to explain the implications of 
the new regulations.
clxiv
  
On March 4, 1966 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare mailed a 
memorandum outlining major changes to all 3 Dorchester County school districts, 
enclosing copies of the Revised Guidelines. It stated that Freedom of Choice plans had to 
be meaningful and had to result in true desegregation. In other words, a substantial 
percentage of desegregation had to follow implemented plans. In addition, desegregation 
now required faculty desegregation, which had only been recommended in the previous 
guidelines. Lastly, the school district could not deny a black student transfer to a white 
school, unless the school faced overcrowding. If a chosen school was over capacity in 
enrollment, then the District was obligated to zone all students who wanted to go to the 
school by proximity to the school, not race. The Office of Education automatically 
updated all southern school district plans from the 1965-66 school year to meet new 
regulations for the 1966-1967 year.
clxv
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On April 15, 1966, Dorchester School District 2 agreed to HEW’s new 
desegregation policies by submitting the proper paperwork. A few weeks earlier, 
however, on April 2, 1966, Durleen Gun, Earnest Geddis, and Wilhelmina Smalls, three 
African American residents of Dorchester District 2 attended a meeting in Columbia, 
South Carolina, presented by Stanley Kruger of the federal Office of Education, on new 
school desegregation regulations for the upcoming 1966-1967 school year.  The meeting 
encouraged African American parents to educate themselves about new federal standards 
in the wake of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Revised Guidelines, and explained effective 
ways to organize communities in demand of school desegregation. Gun, Geddis, and 
Smalls came home determined to encourage people in their own community to take 
advantage of the new opportunities to attend previously all-white schools. They 
particularly took to heart the words of Kruger, when he encouraged black residents to file 
a complaint with HEW and other local civil rights organizations if they found their school 
district was not in compliance with the 1966 guidelines set by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare.
clxvi
 
Gun, Geddis, and Smalls came from a very rural part of Dorchester County 
known as Club House, an unincorporated area, home to approximately 1000 black 
people. Located at the junction of county Highways 63 and 84, Club House was one of 
many isolated, rural black communities spread throughout the county. No paved roads led 
to Club House, only dirt roads, and within Dorchester County, it was one of the poorest 
and most disenfranchised. The community had no plumbing, telephone lines, or 
electricity. State Senator H. H. Jessen of Dorchester County reportedly said of the area 
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“We ought to dig a canal across those roads and leave those Club House Niggers back 
there to die.”clxvii 
The citizens of Club House, after hearing about changing federal policy on school 
desegregation standards, formed a school desegregation committee, held a mass meeting, 
and individually encouraged members of their community to transfer their children to 
white schools. The people of the area filled out their choice forms for their preferred 
schools, requested that their children be sent to Summerville Elementary School and 
Summerville High School, the all-white schools in the district, and then gave the choice 
forms in sealed envelopes to members of the Club House Parents Committee, led by 
Earnest Geddis, to return to Superintendent T.C. Bristow, Superintendent of Dorchester 
School District 2.
clxviii
   
In 1966, Thomas Bristow was in his twelfth year as superintendent. He was a 
graduate of the Citadel, and held a Masters of Arts Degree in Education from the 
University of South Carolina. Bristow considered himself close friends with the 
Associate Superintendent of South Carolina Schools, Dr. Harris A. Marshall, visiting him 
at his home in Columbia often. In July of 1967, when Marshall lost his father, Bristow 
sent the Assistant State Superintendent a personal note over the loss, including heartfelt 
condolences, and reminded Marshall to remember that  “God Knows Best, and sorry we 
missed you when we stopped by last week. Come to See Us. Tom.”clxix Because of his 
close ties with the South Carolina Department of Education, and his upstanding status in 
the community, Bristow had little fear of the authority of HEW and the regulations set by 
the Office of Education. 
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Club House residents soon tested his confidence. On Friday, April 22, 1965, 
determined to apply their newly won civil rights to their own community, and to gain 
access to quality education for their children, Gun, Geddis, and Smalls collected around 
seventy choice forms and traveled to Summerville to submit those forms to 
Superintendent Bristow. All parents requested transfer to previously all-white schools, 
mainly Summerville Elementary and Summerville High School. When Bristow received 
the forms, he opened them immediately in front of the 3 community leaders, and saw that 
the majority of Club House parents wanted to transfer the students to the all-white 
schools in Summerville. He immediately told Gun, Geddis, and Smalls “that it looks like 
there has been a force” from the outside that had intimidated the parents into putting their 
children in white schools.
clxx
 He told the parents they had misunderstood the Freedom of 
Choice guidelines and that transfers only applied to residents who lived in city limits, not 
to rural communities and residents. Besides, he added in an argument similar to one used 
in the famous Clarendon County desegregation case that anchored the 1954 Brown 
decision, the district budget had no money to transport black, rural students all the way to 
Summerville Elementary. District 2 used segregated bus systems until the 1967-1968 
school year. Club House leaders later remarked that white students who lived further out 
were bused past Club House every day, to Summerville schools.
clxxi
   
After explaining why their children would not be transferred to Summerville 
Elementary and Summerville High School, Bristow told parents that black children who 
lived in rural areas would have to go to Canaan Elementary, one of the district’s all-black 
elementary schools. According to Bristow, this information was supposed to be included 
in the letters to parents about the District’s Freedom of Choice policy, but district 
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employees inadvertently left it out. After explaining this information to parents, he asked 
them to leave. On their way out, however, Bristow wanted each of them to write down 
their full name and address. County welfare workers later harassed the three activists.
clxxii
 
After being denied transfer, Club House community members called Victoria 
DeLee, a known civil rights activist in Dorchester County. DeLee, born and raised in 
Ridgeville, was at the forefront of civil rights activism not only in Dorchester, but also in 
South Carolina. She was the president of the local chapter of the NAACP, and would be 
the first black female to run for Congress in the State of South Carolina under the United 
Citizens Party. Though skilled in public speaking and campaign organizing, DeLee never 
had access to a public education herself, and as a result, made education central to her 
own activism. She believed education was a necessary component to achieving and 
protecting civil rights for all people, particularly black Southerners.
clxxiii
 
DeLee knew the battles faced by the Club House parents because she fought 
similar ones in her own children’s school district, Dorchester District 3. DeLee, born in 
Ridgeville on April 8, 1925, spent her childhood assisting her mother and grandmother as 
tenant farm workers, a time DeLee often described as a period of continued slavery for 
black people in her community. DeLee and her family worked long hours in cotton fields, 
and other forms of agricultural labor to earn what she remembered was 25 cents a 
day.
clxxiv
  
During the time that DeLee labored as a field hand, white land owners physically 
beat her regularly and exposed her to violence and racial terror, acts that bolstered her 
resolve to fight against oppression. One lynching in Ridgeville particularly haunted 
DeLee, and she spoke of it often.  Bob Cummings, a local white farmer, openly bragged 
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to DeLee and her family about his participation in torturing and lynching a local black 
man. “And they said they castrated him and stuffed them in his mouth while they shoot 
him,” DeLee remembered. “And they shoot him piece by piece…That thing stick[s] in 
my mind. Here this man being killed, and I overheard. He (Bob Cummings) didn’t care. 
He talked right there in front of us.”clxxv Angered by the powerlessness of blacks against 
white violence and racial oppression, DeLee determined as a young girl that she would 
fight back.
clxxvi
  
 In 1947, at the age of 22, DeLee successfully registered to vote by threatening a 
local voting registrar and celebrated her achievement throughout the local black 
community.  Soon after, with support from the local NAACP under I. DeQuincy 
Newman, DeLee began encouraging black people to vote. She drove local blacks to 
voting polls to obtain voter registration and traveled around Dorchester on Sundays, 
seeking permission from black pastors to make appeals to their congregants. In 1960, 
DeLee formed the Dorchester Voting League and headed voter registration drives 
throughout the 1960s. Black registrants faced constant abuses from white registration 
officials, who often forced them to read aloud the U.S. Constitution in order to qualify for 
a registration certificate. In response, DeLee set up Citizenship Schools in the county to 
teach unlettered blacks how to pass the registration tests.
clxxvii
   
While DeLee saw voting rights as a key element to justice and civil rights for 
black residents of Dorchester, she also viewed quality education an essential piece to 
attaining civil rights. Never having had access to education herself, she fought to ensure it 
for the next generation of black children, including her own. In 1948, DeLee led a protest 
against the county school board to prevent the firing of a teacher whom she valued as a 
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strong black teacher who cared for “all the children.” JohnEtta Grant, who began her 
career in Ridgeville, commuted twenty-six miles by car from Charleston to teach in 
Ridgeville. When other teachers who lived out of  town began to commute with Grant, 
instead of living in Ridgeville, the resident with whom teachers traditionally boarded 
complained. As a result, authorities told Grant she had to live in Dorchester County or 
lose her job. DeLee organized black parents to take a train ride to the county school board 
meeting in St. George. According to DeLee, this was the first time that black parents had 
ever stood up to the all-white school board. The school board allowed Grant to continue 
her employment, marking a pivotal victory for a young DeLee.
clxxviii
  
Throughout the 1960s DeLee tried to register her own children in the all-white 
schools in Dorchester County with little success. Following the Civil Rights Act, District 
3 accepted DeLee’s children for 1965-66 school year, but they received continued 
harassment. DeLee’s daughter often came home beaten, bloody, and even stripped of her 
clothing. School administrators targeted DeLee’s son, Elijah, and suspended him in 
January of 1966 until DeLee signed a paper agreeing that if he caused any more trouble at 
school, he would be permanently expelled. DeLee refused.
clxxix
 During this time, white 
members of the community constantly harassed DeLee. They shot into her home on 
several occasions and in 1965 set fire to her home while her family slept. Her husband 
and children all survived, but her house burned to the ground.  Local authorities never 
investigated or charged anyone for the destruction of DeLee’s home.clxxx 
To assist Club House residents, DeLee arranged for representatives of the 
American Friends Service Committee to come to Club House, and she personally drove 
the AFSC group down what they described as “dirt roads in poor condition” until 
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reaching “the sparsely settled area” of Club House. As a result of their visit, 
representatives of AFSC wrote letters seeking assistance for the community from HEW 
and the Office of Civil Rights.
clxxxi
 AFSC also supported the Club House parents and 
Victoria DeLee in launching suits against Dorchester Districts 2 and 3, demanding the 
districts stop operating a dual system. NAACP lawyers Matthew Perry and Fred Moore 
represented the parents, who filed suit on July 25, 1966, shortly after transfer requests 
had been denied.
clxxxii
 Perry, who worked as chairman of the South Carolina NAACP 
Legal Committee from 1957, was an integral leader in filing and pushing South Carolina 
desegregation suits after Brown. Fred Moore, also an active civil rights and NAACP 
attorney, had previously served as Student Council President at South Carolina State 
College and organized a boycott of white businesses supplying food to South Carolina 
State and Claflin College. It included hunger-strikes in the school dining halls, mass 
meetings, and freedom marches. Because of his participation, administrators expelled 
Moore from school just two weeks from graduation.
clxxxiii
 
Despite their suits, DeLee, Club House residents, and their children remained 
locked out of the white school systems of Dorchester throughout the 1966-1967 school 
year because U.S. Circuit Court Judge Hemphill did not hear the cases until March of 
1967. By this time the school year was almost over. As a result, parents chose to focus on 
the following school year, demanding a complete plan of desegregation for the 1967-
1968 academic year.
clxxxiv
 But after hearing the case, Hemphill found that Dorchester 2 
and 3 met all federal desegregation requirements.
clxxxv
 
In the meantime, HEW officials compiled their own suits against Dorchester 2 
and 3. Judge Marker Dern, federal hearing examiner for HEW, heard the cases after 
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Hemphill issued his decisions. Because Hemphill, a federal district court judge, had 
already ruled on Dorchester’s compliance for the 1967-1968 year, Dern could only hear 
the cases on the current 1966-1967 academic year. Dern ruled that District 2 and 3 failed 
to follow their compliance agreements and terminated their federal funds.
clxxxvi
 However, 
since the year only had a couple of months remaining, HEW ultimately concluded that no 
use could come from termination of federal funds for the remainder of the year.
clxxxvii
 
Because HEW’s case took so long to process, Dorchester School Districts continued 
segregation and maintained federal funding. 
Over the next few years, Dorchester school districts made few meaningful strides 
towards desegregation. At the start of the 1968 academic school year, Dorchester 
Districts still operated dual, segregated educational systems, along with many other 
school districts across South Carolina and other southern states. Only in 1968, with the 
Supreme Court ruled that Freedom of Choice plans no longer met federal desegregation 
standards in Green v. School Board of New Kent County, did total desegregation become 
a reality in the South. Green aligned the Supreme Court with HEW’s Revised Guidelines 
arguing that Freedom of Choice could only be considered desegregation if the results 
created racially balanced schools. The "Green" factors used to determine whether a 
desegregation plan was acceptable included the ratio of black to white students and 
faculty, and absolute equality in facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities. In 
the Green ruling, the Supreme Court also insisted on immediately destroying segregated 
schools "root and branch," which also hastened the pace of change.
clxxxviii
 
Bolstered by the Supreme Court’s 1968 ruling, in March 1969, the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare named all 3 Dorchester school districts and 19 other 
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South Carolina school districts, for violating HEW’s Revised Guidelines through their 
Freedom of Choice policies. In reviewing those districts, federal District Court ruled en 
banc, with all judges of the court present, that all three Dorchester Districts had thirty 
days to come up with acceptable desegregation plans in conjunction with HEW, effective 
for the 1969-1970 school year.
clxxxix
  
When all three Dorchester school districts refused all HEW suggestions, and were 
unable to come up with satisfactory desegregation plants, the U.S. District Court in 
Charleston, under Judge Robert Hemphill, ordered that HEW’s suggested desegregation 
plans, which created racial balance throughout the schools, be the new standards for all 
three Dorchester Districts. HEW provided Dorchester schools with the option to use 
1969-1970 for “orientation and preparation.”cxc As a result 1969-1970 became a 
transition year for all Dorchester schools and the Dorchester community to ready itself 
for total desegregation in 1970. From 1969 through 1970, HEW required Dorchester 
districts to host teacher in-services on “racial understanding, human relations, and 
communication.”cxci Faculties of the black and white schools met for common planning 
by subject matter, and were supposed to establish bi-racial advisory committees to help 
with the transition that would occur the following year, under total desegregation.
cxcii
 
Though HEW ordered the Four Holes School closed under the 1970 total desegregation 
plan, the district left the school open in 1969, greatly upsetting many residents in the Four 
Holes community.
cxciii
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Four Holes School Boycott Takes Root 
Although several black students attained transfer to majority-white schools in 
Dorchester District 2 by the 1969 school year, the District denied all transfers from Four 
Holes, for the 1969-1970 school year.
cxciv
 Four Holes parents tried to gain transfer for 
their children to other county schools in 1966, after the publication of HEW’s Revised 
Guidelines. Like many black student transfer requests in 1966, administrators denied all 
American Indian requests due to overcrowding. (The same year, District 3 officials 
provided a trailer at Four Holes School for an extra classroom because so many students 
attended in the four rooms.) When District 3 officials again denied all American Indian 
students transfer for the 1968-1969 school year, members of the Four Holes community 
approached the black community, particularly Victoria DeLee, for help. Four Holes 
parents and DeLee formed a partnership in protesting the public school system, and 
worked to get all minority students in the community access to the majority-white 
schools in the District.
cxcv
 
Throughout the Freedom of Choice process in School District 3, administrators 
claimed that they evaluated all transfer requests on a first come first serve basis, and 
inevitably had to deny some applicants due to overcrowding. For the 1969-1970 year, 
under DeLee’s encouragement, black residents decided that they would not fill out their 
freedom of choice forms until the Four Holes community submitted and filed all of their 
children’s forms. Two weeks before the start of school, District 3 notified parents 
concerning the school assignments of their children: District 3 honored the majority of 
black transfer requests, but accepted no transfer students from the Four Holes 
community. Many local black activists and Four Holes leaders agreed that they needed to 
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apply civil rights protest to demand transfer and planned to assemble at Four Holes on 
August 19, the first day of school.
cxcvi
 As parents and students made their way to 
Ridgeville Elementary that day, they only asked that newly won civil rights legislation be 
applied to their own community. Only about two-thirds of the Four Holes students 
requested transfer: the other students continued to attend the Four Holes School.
cxcvii
 
In 1969, Four Holes parents and community members had no formal tribal 
organization or leadership and no experience in organized protest. Yet, parents who had 
been shaped by the changing economy of Dorchester, and could no longer find 
agricultural jobs in the county, wanted their children to be able to compete for jobs 
outside of Dorchester. Parents in Four Holes realized that public education was one of the 
few avenues they had to provide their children with something more. One grandparent in 
the community, Georgia Davidson, remarked that she knew it was too late for her, and 
even her children, but that she wanted something better for her grandchildren, and would 
do everything she could to achieve that.
cxcviii
  This hope for something better provided 
courage to parents and students who drove to the Ridgeville schoolhouse in August 1969. 
After Superintendent DeTreville and Ridgeville Elementary teachers rejected the 
Four Holes group, DeLee secured the assistance of NAACP lawyers Fred Henderson 
Moore, Mordecai C. Johnson, and Matthew Perry. They filed suit against District 3 in the 
U.S. District Court for violating the court ordered desegregation plan handed down 
earlier that year.
cxcix
 Perry and Moore represented African Americans in Dorchester 
County in the previous desegregation suits in both Dorchester 2 and 3 and continued to 
be at the forefront of litigation in South Carolina. 
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In the meantime, residents of Four Holes decided to launch a school boycott of 
the Four Holes School and picketed Ridgeville Elementary. Students arrived at the 
Ridgeville every morning, attempted to enroll, and then marched in front of both the Four 
Holes and Ridgeville Elementary Schools when denied. Protesting proved more effective 
at the Ridgeville School because it was located in the middle of the town of Ridgeville 
and interrupted the daily schedules of many members of the community. Throughout the 
protest, DeLee told reporters that Four Holes students had not been given a decent 
education, had no adequate materials or books, and that “these kids are not going to 
attend at Four Holes School again this year, no matter what happens.”cc   
On August 26, 1969 the group returned to register at Ridgeville and was met by 
Superintendent DeTreville. DeTreville reiterated that students could not enter because the 
school was overcrowded. After arguing the point for several minutes, DeTreville allowed 
two American Indian parents to tour the school to make a room-by-room count in order 
to determine if the school was, in fact, overcrowded. Parents found a total of 194 children 
in the school, which had a capacity for 210. At that, Four Holes parents argued that even 
if the District admitted all of the children who wished to attend, the school would only be 
over capacity by 20 students. They suggested that a mobile unit from the Four Holes 
School be moved to provide an extra classroom.
cci
 DeTreville refused and students 
continued their protest. As a result, DeTreville ordered the school closed until the case 
could be heard by Judge Robert Hemphill, who set a hearing for September 4, 1969 in 
Charleston.
ccii
  
On that morning, many parents and students of the Four Holes community drove 
to Charleston to attend the hearing and support the request for their children to attend 
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Ridgeville Elementary. Community members arrived in full traditional dress. Some 
children even painted their faces with tribal patterns, but Hemphill insisted that everyone 
remove the paint before reentering. Four Holes community members listened quietly and 
patiently as Hemphill heard the case.
cciii
  
Superintendent DeTreville argued that Ridgeville Elementary suffered from 
overcrowding and could not accept any more students. Parents from Four Holes argued 
that District 3 had violated their children’s rights under the Civil Rights Act, not only 
because their transfer had been denied under Freedom of Choice, but also because the 
Four Holes School was inferior to the other district schools. One problematic issue for 
Four Holes residents was that HEW classified all children from Four Holes as white. As a 
result, District Three used HEW to support their denial of the American Indian students. 
Ernest Bunch, an HEW official, testified that school officials were following regulations 
set by governmental authorities and were following sound educational practices. When 
cross-examined by Matthew Perry, Bunch admitted that HEW had called for the closing 
of the Four Holes School for the 1970 school year, in the District’s total desegregation 
plan.
cciv
 
Throughout the trial, Four Holes leaders and their lawyers felt Hemphill, 
appointed to South Carolina’s Fifth Circuit by Lyndon Johnson, treated them with 
disrespect. Hemphill took a hard line against Four Holes’ protests and demonstrations. 
When School District 3 lawyers interrogated one Four Holes parent, Georgia Davis, for 
her participation in the protest, Mordecai Johnson objected that the demonstrations 
should not affect the judge’s decision regarding whether or not students had the 
constitutional right to attend Ridgeville Elementary. When he objected, Hemphill 
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snapped at Johnson “to sit down or he would be held in contempt of court.”ccv  Johnson, 
highly offended, later wrote Hemphill, “I have been laboring under the impression that 
members of the federal judiciary refrained from discourteous and disrespectful treatment 
of members of the court’s bar who appeared before them. Or am I too unfamiliar with 
courtroom procedure to think that any attorney has the right to raise an objection to the 
line of questioning of his opponent.”ccvi 
At the close of the trial, Hemphill analyzed school enrollment at Ridgeville and 
demanded that District 3 enroll 15 American Indian students from Four Holes. The 
remaining students were to stay at Four Holes School for one more year until the school 
was scheduled to close permanently. Hemphill broke the acceptance of students down by 
grade level: four second grade students, one third grade student, six fourth grade, one 
fifth grade, and three sixth grade students would be allowed transfer. At the close of his 
decision, Hemphill warned parents that if they continued protest at the schools in any 
way, that they would be held in contempt of court. Hemphill stated, “We are not going to 
have people running around like animals disrupting school. I don’t care if they are white, 
black, red, or mixed.”ccvii  
The decision did not stifle the determination of the Four Holes community. 
Angered at the result, many stated their intent of appealing Hemphill’s decision at the 
U.S. Court of Appeals. “I’ve made up my mind. One parent said. I’m tired of my children 
going to Four Holes School. I told the Sherriff he can cut my throat, but they’re not going 
to that school”ccviii Parents said they would set up a private tutorial service at their homes 
as an alternative. Parents did send 15 of the 75 students to Ridgeville on Monday, 
September 8
th
. When DeLee arrived at the school to help enroll the students, officials 
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arrested her on contempt charges. Upon her release, DeLee contacted Ralph Abernathy, 
the director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) who agreed that his 
organization’s Charleston office should help and soon set up a three-man office in 
Ridgeville led by John Reynolds and field workers James Orange and Allen Smith.
ccix
 
Reynolds lived with Victoria DeLee and her family throughout his stay in Ridgeville, 
while Orange and Smith boarded with families in Four Holes.
ccx
 
Reynolds, who joined SCLC in 1965, got involved in the civil rights movement 
while working with the Summer Community Organization and Political Education 
(SCOPE) project, a voter registration project launched by Martin Luther King Jr., in 
1965. After the SCOPE project, Reynolds went to SCLC's Citizen Education School in 
South Carolina, directed by Dorothy Cotton and Septima Clark, who recommended him 
to become a part of the SCLC national staff. Reynolds worked on projects with 
communities across Alabama organizing voter registration and direct action protest, 
including demonstrations and boycotts. Reynolds coordinated the Poor People's 
Campaign in New England and continued his work on the Campaign in Resurrection City 
in Washington D.C. in 1968. He also supported South Carolina activists in the 1969 
hospital workers' strike in Charleston, South Carolina before coming to Ridgeville.
ccxi
 
Though Hemphill ordered that Ridgeville Elementary and Four Holes resume 
regular school activities on Monday, September 8, Four Holes residents called for a 
continued boycott of the Four Holes School. SCLC representatives also helped organize a 
boycott of local businesses, hoping to assert pressure within the broader Ridgeville 
community. Four Holes and black community members picketed and boycotted white 
businesses daily and also protested at the St. George courthouse, the county seat. After 
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about a week of renewed protest, DeLee and Reynolds called a meeting with local 
business owners, who then met with the Dorchester School District 3 school board on 
Friday, September 19th. At the end of the meeting, the school board voted three to two to 
admit all Four Holes students who had been denied transfers under the Freedom of 
Choice policy. School board officials enrolled students, gave them their new school 
books, and told students to report on the following Monday, September 22.
ccxii
 The Four 
Holes Students finally had access to the county’s public school system. 
While the Four Holes Community celebrated the news, many white community 
members in Ridgeville, horrified by the school board’s decision, launched their own 
protest. Superintendent DeTreville announced his immediate resignation, unless the 
school board overturned their decision to allow Four Holes students at Ridgeville 
Elementary. He argued that the school board overruled his decision and said he would not 
preside as Superintendent of a school district that allowed overcrowding. By Saturday, 
September 20, around 100 white parents had formed a committee which sought to bar all 
of the admitted Native American students, even those that Judge Hemphill ordered 
enrolled earlier in the month. The group, which named itself The Concerned Parents of 
White Children, called for the immediate resignation of all three school board members 
who voted for the American Indian’s children’s enrollment. The Committee ordered all 
classes suspended on Monday September 22, and resolved to meet with Judge Hemphill 
regarding his September decision. Taking a cue from DeTreville’s threat of resignation, 
following the announced resignation if the board accepted Four Holes students, 
Dorchester County Superintendent, John Bell, who worked with all three Dorchester 
school districts, announced he would not run for reelection if the school board’s decision 
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was upheld. Hundreds of teachers rushed to sign a petition in support of DeTreville. The 
principals of Harleyville-Ridgeville High School and Ridgeville Elementary, along with 
many other teachers, announced their resignations if the decision was not overturned.
ccxiii
  
Kermit Kizer, chairman of the Dorchester 3 school board, and one of the three 
members who voted to enroll American Indian students, argued that the board did not 
intend to overrule anybody’s decision, and that he had arranged for portables buildings to 
be installed at Ridgeville to help with overcrowding. But, white outrage in the 
community gained strength. On Monday, September 22, the School Board held an 
emergency meeting at Harleyville-Ridgeville High School. Over 300 angry white parents 
attended. Kizer, retreating from his initial decision, argued he only the made the decision 
to quell the civil rights protest that was plaguing the community and to prevent a violent 
outbreak, which he claimed civil rights workers had threatened.  During the meeting, he 
said, “it looks like we made a mistake, and I hope to correct it.”ccxiv  
Under pressure from The Concerned Parents of White Children, the School Board 
voided their previous decision, then voted unanimously to deny enrollment of Four Holes 
at Ridgeville Elementary. Following the vote, parents demanded the resignations of Kizer 
and the other two members who supported the earlier enrollment decision. The men 
agreed, and the community appointed three new members to replace them. Four Holes 
parents were informed that their students would no longer be welcome at Ridgeville 
Elementary.
ccxv
 
Despite the reversal, 11 Four Holes parents attempted to enroll their children 
when schools reopened on Tuesday September 23. When they arrived, local police 
arrested and charged parents with interference of the operation of District 3 schools and 
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locked them up in the county jail. Those arrested included Gertie Creel, Rosa Lee Hales, 
Ben Scott, Lillie Ruth Davidson, Ruth Scott, Alice Green, Eunice Russell Johnson, Ruby 
Russell, Leon Russell, Albert Lee Scott, and Lorene Muckelvaney, Their children were 
placed under the care of the Dorchester Welfare Department. Many of them, including 
some infants, allegedly received no food or drink during the entire day. Authorities 
eventually released all parents later that day on $100 bonds, paid by a St. George 
Methodist minister.
ccxvi
  
A few days later, on Thursday, September 25, police arrested another group of 
parents protesting at the Four Holes School. The federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, though 
they did not recognize the Four Holes community as a tribe, agreed to pay the bail of 
those arrested when contacted by SCLC leader John Reynolds. While in jail, local 
authorities threatened parents, arguing that if they protested again, they would be held for 
30 days in violation of Judge Hemphill’s court order on September 4, which declared that 
anyone who disrupted Dorchester schools would be held in contempt of court. 
Authorities, in fact, held three protesters, arrested at both schools, for 30 days. Fred 
Moore represented all protestors and attempted to get all charges against them 
dropped.
ccxvii
  
During the continued protest and the boycott of Four Holes School, John 
Reynolds, Victoria DeLee, and parents in the Four Holes community, wanted to help 
students continue with their education and reached out to students at the University of 
South Carolina. DeLee spoke to three different University activist groups including 
Aware, the South Carolina Revolutionary Youth Movement, and the Students for a 
Democratic Society.
ccxviii
 The University of South Carolina prevented DeLee from 
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speaking on campus, claiming she was not a registered speaker, so she arranged to speak 
at the UFO coffee house, a “favorite hangout for students, servicemen, and hippies.”ccxix 
More than 400 people attended. Jack Malloy, a 23-year old education student at the 
University who later took a leave of absence from the University and moved to the Four 
Holes community remembered, “We saw the need for a school, and the need for a sort of 
academic atmosphere in the midst of the community.”ccxx Many other volunteers came 
forward and started a Freedom School in the Four Holes community. 
Malloy joined with USC education and psychology majors Ralph Courtney, 19 
and Jeanie Hardie, 21, along with one high school graduate of the Four Holes 
Community, Joyce Bradley, to open the new Freedom School. With the assistance of the 
SCLC, these USC students found a house to rent and worked to get support from a 
variety of groups, including the USC Young Democrats and the North Trenholm Baptist 
Church in Columbia. The American Friends Service Committee supplied monetary 
support both to the school and to local families who local social workers had cut off from 
welfare because of their participation in the school boycott. The National Council of 
Churches also offered support and sent truckloads of supplies to the community. Four 
Holes residents donated food for lunches at the Freedom School. Women in the 
community sent homemade jelly and other foods. Ralph Courtney told one reporter, 
“When we have money, we have bologna or peanut butter and jelly sandwiches for lunch. 
Some days we have jelly sandwiches.” USC volunteers slept on mattresses in the back of 
the school and in other houses in Four Holes.
ccxxi
 
 The school operated Monday through Friday, from 9:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. The 
school taught math, reading, history, spelling, and social studies.  Teachers also tried to 
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incorporate information about the Edisto culture and American Indian heritage. 
Additional USC volunteers drove to Four Holes on weekends to help with basic tutoring 
of the children in the community. The school started with an enrollment of twenty 
students and mounted steadily. Soon, almost all of the Four Holes students attended, even 
those who had not been involved in the initial boycott. Teachers also offered night classes 
on nutrition and hygiene for adults. Volunteers cleared a playing field on weekends so 
that children would have a recreational outlet.
ccxxii
 
Many parents in the community provided testimony to the effectiveness of the 
school within the first few weeks of its opening. “My boy is going there and he has 
already learned how to write his name,” remarked one mother to a reporter for The State. 
Teachers divided the school into four sections, with two grades per classroom, except 
first grade, which was private. Discussing the teaching strategy of the school, Courtney 
replied “If we expect them to learn anything, we almost have to teach them individually.” 
Some of the children cannot read at all, and they are in the fourth grade.”ccxxiii Protest 
signs decorated the school’s classrooms, one read “We want to be Free”, another “We are 
being denied our learning.”ccxxiv 
USC volunteers also hoped to educate students about the role of government and 
teach children about their own civil rights. Malloy took students to Columbia where they 
“dropped in” on Governor Robert McNair. McNair expressed concern about the students’ 
situation and said he had heard rumors that Four Holes students would soon be admitted 
to Ridgeville.
ccxxv
 During the tenure of the Freedom School, education students from the 
University of Massachusetts also volunteered in fulfillment of their degree program and 
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field experience. Volunteer students from the University of South Carolina also provided 
medical and dental care to many of the malnourished children. 
ccxxvi
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Four Holes Students Gathered at Freedom School 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Students Learn at Four Holes Freedom School 
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Figure 2.4 Young Four Holes Students at Freedom School 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Four Holes Freedom School 
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Figure 2.6 Four Holes Children Swim in Nearby Four Holes Lake 
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Figure 2.7 Four Holes Student Play Basketball in Four Holes Community 
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Figure 2.8 Meeting of parents and community leaders in Four Holes. 
 
By the beginning of October, protestors in Ridgeville, which now included many 
USC students and South Carolina activists, frustrated with the lack of progress for Four 
Holes students, decided to take a more direct approach. Activists began gathering at the 
Four Holes School and then marching the three miles to Ridgeville Elementary School. 
After the third march on the school, sheriff’s deputies stopped protestors almost as soon 
as they started, keeping them from entering Ridgeville. In early October, protestors 
decided they needed to take more vigorous action, and marched on the streets, entering 
school and city property. Authorities arrested all protesters. Coincidentally, NBC news 
reporters, who were in town to do a story on the Ridgeville boycott, caught the protest 
and arrest on camera. Reporters interviewed Reynolds and the story aired on the Huntley-
Brinkley nightly news on October 3.
ccxxvii
 Most of the arrested activists refused to pay 
their bail and spent several nights in jail.
ccxxviii
  
Local authorities continued to crack down on Four Holes’ protesters. On October 
20, federal marshals, sent by Judge Robert Hemphill to enforce his no-protest order, 
101 
 
arrested Victoria DeLee while driving by Ridgeville Elementary School. Hemphill held 
DeLee for contempt of court on a $10,000 bond. NAACP lawyer Matthew Perry 
assembled a group of several lawyers to come to her aid. Throughout the next few 
months, lawyers made continued motions for Judge Hemphill to disqualify himself 
because he had interacted with the United States Marshals, who had spoken directly with 
him concerning Mrs. DeLee's involvement.
ccxxix
 Hemphill, who at first denied 
wrongdoing and refused to disqualify himself, eventually dropped the charges and 
brought an end to the proceedings.
ccxxx
  
In the meantime, black students at Harlevville-Ridgeville High School faced 
several problems in conjunction with the boycott. On October 30, administrators 
suspended Victoria DeLee’s daughter, Doreatha. Black students believed that 
administrators unduly targeted Doreatha, and they demanded that administrators lift the 
suspension. When administrators did not, 26 black students staged a protest on school 
campus. Local police cited students for contempt of court, also using Judge Hemphill’s 
ruling, and arrested all protestors including DeLee’s daughter. Sherriff Carl Knight 
testified that students began “clapping and screaming and disturbing students in 
classrooms.” In addition, administrators suspended all the protesting students for three 
days. Deputies turned students over to federal marshals who took them to Charleston. 
They were later released with bonds and returned to school on November 4.
ccxxxiccxxxii
 
A few weeks later, on November 15, administrators removed six black students 
from Harleyville-Ridgeville High School for wearing black arm bands on “Moratorium 
Day,” a statewide protest of the Vietnam War held throughout high schools and colleges 
across South Carolina. Fred Moore defended students who took matters to the U.S. 
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District Court as a violation of the Court’s desegregation order. Hemphill ruled that 
District 3 violated the constitutional rights of the students suspended.
ccxxxiii
 Prior to the 
ruling, the Supreme Court had recently ruled in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, that suspending students for wearing black armbands in 
protest of Vietnam violated their constitutional rights. Hemphill reinstated all students 
and demanded that the suspensions be expunged from their records.
ccxxxiv
 In addition, 
Hemphill ordered that Harleyville-Ridgeville High provide a black advisor to the 35 
black students at the school among the 304 total students. The school’s only advisor, who 
was white, worked with all students. DeTreville told Hemphill he would “take the advice 
under consideration.” Hemphill also ordered the formation of a bi-racial committee, per 
his court order earlier in the year.
ccxxxv
 The District failed to establish that committee. 
Throughout November and December, some protests for Four Holes students 
continued, but most protests ceased. Despite their commitment, few gains had been made 
for the Four Holes students. Many protestors served jail time, faced charges from the U.S. 
District Court of South Carolina, and put their jobs and education on the line to help Four 
Holes’ students. As federal marshals continued to arrest any protestor at Dorchester 
Three schools, and as DeLee faced continued court hearings to get her contempt of court 
charge dropped, demonstrations for the community waned. USC students operated the 
Freedom School until Christmas, and then made plans to go back to school for the Spring 
semester. Despite the failures of the movement, Four Holes’ activism created a continued 
legacy of social awareness and education. Four Holes organized a formal tribal council in 
1970, garnered interest in the community’s history from South Carolina historians, and 
are currently working to gain recognition from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
ccxxxvi
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Dorchester County After Total Desegregation 
By August of 1970, the Four Holes School closed, and all Districts in the County 
implemented full desegregation plans for their white, black, and American Indian 
students. Yet, even after Dorchester County school districts implemented unitary school 
systems, black and American Indian residents continued protest tactics initiated in the 
Four Holes school boycott to redress problems within the desegregated system, including 
unfair discipline policies, physical violence against black students, academic tracking, 
and inequitable treatment of black faculty and staff. Multiple black student and 
community protests launched from 1970-1973 demonstrated continued resolve to secure 
safe and equitable education for all students in Dorchester County, in accordance with the 
1964 Civil Rights Act. Subsequent federal legislation and financial support for Southern 
schools exerted continued pressure on Dorchester school districts to implement and 
maintain standards of racial equality and provided the black community with the 
necessary tools to fight for civil rights within the desegregated system. 
 Although the Four Holes School boycott ended, tensions between the black and 
white communities in Dorchester, particularly in the public schools, remained high. Many 
other communities across the state faced similar circumstances. More than fifteen years 
after Brown, school desegregation remained an explosive issue. White residents in South 
Carolina protested desegregation, even committing violent acts against black children. 
Black community activism and protest surged in response to white protest and violence. 
In addition, many black activists protested the closing of all-black schools that had been 
sources of community culture, pride, and history.  
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In Lexington, South Carolina, for instance, fifty black high school students 
protested the playing of “Dixie” at a pep rally in October of 1969; authorities arrested and 
suspended all fifty students. When officials disregarded black parents’ demands that the 
suspensions be dropped, demonstrations in downtown Lexington resulted. Black 
community members subsequently boycotted white businesses and delivered a list of 
grievances regarding the treatment of black students to the school board. In Florence, 
Newberry, and Easley, South Carolina, black students boycotted the public schools in 
opposition to the closing of the previously all-black schools in their communities 
throughout November and December 1969. In March 1970, approximately 200 white 
parents overturned two buses carrying black elementary school students at newly 
integrated Lamar School in Lamar, South Carolina. Unrest in elementary and secondary 
schools came on the heel of protest and violence at black colleges across the State 
including the Orangeburg Massacre in 1968 and student demonstrations at Voorhees 
College in 1969.
ccxxxvii
 
Like many other South Carolina communities, violence erupted in Dorchester, 
when white students targeted the few black students who attended Harleyville-Ridgeville 
High School in the last year before total desegregation. On February 27, 1970, over 100 
white students attacked nineteen black students, including several black females. The 
fight erupted at about 10:00 a.m., just after a bell signaled the first class change of the 
day. Black students maintained that they were victims of a planned attack by a mob of 
white males, who initially targeted Elijah DeLee. Students heard rumors before the attack 
that white students were going to try to attack Victoria’s son. One black student 
overheard a white student say, “My father told me don’t come home if you don’t get 
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Elijah today.”ccxxxviii When the fight broke out, about fifteen white males reportedly 
jumped on top of Elijah, beating and kicking him. Teachers did not interfere to help the 
black victims. In fact, some teachers allegedly encouraged the white attackers.
ccxxxix
  
As a result of the assault, three black females received such severe beatings that 
they had to be hospitalized. Black students claimed shouts of “Kill the Niggers” could be 
heard throughout the attack. Superintendent DeTreville suspended three black students 
for the attack, including two of Victoria DeLee’s children, Elijah and Doreatha. No white 
students received any punishment. The principal of the school, William Reeves, and 
Superintendent DeTreville, denied any fault on the part of white students and claimed it 
resulted from a spontaneous clash between one white and one black student.
ccxl
 
In the aftermath of the attack, the approximately 30 black students at Harleyville-
Ridgeville High refused to go school. Represented by Fred Moore, their parents filed suit 
with Judge Hemphill and asked for federal marshals to be assigned to the schools for 
their children’s protection. On March 4, students initiated an official boycott of schools, 
including all ninety black students who attended predominantly white schools throughout 
the District. “The children have decided they can’t take it any longer,” Victoria DeLee 
told a Washington Post reporter. “They have been beaten three to four times a year since 
1965 and every time a white child does something to a black child, the black child gets 
suspended.”ccxli  On the same day that The Washington Post published DeLee’s 
statement, Victoria DeLee and her family received threats from the Dorchester County 
Ku Klux Klan, which warned DeLee to get out of town or “face booby traps in your 
home and your car.” A letter to her said compatriots were in Charleston buying “hand 
grenades, dynamite caps, dynamite, and other destructive articles.”ccxlii  
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On March 27, Judge Hemphill heard the student case and worked to secure an 
agreement between the school board and black parents. Hemphill wanted each side to 
agree that they would retain mutual respect for the other. Hemphill ruled that all three 
suspended students must be reinstated.
ccxliii
 Throughout the proceedings, Superintendent 
DeTreville blamed DeLee for the racial tensions in Dorchester and argued that her 
behavior was singlehandedly destroying the public school system. DeTreville claimed 
that a lot of “good black students” would like to be in school but could not go because 
they feared DeLee, who was only holding out until her children were reinstated.
ccxliv
 
DeTreville argued that white students felt no animosity towards black children, and that 
all the racial problems at Harleyville-Ridgeville High were initiated and perpetuated by 
DeLee’s son and daughter. Black students returned to school on April 1, each side 
promising Hemphill to respect the other.
ccxlv
 
Throughout the late 1960s, many white community members, increasingly 
frustrated with desegregation, did in fact abandon the public schools in Dorchester. In 
1968, black students made up about 60 percent of Dorchester 3 schools. By 1970, black 
students comprised 68 percent of the student body as white students enrolled in private 
school. Many former teachers and school board members opened a segregated private 
school in District 3 in 1968: Mims Academy, which maintained close to 300 students. An 
AFSC investigator found that Mims “acted as a parasite to the public schools.”ccxlvi The 
Mims school board took bleachers from a Dorchester 3 middle school for private use and 
allegedly took other books and supplies. Mims also used the Harleyville-Ridgeville High 
School gym for their school games and did not allow black people or students in the gym 
during that time. Chairman of Dorchester’s County School Board, Joe Pendarvais, 
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enrolled his children at Mims, along with the District Secretary. County Attorney James 
Bell (previously County Superintendent during the Four Holes boycott) served as a board 
member of Mims, along with Chester Kizer, the brother of city Council Chairman and 
former Dorchester 3 chairman of the Board, Kermit Kizer. Neil Infinger, a relative of 
police chief Carl Knight, also served.  Because the Board was closely tied with the 
Dorchester County power structure, it acted as a drain to the public school system.
ccxlvii
 
 
Total Desegregation in Dorchester 
The Fall of 1970 marked the first year of total desegregation in Dorchester 3 
under the US District Court’s desegregation order. Many black schools closed, along with 
Four Holes. DeLee, who wanted to reach out to poor and disadvantaged children, asked 
District 3 to use the old Four Holes Building for a Day Care Center that would service 
poor and minority children within the District. The school board allowed DeLee to use 
the building, but provided no funds. DeLee aimed to educate young black and American 
Indian children and started with approximately 70 children. The staff included four 
volunteer teachers, two volunteer cooks, and staff assistants including several 
Neighborhood Youth Corps workers and some volunteers. The Director of the Center 
was Mrs. J.W. Robinson, the wife of a local minister, who also served as the newly 
appointed advisor to the black children Harleyville-Ridgeville High School. The South 
Carolina Commission of Human Relations (SCCHR) supported the Day Care Center with 
individual member donations. DeLee worked to provide balanced and wholesome meals 
for the children who attended. The Center struggled to provide the proper educational 
materials, costs for utilities and transportation, and also staff. DeLee used her own money 
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at times to float the Center. Throughout 1970, DeLee worked to secure the needed funds. 
Despite impoverished conditions, DeLee told Paul Matthias of the South Carolina 
Commission of Human Relations, on which DeLee also served, “I have faith. If I can just 
get some of these folks to come down here and look these kids in the eyes and see how 
much just the little bit we are doing here means.”ccxlviii The first few years were difficult, 
but DeLee, with the help of Strom Thurmond and other South Carolina representatives, 
later secured federal funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity to operate the 
school.
ccxlix
 
DeLee also worked to reconstruct local, state, and national political processes and 
power throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. DeLee and other members of the 
Dorchester NAACP began entering Democratic Party precinct activity and black 
residents began running for offices in every voting precinct in Dorchester County. In 
early efforts, Dorchester blacks were actually relatively successful in gaining power in 
the local precincts because of poor attendance by local white residents at precinct 
meetings. One year, African Americans actually won the majority of major county 
Democratic precinct offices.
ccl
 White backlash soon followed, however, and whites then 
began to work to prevent black participation. White Democrats would postpone precinct 
meetings until more whites could arrive and use other methods of blocking black political 
power. DeLee protested illegal action of white Democrats to the County Convention and 
Democratic Executive Committee, but her protests were ignored.
ccli
 
White Democrats routinely suppressed black political participation in the 
Democratic Party throughout South Carolina and many other states in the South. In 1969, 
citing abuses and repression by the State Democratic Party and calling for action to 
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ensure enfranchisement for black people, black leaders and progressive whites across 
South Carolina decided to form a third political party. DeLee attended the organizational 
meeting for the United Citizens Party of South Carolina and was elected vice-president. 
Like the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, which preceded it by four years, the 
UCP sought to “speak for the silent majority of blacks and poor whites who are vitally 
concerned with issues of survival.”cclii 
By November 1970, the United Citizens Party fielded candidates for governor and 
lieutenant governor. After the death of South Carolina’s First Congressional District 
representative, Mendel Rivers, in 1971, the UCP entered its second statewide race, 
unanimously nominating DeLee as its candidate. DeLee campaigned on a progressive 
platform that emphasized economic and social justice for the “red, white, and black 
man.”ccliii Even though she lost the race, she did win in some precincts, and upset the 
balance of power between Democrats and Republicans in three counties in the District. 
Her success eventually encouraged the Democratic Party to be more inclusive of African 
American voters.
ccliv
 
In the meantime, racial tensions remained high at Harleyville-Ridgeville High 
School during the first full year of desegregation. Black parents and students argued that 
the new school principal, Lucius Brown, and other teachers and administrators, used 
harsh and unfair discipline policies on black students, particularly suspensions and 
expulsions. These measures had grave effects on black student academic success because 
teachers did not allow expelled and suspended students to make up missed assignments. 
Many black parents around the State and throughout the South felt black students 
received unreasonably harsh punishments after desegregation, which undermined their 
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ability to succeed under the desegregated system. The issue became explosive, and was a 
leading cause of black protest following school desegregation.  
On February 1971, Lucius Brown expelled seven black students and one white 
student for the remainder of the year for fighting. Because of the expulsions, black 
student unrest erupted and parents appealed the decision to U.S. District Judge Hemphill. 
Students also created a list of grievances for the school administration. They argued that 
teachers and administrators favored white students. Students complained that the 
homecoming queen, nominated by the faculty after full integration, was white. Students 
also accused the administration of suspending black children and not suspending white 
children.
cclv
  
DeTreville and Brown claimed that all allegations were untrue and that “white 
students were tolerant and long-suffering” in their response to black students. In a private 
letter, Brown argued that “white students took it as long as they could, that is the kicks, 
jostles, and pushes in the hall.”cclvi Lawyers representing the expelled black students 
argued that black students had done nothing wrong, and in no way deserved school 
expulsion. DeLee also sponsored a boycott of white merchants during the standoff. On 
May 17, 1971, Hemphill finally heard the case and ordered that all black students be 
readmitted to school.
cclvii
 
Meanwhile, under the encouragement of Governor John West, a racial moderate 
who became South Carolina governor in 1970, the General Assembly of South Carolina 
addressed some disparities in the state. In 1972, The General Assembly created the 
 Human Affairs Commission, which had the power to “encourage fair treatment for, and 
to eliminate and prevent discrimination against, any member of a group protected by this 
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act, and to foster mutual understanding and respect for people across this state.”cclviii  
George Hamilton, an ordained minister with the A.M.E. church, secured the role as the 
executive director and became the first black person in South Carolina to head a major 
state agency. Though largely focused on creating economic justice for black South 
Carolinians, the Commission quickly became entangled with various black protest 
movements in public schools across the State, including Dorchester County.  
By the start of the year in 1973, black students and teachers in Dorchester still 
faced obstacles in the public school system. School administrators, particularly at the 
high school level, assigned students and teachers to classes by race. In addition, 
principals and superintendents systematically overlooked black teachers for positions of 
leadership. For instance, black community members argued that at Ridgeville Elementary 
School, black teachers with higher academic qualifications taught lower level classes 
while white teachers with lower academic qualifications taught higher level classes at the 
same grade level. The black community also argued that administrators used 
discriminatory employment in the kitchen staffs of the county schools, hiring all white 
cooks and all black dishwashers.
cclix
  
Administrators overlooked individual black teachers and coaches at Harleyville-
Ridgeville for promotion, angering black residents. One instance came when 
administrators overlooked Samuel Hart, an experienced black coach at Harleyville-
Ridgeville High, for athletic director. Hart, who had a  master’s degree in physical 
education, an A certificate on the NTE, and many years of outstanding service as a coach, 
served as an interim athletic director for Harleyville-Ridgeville High School when his 
immediate supervisor, a white coach with lower qualifications and receiving a higher 
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salary, left the school. Hart served in this capacity with no increase in salary for one 
school term, before being replaced by a white athletic director from outside the district 
who received a salary substantially higher than Hart, and an option of bringing an 
assistant coach with him, demoting Hart to the third ranking coach.
cclx
  
Parents also complained that school board officials maintained their children in 
private schools while neglecting public school facilities. Schools had malfunctioning 
bathroom facilities, inefficient gym equipment, and bare wire hanging from ceilings. 
Classrooms were overcrowded and some classes did not have the adequate number of 
textbooks. Black residents also complained of nepotistic hiring practices within the 
District. They claimed that many wives, sisters, and friends of the DeTreville and many 
principals in the district worked in positions that they were not qualified to do. They 
argued that nepotistic practices discouraged qualified blacks in the system, particularly in 
instances that whites hired were less qualified academically than potential black 
employees.  They also cited three white teachers in the system with only high school 
degrees and no college experience.
cclxi
 
On January 22, 1973, DeLee sent letters listing these and other grievances to the 
South Carolina Human Affairs Commission, County and District 3 school board 
members, and the office of Governor John West. DeLee, who also served as chairman of 
the Parent’s Committee of Dorchester County, demanded that the school board hold a 
special meeting to discuss the Parent’s Committee’s grievances by January 25. When 
board members refused to meet with them, DeLee called for a black boycott of all 
Dorchester District 3 schools, including students, teachers, and bus drivers. 
Superintendent DeTreville closed district schools on Friday, January 26, to avoid 
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confrontation. District Three Schools reopened on Monday, January 29, with only about 
fifty percent of students in attendance.
cclxii
 
George Hamilton and the Commission on Human Affairs, traveled to Dorchester 
to help mediate the conflict. Hamilton called and presided over a meeting held on 
Tuesday, January 30, at the Superintendent’s office, located at Harleyville-Ridgeville 
High School. Some faculty members attended, along with the Parent’s Committee, 
Superintendent DeTreville, and three members on the Human Affairs Commission. Isaac 
Williams, who served as field secretary for the South Carolina NAACP attended, along 
with the President of the South Carolina NAACP Matthew McCollum. Fred Moore also 
attended. During the meeting, DeLee and other parents reiterated the community’s 
grievances and stated that Superintendent DeTreville perpetuated segregationist practices, 
and in effect, operated a dual school system.
cclxiii
  
At the end of the almost three-hour meeting, DeLee called for the resignation of 
Richard DeTreville and Joseph Pendarvais, the current chairman of the District 3 school 
board. Pendarvais admitted that some of the accusations made by the Parent’s Committee 
were well founded, and he agreed to consider the grievances and formally respond in 
 writing to the South Carolina Commission on Human Affairs. DeTreville acknowledged 
that he had passed up Hart for athletic director.  He followed by saying, “The mess this 
school district is in…I wouldn’t come myself.” At this DeLee said “We don’t want you; 
you don’t even like the school system.”cclxiv Both of DeTreville’s children attended 
private school.  
Meanwhile, Judge Hemphill ordered an end to the boycott end and issued a 
federal restraining order against anyone interfering with the operation of Dorchester 
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schools. The demanded that Victoria DeLee specifically, and anyone else generally, who 
disrupted the operation of schools be charged. Dorchester County Attorney James A. Bell 
(the former superintendent who threatened resignation when Four Holes students were 
allowed at Ridgeville Elementary) secured the restraint.
cclxv
 
Black students decided to resume school attendance on January 31. The Human 
Affairs Commission asked that the school board consider student grievances and respond 
by February 9
th
.  But problems continued throughout the District. Tensions remained very 
high at Harleyville-Ridgeville School and several fights between white and black 
students took place. And though the District 3 boycott ended, another protest began in 
Dorchester District 2 on the same day District 3 students returned to school. Students at 
Summerville High School led a walkout and subsequent protest, refusing to leave the 
school campus until the administration met their demands. Police arrested all students 
who participated and took three busloads of protesting black students at Summerville 
High to St. George for processing. Police eventually released students on $100 bonds.
cclxvi
 
District 2’s boycott lasted two weeks, and ended on February 15. When black students 
returned to school in District 2, the administration immediately suspended them for their 
participation in the boycott. 
Throughout both Dorchester school boycotts, the Dorchester County School 
Board, the Ku Klux Klan, and other white terror organizations harassed DeLee and made 
many obscene and threatening phone calls directed at her and the Day Care Center she 
started in Ridgeville, which by 1973 had more than one-hundred and twenty-five 
students.
cclxvii
 The Office of Economic Opportunity granted the Center 75,000 dollars to 
teach preschool children basic educational skills, hygiene, and nutrition. DeLee also ran 
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night classes out of the center for adults in the community. Governor John West attended 
the Day Care Center in 1971, and after his visit, he introduced a plan to launch public 
daycare centers throughout South Carolina. West stated that his visit “strengthened his 
 conviction that daycare centers are a necessity.”cclxviii  But local whites in Dorchester 
County resented the Center. During the 1973 high school boycotts, the Dorchester 
County school board told DeLee she could no longer use the facility after June 1.
cclxix
 The 
Ku Klux Klan threatened DeLee multiple times. One letter threatened, “We’ll get you 
and your family—your family is in danger.”cclxx Another threat read, “We’re going to 
burn your little baby—your Day Care Center down.”cclxxi  
Earnest Geddis, a resident of the Club House community who was on the board at 
the Day Care Center, and had been a plaintiff in the desegregation suit against Dorchester 
2, found a white man spying during a black community meeting during the Dorchester 2 
school boycott. Geddis and the man fought, and the white man fled the meeting. A few 
days later, on February 10, Geddis went to a white-owned store and bought kerosene to 
help build a fire in his home. When he returned home, he poured the newly purchased 
kerosene onto his fire. It immediately exploded, killing his mother and burning down his 
home. The fire also injured two of his children who received severe burns. Geddis 
claimed he was given gasoline instead of kerosene.
cclxxii
 
Then, on February 20, just days after after the District 2 boycott ended, one of the 
Day Care Center buses wrecked while carrying almost thirty children to school. The van, 
driven by Victoria DeLee’s son, Elijah, spun out of control, crossed into the opposite lane 
on a highway, and ran into a ditch, sideswiping several trees. The accident killed three 
small children, a six year old, a four year old, and three year old. Elijah, only 23 years old 
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himself, was also severely injured and hospitalized for several weeks. Victoria DeLee 
immediately suspected that foul play was involved. The day before, incidents occurred 
involving two other Day Care Center cars.  One Day Care Center bus had a steering 
wheel fall off and a Center car also lost a wheel when an employee drove it. Despite 
DeLee’s claims, authorities tried Elijah for involuntary manslaughter as a result of the 
incident.
cclxxiii
 He was convicted of negligence in May of 1974 and sentenced to three 
years in federal prison.
cclxxiv
 
After Elijah’s arrest, Victoria DeLee and her family faced continued legal 
problems. Elijah, who was on the payroll of the Day Care Center from the time of his 
, accident received payments of $240 dollars a month from the Center, even after he went 
to prison. The Governor’s office and Senator Ernest F. Hollings noticed the irregularity 
after a series of articles in the Dorchester newspaper, The Summerville Scene, reported 
fraud at the Center and accused the board of hiring many of DeLee’s children and school 
aged grandchildren. In addition, the local school system claimed it never approved 
DeLee’s use of the former Four Holes School and planned to appeal it. As a result, all 
funding to the Center was stopped. In July of 1975, HEW audited the Center’s finances at 
the request of Hollings. Victoria DeLee justified continued payments to Elijah on the 
grounds that he was working for the Center and was injured when the wreck 
occurred.
cclxxv
  
Even though Victoria DeLee started the Day Care Center, she was not the 
project’s executive director. J.C. McTeer, a local Dorchester minister, served as the 
director and hired Elijah. McTeer died on August 27, 1973 and left her to serve as the 
project’s interim executive director. After his death, DeLee claimed that McTeer wrote a 
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$3000 check to buy a new Cadillac, drawn from the OEO account funds granted to the 
Center. This sparked separate federal investigations, however, because DeLee had 
cosigned the check.
cclxxvi
 Before the investigation launched by HEW, DeLee had also 
taken funds from various federal agencies for multiple antipoverty programs as the 
executive director of the Dorchester County Educational Project. Those agencies 
included the Department of Agriculture, and the Community Service Administration, (the 
former Office of Educational Opportunity). When those federal organizations launched 
investigations they also found DeLee guilty of “embezzling, willfully misapplying, 
stealing and obtaining by fraud, monies, funds, and other assets of the federal 
government.”cclxxvii 
Federal agents indicted DeLee with 48 counts of embezzling 60,000 dollars from 
the federal government between 1972 and 1975, largely by entering the names of 
fictitious or ineligible persons on the payroll at the Day Care Center and other anti-
poverty programs. DeLee, represented by Fred Moore, initially denied all wrong doing, 
but in December of 1976 eventually pleaded guilty of conspiracy to defraud the 
government in order to get a lesser charge. As a result, DeLee received three years in 
prison. The investigation also implicated several of DeLee’s children including Verbenia 
DeLee Jefferson and husband Harold Jefferson, along with Doreatha DeLee Neat and son 
Elijah received a three-year sentence. DeLee’s daughters Verbenia Elijah DeLee. 
Jefferson and Doreatha Neat were sentenced for three and four years respectively. Harold 
Jefferson, husband of Verbenia Jefferson, received six months.
cclxxviii
  
Victoria DeLee served her sentence in a federal prison in Lexington, Kentucky. 
Because of failing health, she served less than a year. Authorities released DeLee in 
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September 1977 to serve several more months in a halfway house before being released 
back to Ridgeville. After prison, DeLee wholly retreated from civil rights activism. 
Toward the end of her life, she did sit for a few personal oral histories and participated in 
a few commemorative events.
cclxxix
 In an oral history done by Cleveland Sellers in 2006, 
DeLee reflected that her civil rights activism took a large toll on her relationship with her 
husband and children. She reminisced that her activism had consumed her, and felt that in 
many ways she sacrificed her family in her struggle for their civil rights. DeLee also 
discussed the financial burden her activism placed on her family. She recalled that some 
days her children could not eat because she used all of their money to bail out an activist 
or to pay for gas to drive them to the voting polls. DeLee passed away on June 14, 2010 
from complications with brain surgery.
cclxxx
 
While rural Dorchester County has not taken a central focus in the memory and 
history of America’s civil rights movement, Dorchester’s local history and civil rights 
struggles, particularly after 1964, expose the burden that changing federal civil rights 
legislation placed on black Americans. While the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act 
laid the groundwork for the implementation of federally guaranteed civil rights and 
desegregation, black communities and activists across the South inherited the ongoing 
responsibility of ensuring that those rights would be meaningfully applied in their own 
communities, schools, and lives. But while local black activists worked to fulfill those 
rights, local white residents also worked to influence the trajectory and outcome of 
desegregation. Using positions of political, economic, and social power, white politicians, 
law enforcement agencies, and school administrators manipulated federal and state law, 
in addition to school policy, to maintain white supremacy after desegregation.  The push 
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and pull between white and black community members not only affected the ways in 
which desegregation manifested in their own communities, but also influenced the ways 
in which federal policymakers perceived their own duties to uphold federally guaranteed 
civil rights across the county. As these battles ensued in communities across the South, 
HEW, federal courts, and U.S. lawmakers all revised their own approaches and 
understanding of the federal government’s role in ensuring civil rights for all Americans.   
In the aftermath of the Civil Rights Act in Dorchester County, the black 
community achieved many victories. But, they also experienced many defeats. Victoria 
DeLee dedicated her life to ensure that future generations of black Americans would not 
endure the repression she experienced as a child, but in the process of fighting for racial 
justice, DeLee and her family members endured great pain and sacrifice. While 
Dorchester County eventually underwent full desegregation in its school system, it came 
at a cost to many community activists, parents, teachers, and children. Twenty years after 
Brown, and ten years after the Civil Rights Act, many black children in Dorchester never 
received quality education, were unprotected from discriminatory disciplinary measures, 
tracked to lower academic classes, and had access to less qualified public school teachers 
and resources. W.E.B. DuBois once said, “The cost of liberty is less than the cost of 
repression.”cclxxxi While black activists, parents, and children in Dorchester must have 
wholeheartedly agreed with DuBois when they waged their campaign for better education 
and political rights, the failure of Dorchester County to achieve the promise of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act in the years after its passage, kept the cost of attaining liberty for many 
black Americans especially great. 
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Chapter 3 
High School Students, The Catholic, and the Struggle for Integrated Education in 
Rock Hill, South Carolina 1970-1972 
 
On January 26, 1972, 200 black students walked out of Rock Hill High School. 
Students, already angered by the firing and demotion of their favorite black coaches after 
desegregation, racially discriminatory discipline policies, and the lack of classes on black 
studies at Rock Hill High, decided to launch a walk-out after the Rock Hill High band 
director forced black students to play “Dixie.”cclxxxii Students walked for several miles 
towards Rock Hill’s downtown district, passing the infamous McCrory’s Drug Store, 
where ten years earlier local authorities arrested nine local Rock Hill college students and 
sentenced them to hard labor on a prison chain gang for simply sitting down at an all- 
white lunch counter.
cclxxxiii
 A few blocks later, the students reached their final destination, 
the former all-black Emmett Scott Senior High. As they walked, they began singing the 
Scott-ite alma mater, which they all knew by heart. Dear Emmett Scott to thee lead us we 
pray. Open our eyes that we might see the dawn of day. The Gold, The Blue, we with 
glory cry, Ever we sing they praise Dear Old Scott High. As students approached the 
once lively school that had been the center of their community for 50 years, however, all 
they found was a closed-up, deserted building.
cclxxxiv
  
After students reached Emmett Scott, they decided to approach Brother David 
Boone, who worked at Rock Hill’s all-black St. Mary’s Catholic Church and Rock Hill 
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Oratory, a local Catholic mission located nearby the Emmett Scott building. The Oratory 
had provided and sustained student protest in Rock Hill for over two decades, including 
the Friendship Nine sit-ins of 1960 and 1961, voter registration drives in partnership with 
the American Friends Service Committee in 1963, and community activism in 
conjunction with the Congress of Racial Equality throughout the 1960s.
cclxxxv
 
“BroDavid,” as the kids affectionately called him, knew all the families in the 
community, not only through his church service, but through his participation in the all-
black city recreational sports leagues. Boone and the Oratory also facilitated the all-black 
Young Men’s and Young Women’s Clubs of Rock Hill in which many of the students 
were active members.
cclxxxvi
 After talking with the students, Boone called Superintendent 
Jeff Savage of Rock Hill Schools, and Principal Calvin Burleson of Rock Hill High, but 
they refused to assist him or talk to the students. In response, students worked in 
conjunction with the Oratory and effectively organized a two month-long school boycott 
of Rock Hill High that demanded a bi-racial student council instead of the white only 
student council that existed, recognition of black student achievement by school 
administrators and teachers, and new school colors, mascots, and school alma mater that 
reflected the history of Emmett Scott. They also demanded a black studies program and 
more equitable disciplinary policy for black and white students.
cclxxxvii
  
In the Spring of 1970, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered all South 
Carolina school districts to end their dual systems of public education, and Rock Hill 
school district, located in York County approximately 30 miles south of Charlotte, North 
Carolina, had to hurriedly implement total desegregation in the Fall of 1970.
cclxxxviii
 Rock 
Hill’s school board, whose African American student population composed 
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approximately 40 percent of the total population in the district, proved ill-equipped to 
facilitate such a drastic physical and emotional transition.
cclxxxix
 The district closed all of 
its black elementary schools, with some of those schools undergoing renovations and 
reopening the following year under different names.
ccxc
 The most intense controversy 
erupted over the school board’s decision to close Emmett Scott High School, the former 
all-black school in Rock Hill.  
Named after Emmett J. Scott, who served as Booker T. Washington’s chief aide, 
the school opened in the 1920s and functioned as a facility that not only educated 
students in academics, but also served as a vital center of community life.  Its students, 
teachers, parents, and administrators went to church together, participated in community 
events with one another, and lived in the same neighborhoods. Intertwined with Emmett 
Scott was the city’s all-black recreational sports league and the Young Men’s and 
Women’s Clubs that facilitated social events, student activism, and student leadership. 
Boone and other church members hosted recreational activities and Club activities at St. 
Mary’s Church, which the kids called “The Catholic,” just a short walk from Emmett 
Scott Senior High. Together, Emmett Scott and The Catholic formed the center of social, 
academic, political, and financial activity within the community, launching voter 
registration drives, sit-ins, and educational programs for the black community of Rock 
Hill.
ccxci
 Instead of rezoning half of the white students from Rock Hill High School to the 
Emmett Scott Senior High, and vice-versa, school district administrators decided to shut 
down Emmett Scott completely, forcing all the high school students from the district, 
both black and white, into what became an overcrowded Rock Hill High School.
ccxcii
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Unlike some South Carolina school districts, like Bowman and Calhoun discussed 
in later dissertation chapters, Rock Hill School District had a minority African American 
population and did not experience major private school movement activity in the 
community.
ccxciii
 But the all-white school board and majority-white school administration 
still operated within a community whose history remained firmly entrenched in racial 
segregation. When the federal government forced the community to desegregate, Rock 
Hill High School’s administration worked within the parameters of newly established 
federal desegregation guidelines, using discriminatory discipline measures, academic 
tracking by race, and black exclusion from extra-curricular activities and the school 
community, to maintain segregated learning and white supremacy in the desegregated 
system. Post-desegregation discrimination affected students’ personal and social 
identities, academic success, and perceptions about the larger society of which they were 
a part, and black student struggles unearth the ways in which desegregation shaped the 
lives and futures of black students in the post-Jim Crow era.  
Ultimately, black students wanted to be a part of the unitary school system, not 
separated from it, but demanded full inclusion. In order to challenge new forms of Jim 
Crow practices in the 1970s, black students in Rock Hill risked expulsion and suspension 
and put their academic futures on the line to reform their school system. Rock Hill 
student activism spread to the neighboring community of Fort Mill, also part of York 
County, whose high school students launched a walkout in support of Rock Hill students 
and to demonstrate against racial discriminatory policies and practices in Fort Mill.
ccxciv
 
At the close of the student boycotts, student efforts fell short of achieving equal 
educational status for black students, but their endeavors were an integral part of the 
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struggle by African Americans to attain equal participation and citizenship, and continued 
to lay the groundwork for collective responses to everyday injustices. 
Rock Hill’s superintendent, Jeff Savage, claimed “civility and elegance” defined 
Rock Hill’s initial integration attempts in Fall 1970.ccxcv Savage, who came to Rock Hill 
School District in 1968 from neighboring North Carolina, assured the citizens of Rock 
Hill that he was “there to follow the law,” and would make integration “successful at all 
costs.”ccxcvi  Yet, while newspapers and school boards celebrated the smooth start of the 
year, black students faced many hindrances to quality education. Overcrowding 
exaggerated physical tensions and agitated all students as they adjusted to their new 
school environments.  White teachers and counselors assigned many black students to 
remediated academic classes because they assumed black students could not perform on 
the same level as white students, which contributed to segregated learning inside 
desegregated schools.
ccxcvii
 Desegregation also transformed school discipline policies; in 
1973, black students at Rock Hill High received expulsions and suspensions 3 times as 
often as white students.
ccxcviii
  
During the 1970 school year, the school board planned to build a new high school 
to open in the fall of 1971, but until then, students had very little room to negotiate their 
new school identities and changing social space. Rock Hill High School held twice its 
capacity, leading to graduating classes of 1971 and 1972 of over 700 students. During 
class changes, the mobs of students in the hallways were four and five deep on each side. 
Students navigating these crowded halls often inadvertently came into physical contact 
with others; knocking into other students and stepping on feet. Fights and outbreaks 
became commonplace, particularly between white and black students. The situation 
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became so volatile that several students resorted to keeping weapons such as baseball 
bats and knives in their lockers.
ccxcix
  
The Rock Hill School Board assigned Sam Foster, the last principal of Emmett 
Scott, to Sullivan Junior- Senior High School as principal during the fall of 1970. 
Because of Rock Hill High School’s overcrowding, the school district forced half of the 
tenth grade students that should have been at Rock Hill High to stay at Sullivan Junior 
High until the new high school was complete. This policy overinflated the student rolls at 
Sullivan causing many seventh graders to stay at elementary schools, and many ninth 
graders, mostly black ninth graders, to spend their year at an old Rock Hill High facility. 
Much of the difficulty in maintaining a safe and peaceful school environment for Sam 
Foster resulted from the lack of space in stairwells, bus lots, and classrooms. At Sullivan, 
students were literally packed in shoulder to shoulder during class changes. 
Administrators found fighting and bullying impossible to fully monitor.
ccc
   
Because of tense race relations, discipline issues became much more complex. 
Before 1970, parents trusted and expected teachers to implement strict discipline policies. 
But after desegregation, black parents mistrusted unfamiliar white teachers disciplining 
their children. Wade Witherspoon, whose father was a former principal at Emmett Scott, 
was transferred from Emmett Scott to Rock Hill High in 1970, and vividly remembered 
the controversy caused by white teachers paddling black students.
ccci
 Suspension and 
expulsion rates soared in the district for all students; Sullivan Middle School suspended 
or expelled 50 percent of its black students in 1973, compared to 23 percent of its white 
students, while students at Rock Hill High were suspended more than 3 times as often as 
white students.
cccii
 In 1973, South Carolina implemented a Student Discipline Law, 
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defining minimum procedures and causes for student suspensions and expulsions and 
setting new state regulations for implementing out-of-school punishment measures. But 
before 1973, school districts could administer this form of punishment at their own 
discretion with little accountability and no communication or notification to parents. 
Even after 1973, Rock Hill school district failed to implement many required discipline 
policies and procedures required by the state discipline law.
ccciii
 Discriminatory policies 
and the breakdown in parent-teacher cooperation ultimately undermined the success of 
many students in the post-desegregation generation.  
Age-old myths held by white Southerners regarding the need to protect white 
femininity against black men also plagued desegregated schools, not only among 
students, but among teachers and administrators. Black male administrators and teachers 
had to be extremely cautious when dealing with white female students whose dress was 
not in line with the school dress code. On one occasion, Foster instructed a female 
guidance counselor to talk with a white female student about what was considered 
inappropriate skirt length. Upon finding out about the situation, the student’s parents 
arrived angrily at the school accusing Foster of deviant behavior for noticing her short 
skirt length.
ccciv
 Conflicts among white female and black male students also surfaced. On 
one occasion at Sullivan, a white female student accused a black male student of pulling 
her hair repeatedly in class in a flirtatious manner. The female’s father demanded the 
black student be physically punished in his presence and petitioned the matter to the 
school board when school administrators refused to do so.
cccv
   
White teachers often used lower academic standards for black students and often 
tracked them into lower level classes. Claudia Brown, a white middle school teacher in 
127 
 
1970 in Rock Hill, remembered the academic tracking that black students experienced. 
“At that time,” she recollected, “they were doing what they called, they had five groups. 
Levels one, two, three, four, and five.  I had some level two’s, and I didn’t have any black 
students in the two’s. I had some five’s and I would say that group was half [white] and 
half [black].”cccvi  Nathaniel Barber, a sophomore at Rock Hill High in 1970, was one of 
few black students who made it into advanced, college preparatory classes. While his 
friends were in the building, he hardly spoke to them once he entered the school building 
because few other black students shared his schedule. He was only able to interact with 
other black students at lunch. When asked about the isolation he felt during those years, 
Barber quietly responded, “You don’t ever want to know what that is like.”cccvii  
In addition, teachers were ill-equipped to handle teaching in racially diverse 
atmospheres. The school district provided no teacher training during the desegregation 
process. Dill Gamble, a black school principal in the early 1970s in Spartanburg, South 
Carolina, whose dismissal as a coach in Sumter had sparked a student walkout in 1971, 
walked around classrooms to see white teachers who simply let black students sleep or 
goof off. Whereas black teachers would not have let their students behave that way at 
Emmett Scott, white teachers did, and in doing so, did not demand the best from their 
students. Certain white teachers at Rock Hill High also developed reputations for never 
passing black students. Calvin Burleson, principal at Rock Hill High, avoided assigning 
black students to certain white teachers because he knew that “a black kid couldn’t 
survive in that teacher’s class.”cccviii  On one occasion, Sam Foster had to go to court with 
several student witnesses to defend a black student against false accusations by a white 
teacher of attacking a white female. The black male student interceded in a fight between 
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two females, one black and one white, and the teacher who witnessed the event told 
parents that the black male student had attacked the white female.  Luckily, enough white 
and black student witnesses were able to come to the defense of the accused student, and 
authorities dropped the criminal charges brought against him.
cccix
 
The University of South Carolina established the State Desegregation Center to 
help with post-desegregation problems and worked to bring communities together, help 
teachers cooperate with one another, and also to teach teachers and students ways to cope 
as desegregation took place. Based out of the University of South Carolina, many 
graduate students, teachers, counselors, and administrators traveled throughout the state 
and worked one-on-one with schools, encouraging conversations and strategies to 
promote effective and peaceful integration. Paul Beazley worked for the Center as a 
graduate student. Beazley and others from the Desegregation Center held discussions to 
help promote understanding between white and black residents. Beazley explained, “We 
would go into a school and work with the teachers trying to help them to understand that 
black parents loved their children just as much as white parents do. That black children 
were not deficient intellectually. And we would try to instill in them some kind of 
appreciation for the problems they were facing for dealing with what would ultimately 
become a unified education.”cccx  However, in order for the State Desegregation Center to 
help South Carolina school districts, those districts had to request assistance from the 
Center. Rock Hill’s superintendent never asked for help.cccxi 
The second year of desegregation in Rock Hill yielded little improvement for 
black students at Rock Hill High. Rock Hill did open a second high school, Northwestern 
High School, in the academic year of 1971-1972, giving the faculty, staff, and students, 
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much more room to operate. The school board appointed Sam Foster, the former 
principal of Emmett Scott, as the new administrator of Northwestern. In preparation for 
his school opening in Fall 1971, he met with teachers, organized athletic assignments, 
allowed students to pick school colors (which incorporated gold from Emmett Scott’s 
colors of blue and gold), and mascots, and met with students over the summer, to ensure 
a smooth start for the year. Because Northwestern was a new school, in many ways, it 
represented a fresh start for black and white students, a place where all students could 
form a community together, with more space and less tension. While Foster had to defuse 
many tense situations such as racial fighting and defilement of his school building with 
racist graffiti after its opening, he believed that the year showed much promise of what an 
integrated school could achieve. But at Rock Hill High, the tensions only mounted, and 
the feelings of exclusion grew among the black student body. 
As the 1971-1972 school year progressed, black students at Rock Hill High 
continued to feel discounted. School colors and mascots had been left to reflect Rock Hill 
High’s history and all-white student body. Students were excluded from the all-white 
school government system and several athletic teams. Students felt that they had no 
avenue to express their grievances and resented the all-white Rock Hill School Board, 
which the community elected at-large.  Black students at Rock Hill High wanted an 
integrated school community, one in which their achievements would be recognized and 
counted. They did not, however, want to be marginalized students in an all-white school 
that ignored their voice, undermined their intellectual and athletic abilities, and 
disregarded their leadership.  
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On Friday January 21st, 1972, Rock Hill High School hosted a conference on 
“black personalities” which black students found offensive and protested by walking out.  
Principal Burleson punished all students for cutting class and gave them no chance to 
explain the reasons for which they left the assembly.
cccxii
 Tensions mounted. On Tuesday 
January 25, seven students at a basketball game refused to stand for the national anthem 
and the playing of the Rock Hill High alma mater as a silent protest of their treatment at 
Rock Hill High. The black student body supported the protest of the students, but the 
following day, the school administration indefinitely expelled all 7 of the students who 
refused to stand.
cccxiii
 Because they refused to sing the Rock Hill alma mater and national 
anthem, they lost their right to public education. 
Making matters worse, on January 26, the same day that Burleson expelled the 
seven black protesters, band director Robert Williams made students, including eight 
black students, rehearse “Dixie” in band practice. One of those students refused to play 
the song and Williams sent him to Principal Calvin Burleson’s office. On her way out, 
five other black students joined her in protest. When other students began to follow, the 
band director told all band students that if they did not like playing the song, “they could 
get the Hell out.”cccxiv  Word began to spread among black students, and their anger grew. 
That afternoon, over 200 African American students walked out of Rock Hill High 
School, walked to their old Emmett Scott School, and later turned to Brother David 
Boone for help.  
Brother David Boone began working in Rock Hill in 1951 after being recruited 
from his seminary home in Kentucky by the Oratory, a residential community initiated in 
the 1930s for Catholic clergyman who wanted to devote themselves to community and 
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church service. The mission of Oratory members was to establish and entrench 
themselves in Rock Hill’s community, particularly to advocate for the poor and 
unfortunate. Rock Hill’s all-white Catholic Parish, St. Anne’s, was established in the 
1920s, but members of the Oratory felt that the black community would benefit from a 
recreational facility and set out to build a church that could meet those needs. Oratory 
members led by Brother Joseph Wahl raised the necessary money and constructed St. 
Mary’s Catholic Church, which opened its doors in 1946, just a few blocks from Emmett 
Scott. At the time of its opening only a handful of black Catholics lived in Rock Hill. 
Equipped with sports and recreational facilities for the black youth, “The Catholic” was 
soon a huge social and political force in the community.
cccxv
 
The unique nature of the Catholic community in Rock Hill provided a bridge for 
interracial communication within the broader community. In 1949, for instance, St. 
Anne’s and St. Mary’s started the Catholic Interracial Council. Members gathered 
together for breakfast, discussed community matters, and got to know one another on a 
more intimate level.  In addition, the priests and administrators at both Catholic churches 
all lived together at The Oratory, which also facilitated communication between the two 
churches and therefore the white and black communities. After Brown declared 
segregated schools unconstitutional in 1954, Brother Boone decided the Catholic 
parochial schools should set the example for the rest of the community and integrate, 
which he believed was not only legally required, but morally necessary. So in the fall of 
1954, St. Anne’s Catholic School integrated and remained the only desegregated school 
in South Carolina until 1963, when Charleston School District integrated under federal 
court order.
cccxvi
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By 1959, large numbers of black youth participated in St. Anne’s recreational 
sports programs, including basketball and softball. Through the sports leagues, “The 
Catholic” initiated the Young Men’s and Young Women’s Club in Rock Hill. The Clubs 
organized social events, discussed current events, and carried out community service 
projects. Students ran clubs independently and elected their own president, secretary, and 
treasurer. The Clubs had four established purposes: club members vowed to be better 
Christians regardless of their church affiliation. They also vowed to be better students, 
better citizens, and to take part in their community. Through this forum, many young men 
and young women received leadership and organizational training. The adult sponsors of 
the Clubs brought in politicians, writers, and activists to work with the students, and 
meetings often served as a forum for discussions of black activism and civil rights. A 
Club entry written on February 20, 1969 by the secretary of the Young Women’s Club 
stated, “Current events [were] brought up. The topic of negroes playing “Dixie” brought 
about an interesting discussion. Brother [David] mentioned the Human Relations 
Committee would meet here Monday and all Club members were encouraged to come. 
Brother would bring articles concerning Afro-styles and using ‘black’ instead of 
‘negroes’ to the next meeting.”  Another entry by the Young Men’s Club secretary in 
1969 stated “An article was also read concerning the Clemson walkout. The Human 
Relations meeting with the black students at Rock Hill High was discussed. Discussed 
Vietnam, the Kenneth Minor case, L.S.D., and diet foods as a cause of cancer.”cccxvii  In 
this manner, Club members discussed issues national in scope and applied those issues to 
their own personal lives. Skills learned in the Clubs provided students with leadership 
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tools essential to the struggles they encountered in the transformative years of community 
desegregation. 
Through the Clubs and recreational events, Brother David worked with parents 
and the larger community, often in conjunction with representatives from activist groups 
such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the American Friends Service 
Committee. In 1960, Boone worked with Guilford College and the American Friends 
Service Committee to start the first large scale voter registration drive in Rock Hill. Later 
on, in 1961, Boone worked with CORE and the local NAACP to support the Friendship 
Nine, the eight local college students from Friendship College and the CORE field 
representative who led the sit in movement in Rock Hill. Coining the term “Jail No Bail,” 
the Friendship Nine served thirty days hard labor in prison rather than paying their bail 
for sitting it at an all-white lunch counter. All eight of the local Friendship Nine students 
had been active participants in the Young Men’s Club.cccxviii  
Since St. Mary’s was essentially in the backyard of Emmett Scott School, the 
programs initiated by Boone and The Oratory had a particularly profound impact, and 
through his services, Boone, though white, became a respected member of the black 
community.  Nathaniel Barber, who served as secretary and president of the Young 
Men’s Club remembered, “BroDavid used to do a lot of stuff. He ran…The Catholic was 
the center of activity in the community. You had the black high school right next door. 
Then you had St. Mary’s Catholic Church. We used to have dances there. We used to 
play basketball out there. He had a league put together. We had The Young Men’s, The 
Young Women’s Club. So this was a very active part of the community. Everybody knew 
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BroDavid. Everybody. Men, women, young, old, black, white…everyone knew him. So 
when he said something, it mattered what he said.”cccxix  So when Rock Hill High 
students went to find Brother David on that January day in 1972, they were pulling from 
a long heritage of black activism in Rock Hill and embracing their community’s broader 
struggle to tear down racial barriers and reshape the post-Jim Crow South. 
After Brother David Boone calmed the students and spoke with Jeff Savage and 
Calvin Burleson on January 26, 1972, he called Wesley Boone (no relation), a trusted 
member of the school board. He also called Willie T. (Dub) Massey, who had been 
involved in the Young Men’s Club, was one of the Friendship Nine, and carried respect 
among the black community.  After receiving Brother Boone’s call, Wesley Boone 
agreed to meet with students on the evening of Wednesday, January 26. He instructed the 
students to write down their specific grievances and be ready to present them to the 
School Board. Dub Massey and Brother Boone worked late into the night at Bannon Hall 
with students and encouraged them to stay calm and refine their list of almost 100 
grievances down to a list of 20.
cccxx
 In the meantime Wes Boone approached the 
chairman of the school board, Frank Kizer, about the situation, and suggested that he 
create an ad hoc committee to help resolve the growing unrest of the black students. 
Frank Kizer agreed, and appointed Wesley Boone as head of the ad hoc committee to 
resolve the tensions mounting at Rock Hill High School.
cccxxi
  
The next morning, the majority of the black students involved in the walkout 
boarded the school bus as usual. Because Rock Hill’s neighborhoods were still largely 
segregated, most of the students rode to school on segregated buses and used their rides 
to and from school as an avenue for planning and communication.  On their ride, students 
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grew distressed as they replayed the events from the previous day and decided to confront 
Burleson immediately about the injustices they faced. Upon their arrival on the morning 
of January 27, over 200 angry students surrounded Principal Burleson and demanded 
they speak with him. Burleson, in a panic, told students to go to the auditorium so that he 
could work things out with them in an orderly manner. As soon as they were in the 
auditorium, Burleson called state and city law enforcement officers and informed them a 
riot was about to occur.  Officers quickly arrived in full riot control gear, and State Patrol 
cars lined the streets of Eden Terrace Road, where Rock Hill High School was located, 
ready to get involved if necessary. At 10:30 a.m. Burleson dismissed the entire student 
body and refused to speak with students about any concerns, largely under pressure from 
Superintendent Jeff Savage. In the process, Burleson slammed the door of his office in 
the face of several black students, and allegedly verbally abused several students. The 
students walked out again, passed the officers in their riot control gear, and headed for 
Bannon Hall. In the meantime, Burleson and Savage suspended all students involved in 
the walkout for 3 days.
cccxxii
 
That evening, 150 students gathered at Bannon Hall to discuss the boycott, clarify 
their list of grievances, and elect a Student Advisory Committee to lead the group. The 
students elected ten representatives: Leroy Ervin, Faye Smith, Bernard David, Nathaniel 
Barber, Jerome Anderson, Karen Brice, Jackie Chisolm, Ordel Griffin, Willie Hope, and 
Jerome Glover. Students also refined their 20 grievances into 7 major complaints. Those 
7 objections addressed lack of leadership positions for black students, presented the need 
for courses in Black Studies, called for a more just system to deal with punishment for 
black students, demanded the inclusion of Emmett Scott colors and mascots in Rock Hill 
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High’s colors, and demanded that the Rock Hill school board include black members. In 
the meantime, Wes Boone told the students that the special advisory committee, the ad 
hoc committee created by Frank Kizer, to address their grievances, would meet with them 
tentatively on Friday, January 28. The district closed schools again on that day because 
administrators feared violence and left police on alert.
cccxxiii
   
On Friday, January 28, as promised, students presented their 7 grievances to the 
Advisory Committee of the School Board and to Wes Boone. But the following day, 
before the committee announced any decisions, the Evening Herald, Rock Hill’s 
newspaper, published a release by Superintendent Jeff Savage that claimed that the 
Advisory Committee of the School Board no longer existed and that if students wanted to 
submit a list of grievances, they were to do it through the regular (all-white) student body 
on Friday, February 4. Savage argued that the committee was not authorized to handle 
any district problems and declared that school would open on Monday as usual. He 
warned that any protesting students would be permanently expelled.
cccxxiv
 Black students 
continued to protest. They rode to school on the bus, but before entering the building, 
they assembled a group and then marched to Bannon Hall. Students reasoned that if they 
did not step into the school building, they could not technically be expelled. Police 
continued to monitor the situation at school, wearing riot control gear and guarding the 
streets of Eden Terrace, sometimes even following the students as they protested.
cccxxv
   
On February 3, Superintendent Savage sent a memo to all teachers in the district, 
encouraging them to talk with parents of students who were involved in the walkouts. He 
also asked teachers to talk with students and tell them that “demonstrations and violence” 
would solve nothing. Savage instructed teachers to encourage parents to pull their 
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students out of the walkout and directed teachers that students would only be able to 
speak with the board as a last resort. He encouraged teachers to handle problems with 
individual students at the school level.  Savage also claimed that student walkouts were 
not necessary in multiple articles in the paper and promised the Rock Hill community that 
he would handle the situation. But the walkouts continued. The students refused to give 
up until the school board heard their demands.
cccxxvi
  
As protest continued, community members became concerned about the 
increasing chaos linked to the student unrest. Store merchants worried that businesses 
suffered because black students walked through Rock Hill’s downtown every day on their 
way to Bannon Hall, and white parents were upset about school turmoil and school being 
canceled so often. Students continued to block traffic on Eden Terrace as students walked 
in protest every day. Increasingly, the community pressured Jeff Savage to resolve the 
conflict.  He finally agreed to meet with students on Friday, February 5, but after meeting 
with students, he promptly dismissed their grievances and did not overturn the expulsions 
of the 7 students who had refused to stand during the alma mater in late January.
cccxxvii
   
The Student Advisory Committee did not give up. On February 7, the students 
wrote a letter to Frank Kizer, Chairman of the Board, again insisting that the students 
should have an opportunity to be heard. In the meantime, Leroy Ervin, president of the 
Student Advisory Committee, also wrote a letter to the United States Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in Atlanta about the happenings in Rock Hill and 
continually tried to build support of the student movement growing in Rock Hill.
cccxxviii
 
On February 10, Jeff Savage responded to the letter sent by the Student Advisory 
Committee to Frank Kizer and once again agreed to meet with students on February 12. 
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Savage requested that only two student leaders be present, each with an adult in 
accompaniment. The school board asked students to keep their presentation under 30 
minutes.  The Student Advisory Committee wrote back and insisted that it was important 
that all members be in attendance and insisted they attend on their own, without parent 
accompaniment.
cccxxix
   
On the morning of Friday, February 12, 1972, the members of the Student 
Advisory Committee readied themselves to present their grievances to the School Board. 
As they began, they reminded school board members that they aimed to tear down the 
racial barriers that prevented Rock Hill High from becoming truly integrated. Jackie 
Chisolm was the first student to speak. She declared, “Our procedure will be a simple 
one. We shall state each grievance. We shall give each an explanation. Whatever time 
remains we would be pleased to spend in discussion or in answering your questions.” 
Next, Karen Brice approached the podium and described the first grievance, saying that 
“a school committee with student representation is needed to deal with school problems.” 
“Why?” she asked, “The student Council has not, in our opinion, been truly 
representative of all students nor has it been functional.” When she was done, Bernard 
Davis spoke up. “Black students should be amply represented on such a committee 
because black students represent an ample percentage of the student enrollment.” Next 
was Willie Hope, who insisted that “blacks are not given proper recognition for their 
achievement.” He went on to pronounce that “Recognition is a very human need. Black 
people have had to struggle for their rights and acceptance. We feel blacks are generally 
not recognized for their achievements. There seems to be a lack of sensitivity to their 
human needs which we share as brothers and sisters.”cccxxx   
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The board continued to listen as the fourth student, Thomas Gilmore, declared, 
“There is need for reform of school identity, symbols, school mascots, etc. We desire to 
be proud of our identity. The identity of Emmett Scott High School is gone and along 
with it our black community’s identification with past achievements. Could not, for 
example, Scott’s colors be added to Rock Hill High’s as a gracious sign of acceptance of 
former Scott students?” Eddie Caldwell then proclaimed, “There is need for a Black 
Studies program. Blacks have made many contributions. These should be recognized to 
complete the education of students.” Jerome Glover insisted, “There is need for black 
representation on the Rock Hill School Board. We recognize election is the way to gain 
seats. However, lacking the ward system or any other system which would make the 
election of black people possible, we have lacked the voice of anyone who lives as a 
black person lives.” Lastly, Jerome Anderson insisted “that no disciplinary action be 
taken against those students who in conscience do not feel compelled to stand during the 
playing of the national anthem or the alma mater. We do not wish to be unpatriotic. We 
do not wish to offend our fellow Americans. While each person must speak for himself, 
the grievance here is directed at the alma mater song, for it too falls into the same 
category as our grievances over the school colors and mascot. We ask only that some of 
our past loyalties are permitted to be carried over to our new integrated situation. Garnet 
and black need not be changed, but could not blue and gold be added?” Leroy Ervin 
closed up the session with a reminder that the goal was to create an equal learning 
environment that insured the inclusion of black students in the classrooms, athletic 
departments, student councils, and community of Rock Hill High. He then opened up the 
floor for questions.
cccxxxi
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Over the next few weeks, board members deliberated. Students returned to school 
on a normal basis and anxiously awaited the decision of the board. In the last days of 
February, the Board announced their decision. They overturned the expulsions given to 
the 7 students on January 27.  The Board decided not to include Emmett Scott’s colors 
officially in Rock Hill High’s school colors but to add “some gold” over the next two 
years to represent Emmett Scott.  They did so by putting a gold stripe down the side of 
the sleeves of the school’s uniforms. The Board ignored the remainder of student 
requests.
cccxxxii
 
Insulted by the Board’s decision, black students once again spoke out. On Friday, 
March 2, when the homeroom bell rang, 180 students walked out of Rock Hill High. This 
time they marched directly to Superintendent Jeff Savage’s office. Lacking the restraint 
of the previous walkouts, many students broke out business windows and street lights. 
They once again demanded that the school board officially change Rock Hill High’s 
school colors along with the alma mater. Despite their march, the School Board refused 
to meet any demands. After an hour and a half, administrators convinced the students to 
leave the superintendent’s office in school buses provided by the district.  When asked 
about the walkout by a reporter, Brother Boone responded, “The board members missed 
the point of the issue.” He went on to say that the students marched down to the office “to 
explain how deep the feeling is about Emmett Scott of those in all the black 
community.”cccxxxiii  
As a result of the protest, all schools in the district closed early that day, and over 
the weekend, Superintendent Savage declared that all 180 students who protested in his 
office would be suspended for three days. In anticipation of the black students’ reaction 
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to this move, schools opened the following Monday only for the tenth grade; the school 
board scheduled eleventh and twelfth grade students to attend separately on each of the 
following two days. When schools opened, 20 black female students rode the bus to Rock 
Hill High, led a protest in the hallway, and then left for home. Savage requested that 
Rock Hill principal Cal Burleson identify as many of the student participants as possible. 
Burleson suspended them indefinitely, and later recommended them for expulsion. 
cccxxxiv
  
Meanwhile, black students in Fort Mill, in support of students in Rock Hill, also 
staged a sit in on Feb. 29
th
, 1972. Black students, who also endured the closing of their 
all-black school in Fort Mill, George Fish Elementary and High School, presented Fort 
Mill High School with a list of grievances, and “sat in” at their school. When they refused 
to leave or go back to class, the school administration called police who violently 
escorted them to jail, using tear-gas on students. Black student grievances demanded that 
the district add black teaching staff, coaches and principals, and demanded a more equal 
discipline code for black and white students. Protestors also requested that the Board of 
Trustees add a black member, wanted an equal number of black and white cheerleaders, 
more athletic activities for girls, and an alma mater that incorporated the Alma Mater of 
George Fish. They also objected to school teachers and administrators referring to them 
as “Negroes.”cccxxxv The local paper, The Fort Mill Times published student grievances. 
Listed under each grievance, however, was the Fort Mill School Board’s response to each 
grievance, explaining why the School Board could not meet the demand. In the aftermath 
of the protest, the Fort Mill School Board did create a bi-racial committee to meet 
regularly in order to circumvent future problem, but made no other changes. Over the 
next few weeks, black students slowly returned to school.
cccxxxvi
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On March 14, 1972, concerned black parents and community members from Rock 
Hill carried their children’s fight forward. Parents took their grievances to the York 
County Legislative Delegation, appointed by the South Carolina General Assembly and 
South Carolina Governor, which appointed the county school board and presided over 
school and community affairs. Parents declared:  
As we are all aware, recent events in our school district have 
brought our community to the brink of open confrontation. As 
individuals we may or may not agree with the arguments 
expressed or the actions taken in recent weeks. But as 
responsible community members, the worst thing we could do is 
pass off these events as unimportant or unworthy of our 
attention. 
We have come here today as representatives of the black 
community to seek the ways to avoid imminent, or future 
confrontations, and to express some of the underlying problems 
in our schools. However, the problems do not affect the black 
community alone, they affect the entire city of Rock Hill and all 
of School District Three. The request to meet with the County 
Delegation has come after attempts to solve the problem through 
other channels have failed.
cccxxxvii
  
After speaking out about what they considered “surface issues” such as school colors and 
mascots, parents complained that larger issues were involved. They stated: 
The surface issues about school colors, administrative rules, and 
representation are not new. The kids have been talking about it 
for two years. The black community has watched white children 
bussed pass Fairfax and Hillcrest Schools (both of which were 
black schools) and into white schools. We have subsequently 
seen Fairfax closed to avoid sending a white child into a school 
that was previously all black. And Hillcrest closed, then one 
year later it opened as Leslie School Two, why?” West End 
Elementary School was closed rather than integrated, and finally 
closure was invoked on an educational landmark, in, and for, the 
black community, Emmett Scott Senior High. No thought was, 
or has been given the colors, mascot, or any other symbols to 
which the black community has identified with for over fifty 
years. You can give all the arguments about Federal Laws and 
Court Decisions as justification for the form that changes took, 
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but when it comes down to local decisions not prescribed by the 
federal law, the black community always loses.
cccxxxviii
  
 
Black community leaders requested that the Delegation expand the school board 
to 9 members from 7, adding 2 African American members. They also wanted to create 
an expulsion review committee so that administrators could no longer expel students so 
easily. The York County Delegation refused to meet any of their demands.
cccxxxix
 Instead, 
the burden to fight the inequities inherent in desegregated Southern schools was carried 
on the backs and in the hearts and souls of America’s children, on the daily basis.  
From the early twentieth century, the legal campaign for desegregated education 
was at the core of the African American struggle for quality education and civil rights. 
Civil rights organizations and black communities fought for equitable public education 
because many saw the denial of equal educational opportunity fundamental to the 
inequalities black citizens endured. But when desegregation became a reality, black 
students had to find their way in hostile environments that offered little guarantee of 
academic, physical, and emotional protection. As a result, many students became 
casualties of the very system that was supposed to offer them a promise of something 
better; school expulsions, disillusionment, and exclusion denied many black students 
their right to a quality education. Almost forty years earlier, W.E.B. Du Bois presaged the 
problems faced by black students during the desegregation era. He declared, “a black 
man…has a right to protest any separation of schools by color, but what, then, of his 
helpless child, sent into a mixed school, where white children kick, cuff, or abuse him, or 
where teachers openly and persistently neglect or hurt or dwarf his soul? The dilemma is 
complete and there is no escape.”cccxl   
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 The victories achieved in the larger civil rights struggle undermined the legal 
justification of Jim Crow policies and proved an important step to the realization of equal 
citizenship rights for all Americans. In the late 1960s and 1970s, across the South, black 
Americans voted for the first time and won the right to send their children to historically 
white public schools and universities. Yet, while mid 1960s legislation dismantled many 
of the legal barriers to racial equality, many economic and psychological barriers 
remained. The legacy of segregation continued to plague public schools across the South, 
even after government-mandated desegregation, and black students did not realize full 
and equitable inclusion in American public schools following desegregation. Black 
students, parents, and activists continued to demand that their school system and local 
government grant the rights won during the peak of the Civil Rights movement, but white 
school boards, legislators, and administrations of the post-Jim Crow Era South, ultimately 
still controlled how newly won civil rights would be implemented on the local level. As 
black parents of Rock Hill argued to the York County Delegation, “You can give all the 
arguments about Federal Laws and Court Decisions as justification for the form that 
changes took, but when it comes down to local decisions not prescribed by the federal 
law, the black community always loses.”cccxli Despite their loss, black student struggles 
demonstrated continued civil rights protest and a sustained resolve to achieve access to 
quality, public education, no matter the risks. 
In a 1961 interview of James Baldwin by Studs Terkel, Baldwin discussed the 
bravery and strength of Elizabeth Eckford, one of the Little Rock Nine who was spit on 
by an old woman as she entered Little Rock High School in 1957. Baldwin argued that 
Eckford was able to endure because, “She knew who she was. She knew who she was. 
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After all, that child has been coming for a very long time. She didn’t come out of 
nothing.”cccxlii  Like Elizabeth Eckford, Rock Hill High Students knew who they were. 
Rock Hill’s history of civil rights activism and community organizing, in conjunction 
with the Oratory, built an infrastructure of support for student activism in Rock Hill and 
rooted black students in a community that bolstered their identity and citizenship within 
the desegregated system. In a system that marginalized black students, the Oratory and 
black Catholic community reinforced that black students mattered, and students asserted 
their voices in a system dominated by white administrators, school board members, and 
educators. While the outcome of the protest failed in many respects, the process of the 
movement laid the groundwork for continued community protest in the post-Jim Crow 
South, giving students the courage to carry their fight forward. 
 
Epilogue 
In 2000, under pressure from the Justice Department, Rock Hill changed its 
School Board’s electoral structure from one made up of 7 members elected at-large, to 2 
elected at large and 5 elected from single-member districts, two of which were largely 
minority. Consequently, in the November 2000 election, the previously all-white board 
acquired three new members. Two of the new members were black: Mildred Douglas and 
Elizabeth Ann Reid, and all represented Rock Hill’s south-side, whose constituents were 
largely made up of minority and working class populations. Yet, despite their election, 
achieving desegregation in Rock Hill has remained a struggle. In 2000, during a 
reassignment debate, Douglas addressed the board, lamenting a projected increase in 
racial imbalance. Her concern, shared by the NAACP, went unheeded. In 2001, when the 
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board again discussed reassignment, Douglas made desegregation a high priority, as did 
Reid. Together, along with the third new school board member elected in 2000, they were 
able to gain support to build a third high school in Rock Hill on the south-side of the 
district, overcoming opposition led by the Superintendent, the board’s chair, and many 
affluent white citizens of Rock Hill. 
cccxliii
   
Yet, immediately, debate arose about what the new high school, set to open in 
2004, should be named. More than 300 former Emmett Scott students and teachers joined 
together to petition the Rock Hill School Board to name the school Emmett Scott Senior 
High. On the evening of their request, the over 300 members attended a School Board 
meeting and sang the Emmett Scott alma mater as they presented a petition of their 
signatures. Dear Emmett Scott to thee lead us we pray. Open our eyes that we might see 
the dawn of day. The Gold, The Blue, we with glory cry, Ever we sing they praise Dear 
Old Scott High. After deliberation, the school board announced they no longer felt 
comfortable naming schools after individual people, and therefore could not name the 
school Emmett Scott. Instead, one room in the district’s flexible learning center was 
given to the black community to commemorate Emmett Scott. Over the next year, 
Emmett Scott alumni worked to create the Emmett Scott Room. They gathered pictures 
of students and teachers for the wall and collected athletic uniforms and other 
memorabilia to be placed in a single glass cabinet for display. The Emmett Scott room 
currently serves as a standardized testing facility and meeting room for teacher in-
services.
cccxliv
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Chapter 4 
 
“They Want to Decide what Philosophy is Best for Our Children, but they 
Have Already Said it is Not Good Enough for Theirs:” Demanding a Voice in Public 
Education after 1965 in Orangeburg, South Carolina 
 
On July 7, 1973, almost 1,000 black parents and community members in 
Bowman, South Carolina demanded the immediate resignation of their school board 
superintendent W.L. Carter and district school board chairman James West. Parents 
argued that Bowman’s school district and majority-white school board neglected 
Bowman’s school system, whose students were over 90% black. Petitioners cited 
Superintendent Carter’s inability to work effectively with the majority-black school 
community and argued that he provided little support to parents, students, and faculty. 
Petitioners also charged that District officials misused federally granted Title 1 funds and 
failed to apply for all available federal funds, leaving the district with large budget 
shortfalls. In addition, black parents objected that all of the district’s white 
administrators, school board members, and teachers enrolled their own children in the 
newly established, all-white, private Bowman Academy, signaling that they had little 
vested interest in the success of the majority-black, public school system. Lastly, 
Bowman residents resented that the District employed no black administrators or black 
representatives in the District’s central administrative office.cccxlv 
Petitioners’ demands included the immediate resignation of Carter and West. 
They also insisted on a functioning sports facility for the public schools; after 
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desegregation, Bowman public school students did not have access to a football field or 
basketball gymnasium. In addition, activists argued that no teachers in Bowman’s public 
schools should be able to teach in the public district if their own children attended 
Bowman Academy, a newly created all-white private school. Parents requested that 
Bowman 2 apply for all available federal funds, including Emergency School Aid Act 
Funds (ESAA). Although the District initially applied for federal ESAA funds in 1970, 
after federal requirements for receiving those funds monitored by HEW’s Office of Civil 
Rights grew more stringent, Bowman 2, like many other school districts around the 
South, stopped applying for the great amounts of federal money available through 
ESAA.
cccxlvi
 
 When Bowman 2’s school board ignored parent and community demands, Quincy 
Smith, who headed the school district’s Parental Advisory Committee and also served as 
the President of the Bowman branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), appealed to South Carolina Governor John West and the 
South Carolina Department of Education. “We feel the goal of these men is to make the 
private Bowman segregationist academy shine,” Smith argued in June, “and let the public 
schools fall apart…They must be held responsible for the present condition of our 
schools.”cccxlvii But following their complaint, the South Carolina Department of 
Education, Governor West and Orangeburg school authorities took little meaningful 
action. As a result, parents and activists initiated a four week, district-wide black student 
boycott that included all but 175 of the 1100 students in Bowman School District 2. 
Organized by the local NAACP, parents pledged that their children would not return to 
school until the School Board and Superintendent addressed all of their grievances.
cccxlviii
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Desegregation came to Bowman 2 in 1970, when the United States’ Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered all South Carolina schools to fully desegregate. 
Prominent white community members reacted by establishing the all-white Bowman 
Academy for the majority of the district’s white students, most of whom abandoned 
Bowman’s public schools. To maintain this all-white academy, Bowman 2 board 
members, many of whom simultaneously served on Bowman Academy’s Board, funneled 
public school resources into the private school. Not only did Bowman District 2 School 
Board members sell an all-brick school from District 2 to the local Bowman Southern 
Methodist Church, who administered Bowman Academy, but the private school also 
utilized many books, supplies, and equipment intended for the public system. As a result, 
the desegregated school system in Bowman, in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Act, 
evolved into another dual and segregated school system: the all-white, private Bowman 
Academy and the majority-black public school system, both competing for community 
and state resources. The private school movement, which became prolific in the State 
after desegregation, weakened many public schools in the state. Before 1964, South 
Carolina had 15 private schools, mostly parochial, with just over 15,000 students. 
Between 1964 and 1974, 134 private academies opened in South Carolina, 131 of them 
segregated, and private enrollment jumped to over 47,000 students.
cccxlix
 
While white residents abandoned the community’s public schools, white 
politicians and leaders in the community still worked to control the public system’s 
resources, administration, and classrooms. Despite the almost 90 percent black student 
body in Bowman, a white majority controlled Bowman’s school board. Governor John 
West appointed the majority-white Orangeburg County Board of Trustees, and 
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Bowman’s board, which was elected at large, remained dominated by white appointees 
despite the majority black population. Control over Bowman Two’s public schools 
granted white Bowman residents continued power over the financial resources of the 
public system, including the authority to decide who profited from federally funded 
positions for teachers, assistants, and staff, as well as from school supplies and 
equipment. In addition, by maintaining jurisdiction over Bowman’s schools, the existing 
white power structure of businessmen and leaders in the Bowman community maintained 
control over the quality of education provided to black students.  
Unable to improve the schools of their children and community through 
traditional voting and legal channels, black parents and activists built on a long history of 
direct action protest in Orangeburg and initiated a boycott to secure influence over their 
children’s education. Using the power of a majority-black student body to attain better 
facilities, resources, teachers, and curriculum, black parents appealed to shifting federal 
desegregation standards, the South Carolina Department of Education, and national 
media outlets to achieve their demands. Through their activism, Bowman parents paved 
the way for greater involvement by the South Carolina Department of Education in 
implementing minimum education, curriculum, and teaching standards for schools in 
their district and across the State. The boycott also pressured District officials into 
applying for all federal Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) funds and drew attention to 
the inequity faced by poor school districts in the State. Black parents, empowered by 
growing state standardization in education, in addition to the implementation of federal 
requirements in conjunction with federal school aid, determined that the Bowman School 
District did not meet minimum federal and state education standards and appealed to an 
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authority outside of the town’s white power structure to secure an adequate education for 
their children.  
Bowman’s boycott demonstrates that even after federally mandated 
desegregation, discrepancies between federal education policy and local school practices 
existed that often undermined the effectiveness of federal intervention, and sometimes 
even contributed to continued racial discrimination following the Civil Rights Act. Yet 
changing federal civil rights standards, even though they were not properly implemented 
on the ground, empowered black Bowman residents and gave them the tools they needed 
to continue to improve public schools after desegregation. Because of their protest, 
African Americans in Bowman attained better school facilities, regulatory powers over 
the use of federal funds, ascertained more effective leadership in their district, and 
achieved more transparency in school and curriculum policy. Black activism was 
essential to creating an adequate desegregated school system in the years following the 
Civil Rights Act. 
 
Background 
Bowman, South Carolina, the “Dairy Capital” of the state, was located in the 
Southern portion of Orangeburg County, and had a population of approximately thirty-
five hundred people in 1970. Only one of the many towns in Orangeburg County, 
including Orangeburg and Elloree, Bowman is around forty-five miles southeast of 
Columbia and seventy-five miles northwest of Charleston. While all the communities in 
Orangeburg County had majority black populations, Bowman’s black residents 
outnumbered white residents two to one. About one third of Orangeburg County residents 
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lived under the national poverty line in 1970, including fifty-four percent of the African 
American population.
cccl
  
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Orangeburg’s economy experienced a major 
transformation from one that was largely agricultural to one more focused on 
manufacturing. The number of farms in the community dropped from 3,415 in 1959, to 
2,690 in 1964, with an accompanying decline in the size of county farms.
cccli
 Many small 
farmers, particularly African American farmers, struggled to maintain their family’s 
livelihood and many turned to extra factory or service jobs in Charleston, Columbia, or 
the town of Orangeburg. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of people involved in 
manufacturing increased from 13 percent to 20 percent.
ccclii
 
Orangeburg residents fell below state and national norms in several categories. In 
1960, the median school age completed by Orangeburg County residents twenty-five 
years and older was eighth grade (8.2 years) versus the national average of tenth grade 
(10.6) and the state number of 8.7.
cccliii
 The median income in Orangeburg County in 
1960 was only $2,603, compared to the national average of $5,260, and only about 40 
percent of homes in the county had plumbing.
cccliv
  
By 1973, black residents in Orangeburg County had a rich history of civil rights 
activism and direct action protest. When the Supreme Court overturned legally 
sanctioned segregation in its 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, and opened the 
door for black children to gain access to educational resources, facilities, and 
opportunities only previously afforded to white children, black Orangeburg residents 
tried to enroll their children in Orangeburg’s public schools. In 1955, Orangeburg 
residents petitioned school boards to desegregate, sued local school districts, and 
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endorsed economic boycotts to demand that South Carolina authorities would fulfill 
Brown’s promise in their community. The presence of South Carolina State and Claflin 
College in Orangeburg, two of the largest and most prestigious black colleges in the state, 
also created a community of young black student activists who played a prominent role 
throughout the Orangeburg civil rights movement. White South Carolinians, on the other 
hand, fiercely resisted school desegregation, successfully using state and local 
government to thwart African American activism and changing federal standards on 
desegregation. Because of white resistance, public education in South Carolina remained 
segregated until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, the community of 
Bowman evaded federal mandates to desegregate through the late 1960s. 
Within months of the Brown ruling, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sponsored petitions around the South 
demanding that previously all-white schools admit black students. In June of 1955, 
NAACP leaders met in Atlanta and authorized local activists and branches to file 
petitions and suits against school districts that refused to enroll black students. The South 
Carolina NAACP and the all-black Palmetto Teachers Association mobilized to support 
those suits, raising money, providing legal services, and demanding that school officials 
initiate the process of school desegregation. South Carolina lawyers, including Matthew 
Perry, the NAACP’s leading attorney in the state, drafted petitions throughout the state’s 
school systems demanding that local school districts desegregate.
ccclv
  In the summer of 
1955, seventeen black parents and activists in Elloree, fifty-seven black parents in the 
town of Orangeburg, eighteen in Santee, and other in the county petitioned the white 
school board to desegregate their public schools. Over sixty petitions materialized.
ccclvi
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  Petitions for school desegregation evoked great hostility in communities across 
the South. Many black petitioners lost jobs, saw credit vanish at local banks and lenders, 
and faced violence and terror. In Mississippi, white residents killed four black men in the 
summer of 1955 in reaction to African Americans trying to register to vote and in the 
midst of newly filed school desegregation petitions.  A white Mississippian murdered one 
man in broad daylight on a courthouse lawn, with no repercussions or convictions. In 
August of 1955, two white men in Mississippi also brutally murdered fourteen-year old 
Emmett Till for allegedly whistling at a white woman. Though they admitted abducting 
Till, an all-white jury found them “not-guilty.” This atmosphere of violence set the stage 
for organized massive resistance to desegregation and growing civil rights activism 
across the South and fashioned a political mood ripe for the formation of White Citizens’ 
Councils (WCC). Initially established in Mississippi in July of 1954, Citizens’ Councils 
stormed the South in reaction to Brown.  
The first Citizens’ Councils in South Carolina actually organized in the 
communities of Orangeburg and Elloree, due to the filing of their school desegregation 
petitions. The groups claimed that they sought to “oppose the use of force by radicals and 
reactionaries” to compel integration.  The town of Orangeburg’s WCC obtained a state 
incorporation charter that declared the organization’s purpose, "To make every legal and 
moral effort to save the segregated public schools." In addition, the group hoped to "study 
ways and means for providing an adequate education for children in School District No. 5 
if radical agitators force the abandonment of the public schools."
ccclvii
  The Orangeburg 
Councils received strong endorsements from local white businesses and community 
leaders. W.J. Deer, Elloree’s mayor, endorsed the Elloree WCC chapter and proclaimed, 
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“We will fight the leaders of the NAACP from ditches to fence posts to keep Negroes out 
of white schools.”ccclviii The Elloree branch grew quickly, attracting over two hundred 
members in the first two days of its establishment and more than eight hundred in its first 
week. In Bowman, over 100 people met to establish a Council chapter. Within a month, 
nearly every community in Orangeburg County had formed its own Council.
ccclix
 
In order to combat African American petitioners, White Citizens’ Councils in 
Orangeburg County initiated economic reprisals that targeted members of the NAACP, 
student activists at South Carolina State College, the State’s largest all-black college 
located in the town of Orangeburg, and civil rights advocates. Shortly after black 
residents filed a desegregation petition in the town of Orangeburg, the Orangeburg Times 
and Democrat published the names of the petitioners. As a result, white employers, 
creditors, and suppliers targeted those who signed. Numerous black petitioners and other 
African Americans lost their jobs, and many local banks recalled longstanding loans. 
Some pharmacies even denied prescriptions to black petitioners.
ccclx
  The mayor of 
Orangeburg, Robert H. Jennings, proved one of the most vindictive in his retaliation. 
Jennings, who served as president of a local bakery, the Coca-Cola bottling company, and 
the Orangeburg Ice and Fuel Company, led the boycott denying goods to black merchants 
who had signed the petition or joined the NAACP.
ccclxi
 James Sulton, a NAACP officer 
and black service station owner in Orangeburg, later remarked, “The Negroes in 
Orangeburg overestimated the white man’s integrity when they petitioned the school 
board.”ccclxii 
White retaliation forced many African Americans to abandon their support for 
school desegregation. In Elloree, whites coerced fourteen petitioners to remove their 
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names, and more than half the petitioners in the town of Orangeburg withdrew their 
names. In Santee, a community in the southeastern portion of Orangeburg County, 
fourteen of the eighteen original petitioners abandoned the appeal. The group recanted by 
claiming that they did not fully understand the meaning of the language in the 
petition.
ccclxiii
  
Yet, many black residents in Orangeburg retaliated against economic harassment 
with economic pressures of their own. Black leaders in Orangeburg organized their own 
boycott of white merchants, especially against those who had harassed the petitioners. 
Under the leadership of South Carolina State student body president Fred Moore, who 
later became a prominent South Carolina civil rights attorney, students at the university 
joined the boycott and pressured the school administration to stop buying supplies from a 
white wholesaler who was active in the Orangeburg WCC. 
ccclxiv
 Students also stopped 
purchasing Coca-Cola and Sunbeam bread because they were distributed by local WCC 
members. They held food strikes and refused to eat in the cafeteria because the college 
still purchased food products from WCC members. One local student activist pointed out 
that South Carolina State students “learned how easy it was to do without Cokes” and 
even learned how to bake their own bread.
ccclxv
 Moore, with the help of the local 
NAACP, convinced a large part of the African American community in Orangeburg to 
join in the protest.
ccclxvi
  
South Carolina State’s administration, under pressure from the South Carolina 
General Assembly, eventually expelled Fred Moore for his participation and refused to 
rehire several faculty members who had supported the students.
ccclxvii
 However, less than 
three weeks after local blacks initiated the counter-boycott, most of the area’s white 
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owned holding companies and distributors denied any knowledge of organized economic 
retaliation and resumed the delivery of goods to black owned businesses.
ccclxviii
   
Not only did African Americans have to face white resistance in the form of 
Citizens’ Councils, they also had to battle the South Carolina General Assembly. 
Reacting to Brown, in March of 1955, the General Assembly repealed the state’s 
compulsory attendance law, providing white parents the authority to keep their children 
out of desegregated public schools. The following month, the Assembly passed a law to 
revoke state funding from any school that desegregated and ended the practice of 
automatically rehiring teachers for the next academic year. The result of newly passed 
South Carolina laws placed more power in the hands of local officials. Unfortunately, 
these laws limited the effectiveness of black activism and newly interpreted federal 
desegregation standards. The changes in teacher employment rules gave school boards 
around the state more control over who taught in their districts’ classrooms, and the 
state’s threat to revoke funding ensured that whites would blame integration-minded 
white moderates and African Americans if their local school closed because of a lack of 
money. In addition, state officials and local officials targeted teachers, students, and 
college professors that supported desegregation.
ccclxix
  
The South Carolina General Assembly’s “Segregation Committee,” created 
before Brown to coordinate the state’s defense of segregated schools, exerted great 
influence over state policies. Directed by State Senator Marion Gressette of Calhoun 
County, the fifteen-member committee obtained the services of South Carolina chief 
counsel David W. Robinson and a legal staff of the state’s most skilled attorneys. The 
General Assembly never rejected one single policy that it endorsed. In 1956, under the 
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direction of the Segregation Committee, the General Assembly passed a series of anti-
NAACP statutes that formed part of a systemic campaign to wipe out NAACP activism. 
Legislation targeted black South Carolina teachers by making it unlawful for the state or 
any South Carolina school district to employee a member of the NAACP. Following 
passage of the anti-NAACP statutes, the State authorized school officials to require that 
teachers submit written oaths regarding NAACP membership. Teachers who failed to 
complete these questionnaires could be summarily discharged.
ccclxx
  
The state vigorously enforced the new anti-NAACP laws during the summer of 
1956. South Carolina school districts sent out questionnaires to all public school teachers 
that required them to divulge whether or not they favored integrated schools, whether 
they agreed with the “aims of the NAACP,” and whether or not they were members of 
the NAACP. These questionnaires and the anti-NAACP law had an almost immediate 
effect on South Carolina’s African American educators. Charleston County refused to 
renew the contracts of more than ten teachers, including Septima Clark, a leading civil 
rights activist who later helped organize “Citizenship Schools” throughout the Deep 
South.  In May 1956, Elloree school superintendent M.G. Austin distributed employment 
applications and questionnaires that asked “Do you feel that an integrated school system 
would better for the colored race for their life’s work? Do you favor integration of the 
races in the schools? Do you support the aims of the NAACP?” After twenty-one of the 
twenty-four teachers at the all-black Elloree County Training School refused to complete 
the questionnaire, the Orangeburg district fired them.
ccclxxi
  
The NAACP used the Elloree teachers to challenge the anti-NAACP law. 
Lawyers Jack Greenberg and Lincoln Jenkins argued that the law denied teachers the 
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right of freedom of speech and association. But a three-judge panel in South Carolina 
upheld the law, ruling that state courts should be given an opportunity to interpret it. The 
NAACP filed an appeal, but before the appeal could be heard, the General Assembly 
repealed it, passing a new law requiring that teachers list membership in associations and 
organizations. The State Supreme Court upheld the new law, and left the fired black 
Elloree teachers with little power to fight their dismissal.
ccclxxii
  
The community of Bowman, like most across the South, maintained completely 
segregated schools for its black and white students throughout the twentieth century. 
Until the 1950s, only one black school, a Rosenwald school, existed in Bowman and met 
only seven months of the year.
ccclxxiii
 By the early 1960s, Bowman operated two black 
schools in the District: Bethune High and Bethune Elementary. Prior to the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, no black student attended a class with a white student in any 
school in Bowman or Orangeburg County. In addition, before 1964, no teacher taught 
across racial lines. In the years following the Civil Rights Act, the District continued to 
maintain its dual system, despite federal pressure to desegregate.
ccclxxiv
  
In 1964, the Civil Rights Act set new standards for southern school systems by 
outlawing racial discrimination in any activity or program that received financial support 
from the Federal Government. Title VI of the Act mandated that school districts eliminate 
discrimination from classrooms, services to pupils, educational facilities, and the hiring 
and assignment of faculty. The Civil Rights Act gave the Justice Department power to 
bring federal desegregation suits against school districts and also gave the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare the power to terminate federal funds if districts 
maintained segregated facilities. Following the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Department of 
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Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) worked to regulate federal desegregation policies 
throughout local Southern school districts, pressuring them to meet new federal 
guidelines for public education. 
ccclxxv
   
In 1965, under the threat from the HEW of losing federal funding, the Bowman 
District applied a Freedom of Choice program to its schools and allowed five black 
students into the historically all-white public schools. HEW allowed this small number, 
under the assumption that a much larger percentage would be accepted the following 
academic year.
ccclxxvi
 In Freedom of Choice plans, districts automatically registered 
students in the schools that they attended under the segregated system. Students could 
choose to attend the school of their choice within their specific school district, provided 
that their parents specifically requested a transfer. Allowing students to attend the school 
of their choice created the potential for successful desegregation, but the stipulation that 
parents specifically request a transfer meant that black parents once again inherited the 
burden of changing the status quo. In addition, many school districts made attaining 
transfer status difficult. Districts purposely made requesting transfer confusing and 
intimidating, and often did not publicize the transfer process. School districts only 
accepted transfers for a limited time period, and even when parents sent in requests 
according to regulation, they were often denied by school boards.
ccclxxvii
 
In March 1966, in response to minimally successful desegregation efforts around 
the South, HEW issued new desegregation regulations for Southern school districts. 
Those regulations replaced the initial set of HEW guidelines, and federal officials hoped 
revised standards would promote a more effective desegregation process. The Revised 
Guidelines stated that Freedom of Choice plans had to be meaningful and had to result in 
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higher percentages of desegregation. In addition, desegregation in Southern school 
districts now required faculty desegregation, which had only been recommended in the 
previous guidelines. Lastly, the school district could not deny a black student transfer to a 
white school, unless the school faced overcrowding.
ccclxxviii
   
But by fall 1966, Bowman made few strides towards implementing a more 
meaningful desegregation plan. In opposition to the Revised Guidelines, Bowman 2 had 
no integrated faculty within the district and only fifteen black students attended 
previously all-white schools, less than two percent of the black student body. The 
superintendent of Bowman, L.F. Arant, begged HEW to give the school board more time 
to implement an effective desegregation plan. He argued that undue haste would result in 
the establishment of an all-white private academy in Bowman, and the abandonment of 
public schools by the white community.
ccclxxix
   
Bowman school officials also reported to HEW that Bowman’s black students and 
teachers preferred the segregated system. They argued that black facilities in the District 
equaled white facilities and that black complacency actually hindered the District’s 
Freedom of Choice policy. According to officials, the District implemented an effective 
desegregation plan to Bowman’s schools, but most students and teachers did not want to 
transfer across racial lines. Bowman officials argued they had provided everyone the 
chance to desegregate, and by granting that opportunity, had fulfilled their constitutional 
responsibility.
ccclxxx
   
But HEW investigators reported otherwise. Bowman operated dual bus systems, 
even requiring segregated bus drivers through the 1966-1967 school year. Investigators 
found that facilities and materials for black students were substantially inferior to those 
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facilities and materials of white students. The Office of Education also reported that black 
students attended larger classes, had access to fewer library books, and worked with 
teachers that had lower NTE scores, compared to white students in Bowman. 
Importantly, the Office of Education received reports that school officials denied many 
freedom of choice requests made by black students and parents.
ccclxxxi
  
HEW and the Office of Education offered continued assistance to Bowman 
County in meeting federal desegregation regulations, but their support made little 
difference.  Officials refused to desegregate faculty positions or transfer any additional 
students across racial lines. On September 27, 1966, the Federal Commissioner of 
Education, Harold Howe II, notified Superintendent Arant of his dissatisfaction with the 
pace of desegregation in the Bowman District and told Arant that he would provide any 
assistance Arant needed to make desegregation successful in Bowman. Arant ignored 
Howe’s appeal.  In addition, the Office of Education made multiple visits to the District 
to help with the desegregation process, but Bowman officials ignored all of their 
suggestions and recommendations. By February 1967, HEW and the Office of Education 
determined that Bowman would not desegregate under voluntary means and terminated 
federal funds. Before final termination, federal officials granted the Bowman District a 
federal hearing to determine the validity of HEW’s ruling.ccclxxxii  
On April 13, 1967, HEW laid out accusations against Bowman 2 in a formal 
hearing presided over by federal Judge Irvin Hackerman. Representing the district was 
South Carolina Assistant Attorney General Ben T. DeBerry. Using newly published 
standards in The Revised Guidelines, HEW asserted that Bowman had not met its federal 
obligations under its Freedom of Choice plan. Black parents testified that Bowman 
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officials denied their children admittance to formerly all-white schools claiming their 
grades were too low. Other black residents testified that the superintendent and School 
Board never held community meetings on the district’s desegregation plan and did not 
make the black community aware of procedures under Freedom of Choice. Many black 
residents also testified that white community members harassed black parents who 
applied for transfer of their children to white schools.
ccclxxxiii
  
In response, DeBerry and Bowman school officials argued that HEW’s policies 
overstepped their constitutional authority. The District objected to HEW’s accusation that 
“no significant desegregation of pupils” had taken place and that a “dual school system 
still existed” in Bowman. The District again argued that it had a valid freedom of choice 
plan, one whereby “each student is afforded a free and unfettered annual choice of 
schools.”ccclxxxiv They argued their District met all constitutional obligations as a result of 
their desegregation plan, regardless of the number of students who actually chose to 
attend across racial lines. According to DeBerry, Brown and the Civil Rights Act only 
required desegregation, not forced integration. HEW simply failed to understand the legal 
distinction between a desegregated school and one that was racially balanced. Lastly, 
school officials argued that the Civil Rights Act never specifically required faculty 
integration.
ccclxxxv
  
After hearing their arguments, Judge Irvin Hackerman, Ohio native and World 
War II veteran, supported HEW’s decision to revoke federal funding and found Bowman 
School District in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
ccclxxxvi
 Additionally, Hackerman 
defended HEW’s Revised Guidelines as constitutional and consistent with the Civil 
Rights Act. In the months after the decision, DeBerry, representing Bowman officials, 
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made several appeals both to Hackerman and the federal Commissioner of Education, 
Harold Howe. DeBerry argued that Bowman’s District was not discriminating against a 
minority, since the majority of their District was African American. Bowman officials 
asserted that that federal officials “Perpetuate(d) unconstitutional discrimination against a 
minority while proclaiming a right of the majority to desegregate.”ccclxxxvii District 
officials also protested that Judge Hackerman did not disclose the “names and addresses” 
of the black witnesses who testified against them so that they could properly defend 
themselves against false accusations. Despite their appeals, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare terminated all federal funds to Bowman schools for the 1967-
1968 academic school year.
ccclxxxviii
   
Following the termination, Bowman refused to cooperate with HEW for future 
compliance. For the 1968-1969 school year, the Superintendent did not submit any 
compliance forms to HEW or the Office of Education, and officials shared heated 
correspondence. After threats for administrative action against Bowman, DeBerry 
responded “In view of the fact that the District’s Federal aid has, for all practical 
purposes, already been terminated, the threat of administrative action lacks substance, as 
do the administrative proceedings themselves, and I am not aware of any law that 
authorizes action by the Department of Justice merely because a school district fails to 
file a report with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.” Bowman 
maintained a dual system, without federal funds, until the 1970-1971 academic 
year.
ccclxxxix
 When that year arrived, Bowman’s white leaders took a path followed by 
many others in the South at the time. They created their own private, segregated school. 
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After Desegregation: The Private School Movement 
By 1970, landmark federal court cases put new pressures on Southern school 
districts to implement more meaningful and effective desegregation plans. In 1968, the 
US Supreme Court ruled that freedom of choice plans no longer sufficed to meet federal 
desegregation standards. Green v. School Board of New Kent County became one of the 
most important school desegregation cases since Brown, and shifted federal compliance 
standards "to ensure racial balance in schools." In this way, the US Supreme Court 
aligned with HEW’s Revised Guidelines arguing that Freedom of Choice could only be 
considered desegregation if the results created racially balanced schools. Though South 
Carolina school districts continued to use Freedom of Choice plans in South Carolina, in 
January of 1970, the United States Fourth Circuit Court ordered all South Carolina 
districts to fully desegregate by the Fall of 1970.
cccxc
  
As school districts around the South faced court-ordered desegregation in 1970, 
newly appointed Bowman school Superintendent V.B. Kiser agreed to voluntarily 
desegregate Bowman’s schools for the 1970-1971 school year. On May 27, 1970, District 
officials agreed to implement a full desegregation plan. Working with HEW, the District 
agreed to turn the formerly all-white Bowman High School and Bowman Elementary 
School into a bi-racial, district-wide elementary school which housed grades one through 
four. Officials assigned grades five through eight to the previously all-black elementary 
school, Bethune Elementary School, and all high school students to the previously all-
black Bethune High School. The school board also desegregated the busing system.
cccxci
 
Despite voluntary desegregation in Bowman, Isaac McGraw, from the South 
Carolina Department of Education, reported that problems emerged even as Bowman 
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officials drew their plans. McGraw reported that the white community of Orangeburg 
was “becoming well organized with the local population and is beginning to recruit 
organizations from Orangeburg and vicinity.”cccxcii Black residents grew suspicious of 
rumors regarding the establishment of a new, private school for white students. In a list of 
written questions and grievances for the Board, the Educational Committee of the 
Bowman NAACP asked, “Will this private school have the moral support of the 
Trustees? Will there be any financial aid given to the private school from the 
district?”cccxciii Bowman officials ignored black grievances completely, refusing even to 
meet with them or offer any information about the upcoming school year.
cccxciv
  
The private school movement became prolific throughout the American South in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of federally supported school desegregation, 
and in many ways, the town of Orangeburg initiated the movement in South Carolina. In 
June of 1964, just a few months after the town of Orangeburg announced upcoming 
desegregation measures, a group of notable white residents formed a private academy for 
white students in the community. The group included Citizen Council member T. Elliot 
Wannamaker, the owner a chemical company in Orangeburg, who, on the eve of 
desegregation declared that “Most Negroes in South Carolina are little more than field 
hands.”cccxcv He went on to preside over the new, all-white Wade Hampton Academy in 
Orangeburg and became president of the South Carolina Independent Schools 
Association, a segregationist private school organization that advocated for the newly 
formed “segregation academies” following the Civil Rights Act.cccxcvi 
The South Carolina General Assembly had supported the development of private 
schools for almost a decade and encouraged other majority-black districts in the state to 
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follow suit. In January 1963, just weeks after the state witnessed Harvey Gantt integrate 
Clemson College, legislators presented a bill to provide tuition grants to public school 
students who decided to withdraw from public schools and enroll in private institutions. 
The bill proposed that the state give parents the amount South Carolina spent per pupil in 
1963--two hundred and twenty-five dollars a year for elementary school students and two 
hundred and fifty for high school students.
cccxcvii
   
African American leaders challenged the state government’s flagrant attempts to 
continue state sanctioned segregation. Matthew Perry, prominent South Carolina NAACP 
attorney, and the NAACP legal team secured an injunction that prevented the state from 
awarding the grant money to parents. In October 1964, the United States Department of 
Justice joined the suit, arguing that the grants were an unconstitutional attempt to avoid 
compliance with Brown v. Board of Education. On May 31, 1968, the US Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found the Tuition Grants Act illegal.
cccxcviii
 
Despite the setback, private schools continued to flourish throughout the State. 
Prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, only eighteen non-parochial private schools operated 
in South Carolina. But between 1964 and 1967, in response to the Civil Rights Act, South 
Carolinians opened thirty-one new, totally segregated, private schools.  In 1969, when the 
Supreme Court ruled freedom of choice plans illegal, fifteen additional private schools 
opened in the state, residents planned three more, and the existing private schools saw 
sharp enrollment increases. In 1970, white residents established thirty-six more private 
schools. Some schools opened with as little as three weeks’ notice and still had to turn 
pupils away. By the mid-1970s, private school enrollment in South Carolina averaged 
around 40,000 pupils, an increase of more than 25,000 students since desegregation.
cccxcix
  
168 
 
Private school enrollment did not just harm students in public schools, whose 
resources were often channeled out of the schools into newly created all-white private 
ones, but it also hurt white students who attended sub-par private schools. Many private 
students attended inadequate facilities with fewer resources and qualified teachers than 
their public systems. The headmaster at Mim’s Academy, a segregationist school formed 
in 1968 in Dorchester County, had an administrative office that doubled as a supply 
room, no library, and a red clay parking lot riddled with pot holes. Since the school did 
not serve lunch, students had to walk to a nearby hot dog stand or pack their own meals. 
The headmaster admitted that “Our reading program’s pretty good. We use phonics. But 
I’ll be frank with you, our math program’s not too strong right now.”cd Most private 
schools did not have vocation programs or technical training and few had business 
courses. In addition, newly established private schools frequently refused to admit 
students with learning disabilities. Cyril Busbee, Superintendent of Education in South 
Carolina throughout the desegregation era, once joked, “All you have to do to open a 
private school in South Carolina is to have a spare stable.”cdi 
In South Carolina some felt that the new wave of private schools operating in the 
state by the mid-1960s necessitated the creation of an organization to help further private 
education in the state. Accordingly, in 1965 T. Elliot Wannamaker, the headmaster of the 
Wade Hampton Academy, invited representatives from seven of the other newly formed 
private schools in South Carolina to Orangeburg in order to discuss the creation of an 
independent school association. As a result of that meeting, the South Carolina 
Independent School Association (SCISA) requested and received a corporate charter 
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from the state, and quickly became the leading private school association in South 
Carolina, with T.E. Wannamaker serving as its first President.
cdii
  
SCISA appointed executive secretary Tom Turnipseed, founder of Jefferson 
Davis Academy in Blackville, South Carolina, to assist and advocate for newly 
established private schools in the state and serve as the organization’s public relations 
manager. In addition to insuring that the quickly forming new schools were able to obtain 
tax-exempt status, Turnipseed also worked to separate the SCISA from its segregationist 
reputation. He argued that the newly formed association was not a segregationist 
organization but instead consisted of a group of prominent citizens concerned about 
quality education in the state. Indeed, publically, the SCISA never mentioned race. Tom 
Turnipseed served two years with the SCISA  before leaving South Carolina to help 
organize George Wallace's presidential campaign in 1968.
cdiii
  
Religion also figured prominently in the creation of private schools in Orangeburg 
and throughout the State. As president of the SCISA, Elliott Wannamaker encouraged 
communities interested in launching private schools in the aftermath of desegregation to 
work in conjunction with local churches. Churches provided schools with classroom 
facilities and often had the organizational structure to support upstart schools. According 
to one study, churches sponsored more than one-third of the one-hundred and eleven 
segregation academies in South Carolina by 1973. Indeed, in Bowman, one church 
proved integral to the establishment of Bowman Academy in 1970.
cdiv
  
In 1961, the Southern Methodist Church of Bowman purchased a brick, two-story, 
former elementary school from the Bowman public school district for only $1000. At the 
time of that sale, two members of the church board served simultaneously on the school 
170 
 
board: Bowman’s postmaster, Robert Berry, Jr, and George Weathers, then chairman of 
the school board. During the time of the sale, two other school board members also 
served as members of the Bowman Southern Methodist Church board. In 1966, the 
Bowman Southern Methodist Church filed a new deed for the school building, editing the 
purchase price to $1500. The church board claimed they filed the new deed in response to 
criticism that they did not follow proper procedures during the original transaction. Berry 
attributed the flagrantly low sale price to supposed district plans to abandon the old 
public school building anyway. The church allegedly bought the building for protection 
of its nearby church facility and because the members needed the space for parking. “We 
did not want the property to become a clip joint or a dance hall,” one church member 
claimed.
cdv
 
Because of its affiliation with the Bowman Southern Methodist Church, Bowman 
Academy, which quickly joined the SCISA, paid no taxes after its establishment, 
qualifying as an eleemosynary, or charitable, institution. Yet, the links between Bowman 
Academy, the local Southern Methodist church and the Bowman School District were 
problematic. Timrod Austin, who served as a school board member for Bowman District 
Two in 1973 at the time of the black student boycott, also served as vice-president of 
Bowman Academy. James West, Chairman of the Bowman Public School Board, and 
school board member Robert Berry, Jr., both served on the Board of Bowman’s Southern 
Methodist Church. Both Austin and West sent their children to Bowman Academy. A.L. 
Felder served on the Bowman Methodist Church board, and his son was on the Bowman 
School District Two Board of Trustees. Another community member, G. B. Patrick was 
on the Bowman Southern Methodist church board and was the Bowman Academy 
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representative to SCISA. Bowman Academy recruited its white teachers from the public 
system, and several white teachers, teacher’s aides, and two secretaries in the public 
school system sent their children to Bowman Academy.
cdvi
 
Because of crossover in leadership, Bowman Academy trustees could easily 
siphon public school resources into the private system. Bowman Academy used exercise 
mats taken from the former all-black high school. The janitorial staff in Bowman public 
schools reported that Bowman School District members packed up and left with 
truckloads of supplies from the public schools. Bowman Academy’s teachers conducted 
classes for its almost two-hundred students in the brick building owned and operated by 
the Bowman Methodist Church and also utilized the church’s educational building. An 
investigator with the American Friends Service Committee argued that the sale price to 
the church was not adequate for the building, and also claimed that prior to the sale, the 
school board took no other bids for sale of the building.
cdvii
 
Many white Bowman residents readily defended the establishment of their all-
white private school. Larry Patrick, one of the founders of Bowman Academy remarked, 
“The thing we were really interested in was good education. Although I will agree that 
segregation plays a part…The education our children are getting is now superior to what 
they were getting in the public school…We’re not against colored people. In most cases 
we’re more than willing than they are to see that they’re [sic] children go to school. Right 
here on the farm, I have to get after my colored people all the time to make sure their 
children are in school. They don’t seem to care….of course, that’s a lack of education on 
their part.”cdviii Patrick had three daughters enrolled at Bowman Academy at the time of 
the boycott. He argued that he was in favor of a good public school system. “But I am not 
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going to put my child in the public schools and sacrifice that child’s future to raise the 
average of the public schools just a bit.”cdix 
Public school board member Timrod Austin asserted much more openly the 
motivations behind the establishment of Bowman’s private school. Austin told a 
Washington Post reporter that Bowman organized the private, segregationist school 
because of fears that total integration would disrupt learning. “And it has,” Austin stated. 
“I don’t care what the government or the Supreme Court Says. We’ve had about 20 white 
people drop out of the public school this year. They said they wasn’t learning anything, 
they was so far ahead of the coloreds. The colored people just don’t take an interest in 
learning the way white people do.”cdx Chairman of the Board West agreed with Austin 
and claimed, “They don’t want to learn and don’t want anyone else to learn either.” West 
argued that he sent his children to Bowman Academy because “you can’t put children 
capable of doing 6th grade work next to students capable of doing 3rd grade work. We 
try to get them to come to school and study, but that is just out of the question.”cdxi 
In conjunction with the establishment of Bowman Academy, the public schools 
also lost use of their gymnasium and football field in the years following desegregation. 
Established in 1948, the Bowman Memorial Gymnasium Corporation technically owned 
and controlled the facilities, not the public schools. In the mid-1950s, the corporate group 
built a gym and football field (allegedly using town funds) used by the all-white Bowman 
High School until integration. After 1970, the Corporation only allowed the private 
Bowman Academy to use their sports complex, leaving public school students with no 
sports facility. The 1948 charter for Bowman Memorial Corporation listed J.D. West, 
father of School Board Chairman James West, and G. B. Patrick, father of Larry Patrick 
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on the Bowman Methodist church board and incorporator of Bowman Academy, as 
founding members.
cdxii
   
As the first few years after desegregation progressed in Bowman, the black 
community continued to feel that the school board was not creating a positive school 
atmosphere or quality education for their children. Throughout the early 1970s, many 
prominent white community members in Bowman, like school board members West and 
Austin, continued to argue that white students and black students should not be placed in 
the same classes because of white academic superiority and black student apathy towards 
academics. Black residents in Bowman vehemently denied those statements and argued 
their children desperately wanted to learn but did not have the opportunity. Helen 
Summers, a black Bowman resident who moved to Bowman from New York in 1969, 
claimed her children had already covered what they were learning in Bowman schools in 
New York. Her youngest son, Marion Summers, a freshman at Bowman High School in 
1973, maintained an A average before coming to South Carolina. He complained that 
“Windows in the school are broken out, and the bathrooms are not fit to use. We never 
get the stuff we need.”cdxiii Many complained that the public high school was vandalized, 
its grounds littered with broken glass and broken furniture, its playground unkempt, and 
its playground un-mowed. Chairman West blamed students for the disrepair. He claimed 
that “the colored school was painted, everything fixed. It was in tip top shape. Now it’s 
torn up completely.”cdxiv The Board of Trustees claimed that they would no longer fix the 
schools because the black students destroyed the property. Hayes Mizell, director of the 
American Friends Service Committee’s community relations program in South Carolina, 
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listed Bowman County among the ten worst school districts in the state, and referred to 
the district as an “educational disaster area.”cdxv 
 The misuse of federal monies in Bowman 2 also frustrated black parents and 
residents. Leaders in the black community charged that the District misused Title 1 funds, 
granted under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Part of Lyndon 
Johnson’s War on Poverty, the provided money to school districts with large populations 
of impoverished children. The federal government authorized specific uses of funds for 
professional development, instructional materials, resources to support educational 
programs, and for the promotion of parental involvement in schools. But black parents in 
Bowman claimed that Title I funds, which amounted to $160,000 and more than a quarter 
of the District’s budgetary allowance, were not being used for Title I functions. William 
G. Harden, who served as the District’s federal programs coordinator, reported that the 
District misused funds, prompting the school board to fire him.
cdxvi
  Harden’s dismissal 
outraged the black community. Quincy Smith claimed that Harden was “trying to get 
programs to benefit the underprivileged children of the district, but the people here just 
don’t like that sort of thing, so they gave a walking ticket.”cdxvii Though Hardin never 
gained rehire in Bowman, he eventually became the director of the Citizens Rights 
Committee for the South Carolina Council for Human Rights.
cdxviii
 
HEW investigated Bowman, along with other school districts in South Carolina, 
and found many irregularities. Teachers hired to teach under specific Title I functions 
actually taught other subjects or fulfilled other school duties. For instance, the District 
paid the lunchroom supervisor and school nurse with Title I funds, listing them as reading 
teachers. Investigators also found many supplies and equipment purchased with Title I 
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money “stashed away in a closet,” and not allowed for student use. ESEA coordinators 
warned the school district to resolve the irregularities or funds would be terminated.
cdxix
 
Black parents and activists in Bowman also complained that Bowman did not 
apply for Emergency School Aid Act funds, which they felt could greatly benefit the 
District. The Emergency School Aid Act of 1970, passed under the Nixon administration, 
granted large amounts of federal monies to southern school districts to aid in the 
implementation of desegregation. The measure had many advocates across a wide 
political spectrum. Conservative southern educators hoped the money would help white 
students by upgrading existing educational programs. Ardent civil rights supporters in 
Congress hoped it would help African American students in the difficult transition of 
desegregation.
cdxx
  
Problems quickly emerged with the disbursement and regulation of ESAA. Before 
Congress constructed substantive legislation for ESAA in 1970, Congress and the Nixon 
administration granted temporary ESAA funding to HEW in August of 1970, with no red 
tape, to provide emergency aid for the Fall of 1970, the year most Southern districts fully 
desegregated. Local officials threw together plans to get ESAA funds before schools 
opened, and under strong White House pressure to disburse money by September, HEW 
allowed its staff only thirty-six hours to examine a district’s application. HEW’s staff 
approved almost all applications submitted and granted millions of dollars within just a 
few months of ESAA’s passage. The “frenzy to send dollars South” resulted in many 
decisions to send money to districts implementing blatant violations of the Civil Rights 
Act. HEW, for instance, granted 1.3 million dollars to Jackson Mississippi, four days 
before it even received the city’s formal application.cdxxi Civil rights organizations 
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reported that more than half the districts examined continued illegal practices of 
segregation. The General Accounting Office, Congress’s auditing and investigatory arm, 
found that applications for funding did not explain how the money would be spent and 
did not relate the new funds to integration. Often the program became little more than a 
form of general aid, operating in favor of the most segregated systems in the country.
cdxxii
 
Bowman, for instance, applied for, and was granted $18,000 in ESAA funds in 
1970. District officials left a majority of their 1970 ESAA application blank, explaining 
very little about why Bowman’s school needed funding. On the last page of the 
application, Bowman officials briefly clarified why the district needed the federal 
monies. “The desegregation of the system has caused the town to split and many parents 
are sending their children to a private school, since the ratio of black students is nine to 
one. The faculty is also of a black majority. This has led many parents to believe that 
quality education will be lost. Town meetings have been held to try to explain the entire 
situation to the people, but have not been successful. We hope that through this federal 
grant people will realize that the school system here in Bowman has not only continued, 
but will make great progress.”cdxxiii The Bowman district argued that with additional 
federal funds, the school would be more attractive to white residents, but their biggest 
concern was that white students left the public system, their focus not on improving the 
system for black students. Additionally, Bowman officials argued that “Many students 
not able to function in normal classroom situation,” and claimed they wanted more 
“special education classes, teachers, and materials.”cdxxiv Admittedly, officials stated on 
their application that the school had no organization that would promote biracial activity, 
but argued that with ESAA money they would be able to start a school band, which 
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“appealed to both races.”cdxxv On the ESAA application, Bowman officials stated that no 
public school property had been transferred to non-public schools.
cdxxvi
  
Pressures brought to bear by civil rights organizations and members of congress 
provoked a major reorganization of HEW’s procedure in making ESAA grants. Senator 
Walter Mondale presided over a series of hearings that exposed problems with initial 
ESAA procedures and provided the basis for a newly written version of ESAA. The 
revised 1972 Act, clearly provided incentives for integration, reserved money for specific 
purposes recommended by desegregation experts and civil rights organizations, and 
incorporated strict standards of eligibility. As a result, many Southern Districts stopped 
applying.
cdxxvii
  
Neighboring Orangeburg District 1 went through a painful ESAA application 
process when applying for ESAA after 1972. HEW officials denied Orangeburg 1, which 
regulated Norway, Neeses, and Springfield schools, in its 1972 application for violating a 
section of the ESAA which mandated that minority grouping and segregation could not 
occur within classroom assignments. The Office of Civil Rights and HEW found that 
Orangeburg 1 had racially discriminatory classrooms, which were only acceptable if they 
could be validated by test scores. The District claimed to resolve the issue and the Office 
of Civil Rights eventually granted funds, but terminated them later in the same academic 
year because HEW discovered racially identifiable classes.
cdxxviii
 
Hayes Mizell worked with the AFSC to educate black parents on pressuring 
districts around the State to apply for ESAA after 1972. He explained to parents that 
ESAA funds could be used by local school districts to provide in-service training for 
teachers, to improve curriculums, to develop programs for underachievers, to sponsor 
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human relations workshops, and to improve school-community relations. Mizell told 
parents in 1975, “Since all applications for ESAA funds must be cleared by HEW’s 
Office of Civil Rights, many district have been unwilling to apply for funds because they 
don’t want OCR to have an excuse to look into policies and practices in their respective 
school districts.”cdxxix Bowman 2, like many others, stopped applying for ESAA after 
1972, angering many black parents who wanted all possible funds that could help their 
students. A culmination of the school board’s misuse of Title One funds, its failure to 
apply for ESAA funds, and its neglect of the facilities of Bowman, forced many parents 
to see a school boycott as the last resort to turn their system around.
cdxxx
 
 
The Bowman Boycott Begins 
After parents, students, activists, and the Bowman NAACP voiced their 
grievances in June of 1973, the Office of Technical Assistance, an office of the South 
Carolina Department of Education, in conjunction with the Orangeburg County School 
Board, appointed an investigative committee to evaluate the District in lieu of parent 
complaints. The committee largely agreed with the petitioners. On June 25, the 
committee, chaired by Isaac McGraw and Joe Durham of the South Carolina Department 
of Education, and joined by three members of the Orangeburg County School Board, 
announced their findings. The committee criticized the Bowman School Board for having 
no written school policies and regulations in writing and recommended that the Board 
formalize their procedures and policies immediately, using the National School Boards 
Manual as an example. They also urged the School Board to take immediate steps to open 
channels of communication between parents and board members regarding the planning 
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and operation of the District Schools, and advised officials to take positive steps towards 
building school pride and responsibility.
cdxxxi
  
In addition, the investigative committee recommended that the District seek all 
federal help available, specifically naming ESAA funds. Investigative members also 
advised the school board to appoint a full-time administrator at each school, who would 
be responsible for evaluating teachers annually; no faculty evaluation system existed in 
Bowman in 1973. The committee found the per pupil expenditure inadequate to meet all 
students needs and state regulations. Lastly, the committee argued that the facilities 
needed maintenance. Restrooms needed new fixtures, partitions, and special daily and 
annual attention. They argued that the school’s eating areas in the lunchrooms needed 
redecoration, and that the schools needed fencing and landscaping. Lastly, the committee 
argued that the completion of the football field and stadium would strengthen the schools 
program and improve community relationships.
cdxxxii
  
The investigative committee presented their recommendations to the Bowman 
School District, Orangeburg County School District, and also published their findings in 
the Orangeburg Times and Democrat. Ellen P. Chaplin, Superintendent of all Orangeburg 
Schools, worked with the State Department of Education and Bowman officials in the 
hopes of finding an agreement between the school and community.
cdxxxiii
 Yet, at the heart 
of Bowman community grievances, was that black parents, students, and concerned 
citizens had no voice or control over the public school system. In addition, the group felt 
that Bowman officials’ allegiance to Bowman Academy interfered with their ability to 
contribute positively to the Bowman public schools. Black parents believed that 
appointing a new school board and Superintendent would be the only way meaningful 
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change could be achieved. Despite the recommendations from the Office of Technical 
Assistance and the Orangeburg County School Board, Superintendent Carter and board 
members West and Austin refused to resign.  
In response, 450 black parents, students, and community members in Bowman 
met at the local Antioch Baptist Church and voted to initiate a District-wide boycott. 
Declared on August 24, 1973, the day slated for the first day of school, its effects were 
immediately felt by the school district. Quincy Smith reported that 95 percent of African 
American students participated, with less than 200 students attending district wide. 
Throughout the boycott, activists picketed the schools, spoke to local and national media 
outlets including the New York Times, Washington Post, and ABC Nightly News, and 
continued to protest their grievances to Governor West and the State Department of 
Education.
cdxxxiv
 
The boycotters maintained five main grievances and claimed they would not send 
children back to school until district officials met all five of those grievances.
cdxxxv
 The 
first and second grievances demanded the immediate removal or resignation of 
Superintendent W.L. Carter and board members James West and Timrod Austin. The 
black community argued that the Superintendent and Board did not have the confidence 
of the community and used the recommendations and findings of the State investigative 
committee to support their claims. They largely objected to Austin and West because the 
two sent their children to Bowman Academy. Black parents quoted derogatory statements 
about desegregation made by Austin and West to the Washington Post, including Austin 
saying, “I don’t care what the government or the Supreme Court says, total integration 
would disrupt learning.”cdxxxvi The black community also requested in their third 
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grievance that administrators release all teachers who sent their children to Bowman 
Academy. The fourth and fifth grievances addressed facility requests; parents wanted the 
immediate completion of a football field and stadium for the District and also requested 
the construction of a vocational and agriculture shop for students.
cdxxxvii
 
Despite many negotiations between Bowman’s board and boycotters, Carter, 
West, and Austin refused to resign their positions. In an interview with the Associated 
Press, West told reporters, “Yes, my children are in private school. After desegregation 
my son went one year to the public school. Then I decided he was getting very little 
teaching, very little requirements necessary to go to college and better himself, so I sent 
him to private school.”cdxxxviii Despite his decision, West felt that he was more than 
qualified to continue to preside as a Bowman School Board member. But, state 
authorities claimed they could not legally remove board members or the Superintendent 
from office without legal cause. Governor West argued that he would not remove any 
school board members until they had been indicted.
cdxxxix
 
Because boycotters refused to compromise, the boycott continued. By mid-
September Isaac “Ike” Williams, South Carolina NAACP field director publicly pledged 
the South Carolina chapter of the NAACP’s support to Bowman’s students and 
participated in both public protests and negotiations.
cdxl
 Williams, who attended South 
Carolina State in the mid-1960s and served as student body president, served as the 
NAACP’s field director and executive secretary from 1969-1983. He supported multiple 
student boycotts across the state during his tenure. With mounting pressure, West and 
Austin agreed that after they served out their terms, they would not run for re-election on 
the School Board as long as their children attended Bowman Academy. Carter, however, 
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refused to resign or wave the right to run for re-election.
cdxli
 On September 9, with West 
and Austin’s agreement to not run for reelection, the District agreed to meet all of the 
demands by parents, except the firing of Carter. More than 400 parents, dissatisfied, 
voted to continue the boycott, which carried it into its second month.
cdxlii
 
With no end to the boycott in sight, Governor James West requested that his 
assistant, James Clyburn, help secure an agreement. Clyburn, the first black advisor to a 
South Carolina governor, began working for West in 1971. Clyburn, a South Carolina 
native, was very much rooted in the Orangeburg community and broader South Carolina 
civil rights movement. Born in 1940 in Sumter, South Carolina, Clyburn was elected 
president of his NAACP youth chapter when he was 12 years old. He attended South 
Carolina State College in Orangeburg and earned a bachelor's degree in history. During 
his college years, Clyburn became a leading member of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee and helped organize numerous civil-rights marches, sit-ins, and 
demonstrations. After college, Clyburn took a job teaching at C.A. Brown High School in 
Charleston. In 1971, he ran for the South Carolina General Assembly, but following his 
defeat took a position as minority advisor to Governor John West. Because of his 
experience as a teacher and his position in the community, West hoped Clyburn could 
effectively work to end the school boycott.
cdxliii
  Clyburn traveled to Bowman, largely in 
support of the black community. Though he backed almost all of the parent demands, 
Clyburn urged Bowman residents to pursue legal sanctions against Carter, arguing that 
South Carolina law protected him from dismissal.
cdxliv
  
 Upon the urging of Clyburn, the Bowman NAACP and black parents agreed to 
settle their grievances before the newly established South Carolina State Human Affairs 
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Commission. The South Carolina General Assembly created the Human Affairs 
Commission in 1972, which had the power to “encourage fair treatment for, and to 
eliminate and prevent discrimination against, any member of a group protected by this 
act, and to foster mutual understanding and respect for people across this state.” George 
Hamilton, an ordained minister with the A.M.E. church, secured the role as the executive 
director and became the first black person in South Carolina to head a major state agency. 
Though this Commission largely focused on creating economic justice for black South 
Carolinians, the Commission quickly became entangled with various black protest 
movements in public schools across the State, including Bowman and Dorchester School 
Districts. James Clyburn followed George Hamilton as director of the Commission in 
1974.
cdxlv
 
 After hearing both sides, the Human Affairs Commission found “cause for 
conciliation.” Bowman School District agreed to disclose all future information about 
their use of Title 1 funds to the Commission, the South Carolina Department of 
Education, and the Orangeburg County School District. James West agreed in writing 
that he would not seek reelection, and Timrod Austin agreed he would only seek 
reelection if he no longer enrolled his children in private schools. Both parties agreed that 
all new teacher hires could not send their children to Bowman Academy. In addition, if 
teachers had to be laid off, those with private school children would be the first to be let 
go. Bowman District Two also agreed to provide a working football field with showers 
and dressing rooms, and they promised the next building priority would be the 
construction of a vocational-agricultural shop facility. Lastly, the Bowman School Board 
agreed that no student would receive retaliation for having participated in the 
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boycott.
cdxlvi
 Parents and the NAACP decided they would accept the terms, and pursue 
grievances against Carter through the South Carolina court system.
cdxlvii
 On September 
19, 1973, almost four weeks after it began, Bowman’s boycott ended. More than a 
thousand black elementary and high school students quietly returned to their classrooms 
for the school year. “We wanted justice,” said Smith. “Now we have lifted the gates so 
that justice may flow down like water.”cdxlviii 
In the weeks and months following the boycott, Bowman’s school District made 
greater attempts at communicating with students and parents. The Board initiated a series 
of district newsletters that disclosed important information about curriculum and 
instruction, Title I funds, grades, and attendance. In addition, the District hired a black 
federal funds coordinator in the Fall of 1973 who worked in the District’s administrative 
office. Bowman began applying for federal ESAA funds for the 1974-1975 school year 
and applied for ESAA funds throughout the 1970s, meeting the more stringent HEW 
requirements to attain those funds.
cdxlix
 Though Carter maintained his post as 
Superintendent for the 1973-1974 school year, he met with the Parent Advisory 
Committee (PAC), headed by Quincy Smith, every third Thursday of the month to 
discuss the use of Title I funds and other school decisions. The PAC invited parents to the 
meetings and allowed them to present ideas and concerns. The following year, the 
community of Bowman elected a new Superintendent of schools, Joseph P. Rice, who 
worked with the community to build on the changes implemented in the 1973-1974 
academic year.
cdl
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Conclusion 
The Bowman boycott captured a moment of transition in the post-Jim Crow 
South. Schools offered a window into the challenges presented by desegregation showing 
not only the ways in which many white South Carolinians resisted federally enforced 
desegregation efforts, but also the processes whereby black South Carolinians continued 
to fight for social and political equality using new civil rights legislation and federal 
regulation. Growing federal oversight greatly shaped the trajectory of desegregated 
education in the South, strictly permitting and encouraging certain programs and policies, 
while forbidding others. But Bowman’s boycott demonstrates that discrepancies between 
federal education policy and local school practices existed that often undermined the 
effectiveness of federal intervention, and sometimes even contributed to continued racial 
discrimination following the Civil Rights Act. 
Bowman’s boycott also displays how crucial African American activism was to 
the success of hard won civil rights victories after 1965, and especially after 1970. 
Bowman’s black community had to organize and use direct action protest to ensure that 
their children would receive the same standard of education that white children received 
before desegregation. Collective protest through the local NAACP proved key for the 
black Bowman community. Only when their activism brought normal school activities to 
a halt and garnered national media attention did they gain a voice in their school system. 
While the black population of Bowman did not have the full support of the South 
Carolina State Department of Education and governor at the start of the boycott, once 
black Bowman residents took their grievances to the state and national press, state 
authorities had no choice but to address the District’s most glaring problems, particularly 
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in the wake of the Voting Rights Act, which contributed to a growing black electorate in 
the State. 
In conjunction with growing federal education regulations, the South Carolina 
government began to assert its sovereignty over the public school system as never before. 
Problems such as those that Bowman residents faced in poor, rural districts prompted the 
State to seize more control from local trustees and administrators. The first major 
education legislation in South Carolina came in 1974 with the passage of the Teacher 
Employment and Dismissal Act, which established uniform procedural rights for teachers 
and reduced the discretionary powers of local boards. In addition, funding discrepancies 
between wealthy districts and more impoverished districts like Bowman emphasized the 
great inequity in South Carolina school systems. In the early 1970, a movement to 
transform South Carolina’s school finance system gained strength, which contributed to a 
restructuring of South Carolina’s funding system in the late 1970s, a system that the State 
of South Carolina still currently uses to regulate school funding. 
Black residents in Bowman used this ever-changing political landscape, taking 
advantage of growing federal and state authority in local education policy, to improve 
their children’s education and their own political strength within the local school system. 
Bowman residents attained better school facilities, regulatory powers over the use of 
federal funds, ascertained more effective leadership in their district, and achieved more 
transparency in school and curriculum policy. Though black students around the State 
continued to struggle in the desegregated, public school system in the months and years 
following Bowman’s school boycott, the success of the boycott still marked a moment of 
achievement for black Americans in the post-Jim Crow South. Bowman’s black 
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community refused to allow public education to deteriorate after desegregation without a 
fight, preserving the legacy of civil rights activism in Orangeburg County and South 
Carolina, and once again emphasizing the importance of education in that struggle.
188 
 
Chapter 5 
“Black Folks Got White Folks All Shaked Up Now:” Black Student Activism in 
Calhoun County A Decade After Desegregation 
On October 26, 1976, an African-American senior and star athlete at St. Matthews 
High School in Calhoun County, South Carolina, Jerome Anderson, presented his school 
principal, Ernest “Bucky” Stokes with a list of 13 grievances concerning the state of 
schools in Calhoun County. Anderson chaired the Student Grievance Committee, a black 
student-activist group, formed at St. Matthews High in order to improve Calhoun 
County’s schools, which students claimed “were declining to nothing.”cdli Black students, 
who made up 88 percent of the student population in Calhoun’s schools, challenged 
abuse from teachers, physical abuse and threats from school administrators, misuse of 
school monies, and deteriorating school facilities. Students also accused the district of 
using racially discriminatory discipline polices and claimed Calhoun’s white teachers, a 
majority of whom enrolled their own children at nearby, all-white private academies, 
failed to adequately  teach students.
cdlii
  
Just few days after their formal complaint, Principal Stokes of St. Matthew’s High 
School nominated two white students for homecoming queen, exacerbating student 
anger; in the years following desegregation in Calhoun, a black and white nominee had 
traditionally served on the homecoming court. On Monday, November 1, the first school 
day following homecoming, student leaders confronted Principal Stokes at school and 
demanded an explanation. He refused to comment and called the police.
cdliii
 After a week
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of continued student unrest, on Friday, November 5, approximately 450 black students 
boycotted classes and assembled in the school auditorium, taking turns expressing their 
frustrations and ideas. After several hours of discussion, the students decided to boycott 
schools until the Calhoun County School Board of Trustees dismissed Principal Stokes 
and Superintendent Thad Ott.
cdliv
  Their protest lasted over two-months and eventually 
included 1,800 students and 1,200 parents and community activists. The local and state 
chapters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
supported students, who employed direct action and collective protest. Students marched 
to the State Capitol in Columbia to demonstrate their frustrations, and protestors also held 
marches in St. Matthews with thousands of participants.
cdlv
 The St. Matthews Student 
Grievance Committee had started what the New York Times called the “most serious 
crisis to hit Calhoun County since the slaves were freed.”cdlvi   
By demanding an adequate education, black students in Calhoun County exposed 
the cruelty, indifference, and corruption of Calhoun County’s all-white school board and 
majority-white administration and faculty, unmasking the deep roots of racial bigotry 
directed at African American children more than a decade after the Civil Rights Act and 
twenty years after Brown. When local leadership failed to provide Calhoun County 
students with even a minimally adequate education, students appealed to an authority 
outside of the local government, including the Governor of South Carolina, James 
Edwards, and the South Carolina Department of Education. Before the student boycott, 
the state did little to help students in the district, despite one of Calhoun’s schools losing 
state accreditation from the state department and several others schools being placed on 
probation by the state. But when thousands of black parents and students collectively 
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boycotted Calhoun’s schools in 1976, using local, state, and national media outlets to 
communicate the deplorable state of their schools and the illegal and unprofessional 
actions of their teachers and school administration, they put immense pressure on South 
Carolina’s Superintendent of Education, Cyril Busbee; Governor Edwards; and the state 
department to immediately and publicly support students.  
Building on continued black student and community protest in South Carolina 
following the Civil Rights Act, Calhoun student protest provided a final impetus to the 
state for expanding state regulations in education. While the state had explored and 
discussed reform in curriculum and education from the early 1970s, in the wake of 
Calhoun’s school boycott, the South Carolina General Assembly passed education 
legislation regulating almost every component of Calhoun student grievances, including 
teaching standards and teacher evaluation procedures, curriculum standards, and 
education finance reform for poor, rural school districts in South Carolina. Calhoun 
students also secured reform on the local level. Within Calhoun County, the Department 
of Education monitored and developed new curriculum standards throughout the late 
1970s. These changes included new standards regulating academic testing, pupil 
placement, and curriculum design. Administrators launched new school community 
programs which empowered students and gave them a voice in the day-to-day operations 
of their schools, and all schools in Calhoun County developed bi-racial student councils 
and Parent Teacher Associations. In addition, the South Carolina Department of 
Education audited district finances well into the 1980s.
cdlvii
 It took consolidated protest on 
the part of black students in rural Calhoun County to secure improved educational 
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opportunities. As one young participant said, “Black folks got white folks all shaked up 
now. We can do this thing. All we got to do is stick together.”cdlviii 
  
Figure 5.1 Map of Calhoun County 
 
Calhoun County is located about forty miles southeast of Columbia, South 
Carolina, and fifteen miles northeast of Orangeburg, South Carolina. Turmoil in Calhoun 
County’s schools dated back to the late 1960s, when the federal government began 
enforcing desegregation through Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In fact, from 
1968-1977, the number of white students enrolled in Calhoun County declined 64.1 
percent.  In 1976, 2,036 black students and 282 white students attended the district’s 
schools: the smallest percentage of white student enrollment in public schools across 
South Carolina. Private school enrollment accounted for 14 percent of the county’s 
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student population: the highest percentage of private school enrollment in the state and 
more than double the state average.
cdlix
   
After St. Matthews’ students walked out of school on November 5, 1976, news of 
the boycott spread. Initially, many parents disapproved of their children’s participation 
and found their refusal to attend school alarming. A majority of parents in the district 
lacked formal education themselves and saw their children’s education as an integral step 
to personal, economic, and community advancement. Jerome Anderson reported that his 
mother was “pissed” when she found out her son was not attending school.cdlx Confused 
about why his children participated in the boycott, Leon Howell, met with the Calhoun 
County Superintendent Thad Ott, who told Howell that “It wasn’t nothing to it and don’t 
pay any attention to it.”cdlxi But despite parental concern, students carried on. When asked 
about the situation by a newspaper reporter, one St. Matthews student replied “Finally on 
Friday we said we were taking matters into our own hands and we walked out.”cdlxii 
Students understood that the burden to improve County schools was theirs to bear. 
In the days following the boycott’s initiation, student participants released their 
list of grievances to the community. Boycotters walked door to door in black 
neighborhoods handing out fliers and talking to neighbors. They discussed their concerns 
with the local NAACP President, Frank Keller and spoke with several newspaper 
reporters about their motives. Criticisms leveled by students varied in nature and degree, 
but included complaints of abuse from teachers, abuse and threats from school 
administrators, misuse of school monies, objections about deteriorating school facilities, 
unfair discipline polices, and general apathy on the part of teachers and administrators 
regarding student education.
cdlxiii
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Some of the accusations of teacher abuse and neglect, for example, charged that 
one teacher sprayed three of his students with tear gas for fighting. Lefus Haynes, a 
student at St. John High School testified that “I was one of three fellows who were 
fighting outside of the canteen when all of the sudden, Rev. Utany (teacher) ran up and 
sprayed tear gas in the eyes of the other guys. After he sprayed tear gas, he went back to 
his classroom. We went to Mr. Funderbrook and told him what happened and he said he 
could do nothing about it. He wouldn’t even let us call home.”cdlxiv Rev. Utany also kept a 
.38 pistol on his desk to intimidate students.
cdlxv
 Another teacher kept whiskey in his desk 
and occasionally exposed himself to students when intoxicated.
cdlxvi
  
When a student kicked Stanley Ellis, a student at St. John Elementary School, in 
the face, his teacher did not allow him to call home and inform his parents, postponing 
the medical treatment he eventually received.
cdlxvii
 Stanley’s father, Tom, reported “My 
son, a fourth grader at St. John Elementary School, received eye injuries from a kick in it 
by another youngster. No one at the school made any effort to get him to a doctor. 
Stanley’s eye was swollen shut. He came home on the school bus that evening as 
usual.”cdlxviii Teachers also ignored eighth grade student Mary Ellis’s injury, which she 
received in class. She explained, “In August 27, 1976 at St. John High School I was 
kicked in the stomach by Henry Lee Tollier, after which I passed out. Some girls picked 
me up off of the floor and took me to the restroom, where I waited until my mother came. 
At the time I was kicked, I was in Mrs. Bonnaparte’s classroom. She didn’t assist me in 
any way nor did she or Mr. Funderbrook call my mother to tell her I was hurt in school. 
Another student called my mother and told her I was kicked and had passed out.”cdlxix 
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Students also criticized teachers for charging unauthorized fees. According to 
several affidavits taken by lawyer Franchot Brown, some teachers charged students to sit 
near windows or chew gum, allegedly keeping the money for themselves.
cdlxx
 Another 
teacher charged students to watch a film that they were later tested on, even if students 
could not pay to watch it.
cdlxxi
 Students also complained of teacher apathy towards 
students and curriculum. Hyiott Ulmer, for example, testified that her daughter, Monica, 
paid to attend a fieldtrip in Orangeburg where students were supposed to watch a film. 
Instead, teachers dropped Monica and her classmates off at a fast-food restaurant the 
entire school day.
cdlxxii
 Students insisted that those who qualified for special education did 
not receive state mandated services and many teachers ignored students who needed extra 
help with their studies. One parent, Ted Gray testified that though his daughter had 
qualified for special education in 1975, St John High School had still not serviced her or 
placed her in special education classes by December 1976.
cdlxxiii
 
Black students frequently faced unfair disciplinary action, suspension, and 
expulsion for inadequate cause. Students who were tardy or absent, even with parental 
excuses, spent their days cleaning bathrooms and floors as punishment. Teachers forced 
Louise Plush, a ninth grader at St. John High, to clean bathrooms for an entire school day 
because of an absence. Principal William Funderbrook locked Debbie Robinson, an 
elementary student, in a small bookroom with no windows for several hours because her 
sister complained to Principal Walter Funderbrook that a teacher jerked Debbie out of 
line. She explained, “My sister Cathy went to the Principal about it and he said that he 
didn’t want to hear it and for me to come with him. He put me in the bookroom which 
has no windows and told me to stay there until he got back, which was all day.”cdlxxiv 
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Jerome Anderson objected that his Family Living teacher gave a test on material that was 
not covered in class. In response, his teacher escorted him to the Principal who suspended 
him three days for being rude.
cdlxxv
  
Students also complained of theft and misuse of school funds. Despite paying 
large book fees, many students across the district never received textbooks. Dolores 
Clover, teacher at St. John Elementary, testified that students in her math classes had no 
textbooks or old textbooks on the wrong level.
cdlxxvi
 Mary Wright affirmed that in 1974-
1975, “my children kept coming home without any books even though I had paid the 
book fees. Several months elapsed and they still hadn’t been issued their books and I was 
told this was true for all classes in all grades at Bethlehem Elementary.” When Wright 
went to talk to Mr. Ott, he told her that “it was just a mixup and he didn’t know why we 
were there because we were already told it was a mixup.” She claimed that “Mr. Ott at all 
times displayed a nasty attitude and spoke to us as though we should not be concerned 
about our children’s education.”cdlxxvii 
According to students, Walter Funderbrook, Principal at St. John High School, 
allowed students to wear anything they wanted, disregarding the dress code, if they paid 
him money. Funderbrook paddled or suspended students if they did not have any money 
and broke the dress code. Student Elnora Clover explained, “On May 1, 1976, Mr. 
Funderbrook made an announcement concerning the school dress code. He stated that a 
student could wear anything he wanted to wear providing that they paid a fee of .50 to the 
homeroom teacher and the homeroom teacher was to turn all the money over to Mr. 
Funderbrook. Mr. Funderbrook’s rule change was hard for students to adjust to so a lot of 
them were suspended or beaten with a paddle.”cdlxxviii In addition, administrators 
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mandated that all students must purchase school insurance policies. Those who did not 
received threats from both teachers and principals. Walter Funderbrook, for instance, told 
Roger Darby “he would lock me and my sister in a room until we paid.”cdlxxix  
Deteriorating school facilities triggered additional student unrest. Many buildings 
had holes in the floors and ceilings and recurrent floods and water accumulation in 
bathrooms. Termite damage destroyed several walls in one of the county’s elementary 
schools without repair. Harold Carson, a community leader, attested that John Ford 
Middle School had deplorable conditions. After a visit, he reported “The first thing that 
came to mind was the poor lighting in the hallways. It reminded me of walking through 
an alleyway after dark. The paint on the walls was not easy to identify through the 
smudges and accumulated stains. The floors and windows were worse than the staircase 
leading to a major subway.” He went on to say that the “chairs in the gymnasium were 
hardly big enough for a first grader to sit on comfortably.” And when he approached the 
bathroom, he found that “the terrible odors from the stools and urinals were unbearable. 
There were beer cans, cigarette butts, and a lime looking substance all over the 
place.”cdlxxx The State Department, upon inspection, banned the use of the locker 
room.
cdlxxxi
  
Celesteene Wannamaker, a mother of two children attending Bethlehem 
Elementary School, went to the school in April of 1976 to take her daughter a change of 
clothes. When she arrived at the school, Wannamaker and her daughter went to the 
bathroom and found the restroom floor covered in water. She contacted Superintendent 
Ott about the situation, who said “Like I told that boy that called before, when we get 
water out there, you’ll have water.”cdlxxxii Flooding issues continued.  
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The local NAACP office supported Calhoun’s boycott from its inception. 
Boycotting students worked in conjunction with Frank Keller, the President of the 
County NAACP, to communicate their frustrations and garner community support. Keller 
and his wife Rebecca, who served as secretary for the county organization, talked with 
parents and organized meetings to impress upon parents the seriousness of their students’ 
actions. In addition, Oscar Means, the head of the Education Committee for the Calhoun 
County chapter of the NAACP and a former teacher and New York social worker, began 
to rally the public, expanded a Parent Organization called the Concerned Citizens 
Organization of Calhoun County (CCO) and worked with South Carolina NAACP field 
representative, Isaac “Ike” Williams to build a case against the local school 
administration.
cdlxxxiii
 In the meantime, many students met daily at an old Masonic Hall in 
St. Matthews to study and continue their school work, which quickly stressed to their 
parents and community the seriousness behind their actions. And momentum built. Just a 
few days after the boycott’s commencement, it included over 80 percent of African 
American students from the five elementary and two high schools across the 
county.
cdlxxxiv
 Importantly, students initiated and directed this boycott, who even after the 
state NAACP got involved, and after parent and community involvement, retained a 
voice in its direction, its demands, and its end. 
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Figure 5.2 Picture of students studying at an abandoned Masonic Lodge in Calhoun 
County during the boycott. 
 
 
NAACP activists cultivated statewide awareness of the growing student 
movement by publicizing the student boycott and grievances and exerting pressure on the 
South Carolina State Department of Education and members of the South Carolina 
legislature. Williams, Keller, and Means understood that support from outside rural 
Calhoun County was integral to meaningful change in their County’s schools. By 
November 11, only three days into the boycott, NAACP leaders spoke with State 
Superintendent of Education Cyril Busbee, and met with State Senator Marion Gressette, 
who chaired the State Segregation Committee from 1951-1966 and continued to be a 
powerful Senator on the Senate Education Committee, and State Representative John 
Felder, both representing Calhoun County, to discuss possible solutions to student and 
199 
 
community discontent.
cdlxxxv
 Williams purposely targeted Gressette, telling one group of 
protestors, “With the kind of power he has at the State House he ought to be able to 
handle problems in his own county’s schools. If he don’t help out his constituents then he 
may be looking for another job after the next election.”cdlxxxvi The rallying point for 
students and NAACP leaders quickly became the dismissal of Thad Ott, Calhoun County 
Superintendent, William Funderbrook, Principal at St. John’s High School, and Ernest 
Stokes, Principal at St. Matthews High. NAACP leaders and protesting students held firm 
that the boycott would not end until the School Board of Trustees dismissed the three 
administrators.
cdlxxxvii
 
 
White Resistance to School Desegregation Before the Boycott 
Unrest in Calhoun County’s school started in 1965, when the federal government, 
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, began regulating desegregation efforts in public schools 
through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).
cdlxxxviii
 Prior to 
desegregation, Calhoun County divided its schools into two school districts: St. Matthews 
District 1 and Cameron District 2. In 1965, HEW found both districts out of compliance 
with federal desegregation standards.
cdlxxxix
 
In 1965, St. Matthews District 1 operated a completely dual school system based 
on race.
cdxc
 In response to HEW’s demands to integrate their public schools, St. Matthews 
Board of Trustees implemented a Freedom of Choice Plan, which it continued using until 
total desegregation in 1970.
cdxci
 Freedom of Choice plans technically allowed children 
within segregated school systems to attend the school of their choice, mostly providing 
for the transfer of black students into majority white schools. But Freedom of Choice 
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Plans put the burden of transfer on African American families, and usually required black 
students to find their own transportation to school. In addition, school boards routinely 
denied black students acceptance into white schools based off of technicalities in their 
applications. For the most part, Southern school districts employed Freedom of Choice 
plans as a ruse to maintain segregation while retaining federal aid. In 1965, St. Matthews 
1 allowed 16 black students, of the 25 who applied, to attend previously all-white schools 
in the district.
cdxcii
 Black transfers remained a small percentage of student enrolment at St. 
Matthews High until 1970, when the U.S Fourth Circuit of Appeals required all South 
Carolina school districts to totally desegregate.
cdxciii
  
Cameron District 2 had a different trajectory than St. Matthews 1. In 1965, 
Superintendent of Cameron Schools, JP Dufford, turned down federal funds in order to 
maintain segregated, dual school systems, a choice he defended as being in “the 
educational interests of the students.”cdxciv By 1968, in financial stress, the district did 
accept federal funds but shut down its white school in lieu of desegregating. White 
parents sent their students across district lines to the still largely segregated St. Matthews 
District 1, or to private schools. By the 1968-1969 school year, the Cameron District’s 
student population was 100 percent black. Cameron still paid to maintain an all-white 
school board and administration that created offices at the empty, previously white, St. 
John High School.
cdxcv
 In 1969, the General Assembly approved a ten million dollar tax 
refund to white residents of Cameron school district who attended private schools. This 
cut ignored the fixed cost for school operation and it soon became impossible to properly 
maintain Cameron’s facilities. In addition, the millage rate, the amount per thousand 
dollars that is used to calculate property tax for school support, was lowered over a four-
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year period from a high of 54 mills in 1967 to a low of 44 mills in 1970.
cdxcvi
 By 1976, 
only one school in the state had a lower millage rate than Calhoun County.
cdxcvii
 
In 1974, the county’s legislative delegation, headed by Senator Marion Gressette, 
decided the county was too small to maintain two separate school districts.
cdxcviii
  The 
State Department of Education approved a merger, which soon created a consolidated 
Calhoun County School District 1. In the midst of the merger, signs of a growing 
solidarity emerged in the black community. Many African American parents and activists 
met with the Calhoun County School Board and insisted that school board officials for 
the newly structured district be elected from single member districts within the county 
and opposed their current at-large system. Black residents argued single member districts 
would be the only way to have a fair electorate among the school board and to ensure that 
black voting strength would not be diluted. But the consolidation legislation opted for at-
large elections.
cdxcix
 Later in 1974, the General Assembly passed the legislation.
d
 
Parents objected and took their complaints to the federal Department of Justice 
(DOJ), where they argued that the at-large election mechanism was racially 
discriminatory. While the DOJ eventually sided with the black petitioners, by the time a 
new electoral plan was implemented, it was already the middle of 1976 and problems in 
the County’s schools were so serious that students had little hope for change. Even the 
1976 elections, which employed single member county elections and took place right 
before the boycott began, resulted in a 6 member school board with only 2 African 
American members, despite the fact that 6 black candidates campaigned.
di
  
Only 48 percent of the eligible black population of Calhoun County registered to 
vote in 1976. When asked about the lack of black voting strength in Calhoun County by 
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the New York Times, community activist Helen Carson replied, “It’s hard to pin down but 
we get things like reports of people being run off their farms where they’ve rented all 
because they voted.The South isn’t the political promise land yet”dii As a result, many 
parents remained locked out of the management of their children’s schools. Only through 
the power of the students did an effective movement emerge. Rebecca Keller, NAACP 
secretary stated “that it was the students who brought everyone together.”diii Community 
members challenged unjust school policies before 1976, but never with such collective 
force. 
 
The Boycott Continues 
Once the boycott commenced, the South Carolina Department of Education 
pressured Superintendent Ott to negotiate a settlement with students. Ott, who was in his 
twenty-ninth year with the District and employed both his wife and daughter in his office, 
did not report the boycott to the State Department of Education and continued to collect 
money for student attendance and school lunches. The Office of Technical Assistance, a 
section of the State Department of Education, questioned this behavior, but Ott claimed 
that he wanted to ensure there was enough food and cafeteria staff to accommodate 
students when they returned to school. It seemed Ott did not realize the urgency or 
gravity of the boycott.
div
  
But by mid-November, the student movement gained strength. The same day Ott 
spoke to the State Department of Education, a rally including over 500 community 
members, took place at the First Baptist Church of St. Matthews. Building on the student 
rallies that were held since the beginning of November, this event included parents and 
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activists. So many attended the rally that the church could not accommodate everyone; 
people packed into the church pews, stood in the aisles and doorways, and crowded the 
walls. According to newspaper reports, a young man opened the rally by proclaiming, 
“Your children are tired. Something is going on in Calhoun County. Black folks got 
white folks all shaked up now.”dv  
After he spoke, Oscar Means and Ike Williams, field representative for the 
NAACP, rallied the crowd. Williams told parents, “Today we heard from the lieutenant 
governor’s office, the Superintendent of Education’s office, Mr. Gressette’s office, 
Representative Felder’s office. They weren’t concerned with the problems of your school 
when you were in school. And do you know why? They don’t like all this attention.”dvi 
Williams knew that the post-Jim Crow political terrain, in addition to tightening state and 
federal education standards provided the community with an opportunity to transform 
Calhoun County Schools, and the large amount of protesters gave weight to the 
movement. Indeed, before the boycott, the County failed to meet standards set by the 
State Department of Education. By 1976, three schools in the County faced probation 
from the South Carolina Department of Education, and one school, Guinyard School, lost 
its accreditation from the State. Causes listed by the Department of Education included 
inadequate school facilities, uncertified teachers, insufficient course offerings, and 
teacher overloads. The State, however, took little action to encourage the school board 
and administration to improve.
dvii
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Figure 5.3 Picture of Oscar Means (left) and Issac Williams (right) during a rally 
at Bethlehem Methodist Church, November 1976 
 
A 1976 South Carolina Department of Education report on Bethlehem Elementary 
School in Cameron reported that the school needed the ceiling replaced due to water 
damage, new chalkboards and bulletin boards, replacement of termite damaged areas, 
shelves, door frames, and replacement of missing and worn floor tiles. It also reported 
that the music room needed “A secure covering of the hole in the floor,” in addition to 
restrooms and carpet for kindergarten classes. Lastly, it called for the “removal of the 
burned portable wall,” and a new roof. The Lower Savannah Regional Planning and 
Development Council, an organization that investigated South Carolina school districts, 
completed a study regarding Calhoun County schools for the state in January of 1973. It 
found that the district needed to expand its curriculum and vastly improve its facilities. In 
short, it concluded, “the school system is not meeting the needs of the majority of its 
students.”dviii Despite reports, the district made no changes. 
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The South Carolina Community Relations Program (SCCRP), headed by the 
American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization that worked for civil rights 
activism, also reported problems in years preceding the boycott. They recounted incidents 
of mishandling of funds and low student performance in the county. During the boycott, 
one SCCRP field worker blamed the problems in Calhoun County on “a whole series of 
weak administrators surrounding themselves with weak principals.”dix He argued that 
racism and white disinterest in this school system by the majority white school board and 
majority black school population produced a subpar learning environment.
dx
  
Throughout November and early December students and parents employed direct 
action and collective protest by participating in marches and rallies; students even 
marched to the State Capitol in Columbia to demonstrate their frustrations.
dxi
 Other 
marches were held in St. Matthews with thousands of participants.
dxii
 They received 
national attention from the New York Times, Baltimore Afro-American, and newspapers 
across South Carolina. And as Williams mentioned in his rally to parents, problems that 
plagued the district for years were finally being addressed.  
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Figure 5.4 Picture of Protest in St. Matthews on November, 12, 1976 
 
The Calhoun County NAACP hired the Columbia lawyer Franchot Brown to 
represent boycotting students. Brown, who still works as a labor and employment lawyer 
in Columbia, negotiated with the State Department of Education, School Board of 
Trustees, and gathered affidavits from students, parents, and teachers. To address student 
accusations, especially in the continued solidarity of the boycotters, the State Department 
of Education in conjunction with Senator Gressette and Representative Felder, nominated 
a six member, bi-racial Special Investigative Fact Finding Committee. Initiated on 
November 24, the Committee investigated the truth behind student grievances. Dr. 
Amelia Roberts and W.J. Clark co-chaired the Committee and decided to meet with 
parents and students of St. Matthews High and St. Johns High before speaking with the 
accused administrators.
dxiii
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On Wednesday, December 1, committee members met with students and parents 
at St. Johns High School who discussed their grievances for over two hours. Two days 
later, the fact finding committee met with parents at St. Matthews High. Students 
presented an “Ad Hoc Committee to Evaluate Grievances of Students, Parents, and 
Citizens of the Calhoun Co. School District,” which contained six pages of grievances. 
Students and parents talked openly about their frustrations. Some of the specific 
grievances stated that the Principal refused to share factual information about the school 
program to students/parents, disciplined students unjustly for identical acts according to 
race, disrespected students, refused to present financial reports to students, and that 
Stokes even watched a teacher “run students down, choke, and hit them because they 
referred to a teacher as “George.”dxiv Students and parents again called for the dismissal 
of Ott, Funderbrook, and Stokes, and broader school reform to address their other 
complaints.
dxv
 
After initial evaluation of the situation, meeting with parents, students, and 
administrators, and looking at the facilities, the Fact Finding Committee thought it would 
be best for the Board of Trustees to temporarily relieve the three accused administrators 
of their duties with pay until the investigation was complete. They expressed this 
statement both verbally and in writing, but the Board of Trustees disregarded the 
recommendation and left the administrators in their positions. In the meantime, 
boycotting students and the NAACP strengthened their position. On December 11, Ike 
Williams and Oscar Means met with Governor James Edwards at the Governor’s 
Mansion in Columbia. Coincidentally, State testing score reports circulated right after the 
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meeting which reflected Calhoun County to be below both state and national levels for 
academic achievement.
dxvi
 
 
Figure 5.4 Picture of St. Matthews High School classroom in the midst of the boycott on 
December 3, 1976.  
 
As the student movement progressed, divisions between the students, parents, 
lawyer Franchot Brown, and NAACP representatives emerged, particularly regarding 
how and when the boycott should end. The School Board of Trustees and State 
Department of Education put students under an immense amount of pressure to return to 
school, and students feared being held back, losing scholarships, and not graduating. 
Jerome Anderson, for example, was being recruited to play basketball by several Division 
One schools prior to the boycott. The St. Matthews basketball players were State 
Champions during the 1975-1976 school year, and Anderson received a lot of attention 
for his athletic ability during high profile games. When the boycott started during the 
1976-1977 basketball season, recruiters no longer wanted Anderson on their college 
teams. In fact, Principal Stokes threatened to give Anderson bad recommendations 
because he participated in the boycott.
dxvii
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This immense amount of pressure affected students, who began to doubt the 
possibility of all their grievances being met. Ike Williams and Oscar Means, however, 
insisted that the boycott would not be successful, and therefore should not end, until the 
School Board fired William Funderbrook, Ernest Stokes, and Thad Ott. On December 22, 
Williams and Means told the press that “the boycott will not end until Ott and Stokes are 
removed.”dxviii They went on to say that the community would prefer the new principal 
and superintendent to be black. But other black participants in the negotiations disagreed 
and told the press that “a lesser concession by the school board, such as changes in 
policy, clear cut instructions to the superintendent and formal standards for student rights, 
might be enough to get the blacks back in school.”dxix Franchot Brown doubted the legal 
grounds behind such an administrative dismissal, but Means and Williams kept his 
opinion from students.
dxx
   
According to the Spartanburg Herald Journal, Means and Williams and 
Governor Edwards discussed the firing of the administrators for the majority of their 
December meeting. While the governor told reporters that “he intended to utilize the 
good offices to try to effectuate a solution, the problem was not that people disagreed 
about their (the administrators) dismissal, but the legal justification behind it.” He went 
on to say that “the three administrators surely deserve due processes of law.” Edwards 
told the press that “it may have to be taken to the courts to finally resolve the situation,” 
and that he planned to set up meetings with the three administrators and with the Board of 
Trustees in Calhoun County. In the meantime, he urged students to return to school.
dxxi
 
Governor Edwards also invited the Fact Finding Committee to the Governor’s 
Mansion to hear their initial findings. In addition to the Committee, the Lieutenant 
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Governor of South Carolina, Brantley Harvey; Educational Aid to the Governor, Roger 
Kirk; and Jesse Coles, Deputy State Superintendent all attended.
dxxii
 The governor urged 
the committee to work quickly and report its findings by January 5, when school for the 
new semester started.
dxxiii
 He told reporters that while he did not have the legal authority 
to settle the boycott, he would use “the persuasive powers of my office to do whatever I 
can.”dxxiv  
By the beginning of January, the Special Investigative Fact Finding Committee 
reported its findings, which overwhelmingly supported the boycotting students. The Fact 
Finding Committee found that The School Board of Trustees had no developed set of 
written board policies to guide administrators in administering of schools. Stating that the 
Board was in desperate need of policy guidelines, it urged the district to join the State 
School Board Association and publish a codified set of guidelines, going on to say that 
“the Board was accountable to the tax payers and needed to become deeply involved in 
the total school endeavor.”dxxv In addition the committee asserted that parents and 
students had too few lines of communication with administrators. No Parent Teacher 
Association existed and the Fact Finding Committee recommended that parents needed to 
be given a voice and treated with more respect. Committee members ruled that there was 
a shortage of black professional persons in the County, and that the Board of Trustees 
should use Affirmative Action to fill upper echelon professional positions in the 
district.
dxxvi
 
The Committee also criticized the District for not applying for available federal 
funds, specifically the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA). Under the authority of 
ESAA, federal financial assistance was granted to meet the special needs of 
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desegregating school districts, particularly those with large African American 
populations. Legislators designed ESAA to encourage the voluntary elimination, 
reduction, and prevention of segregation and to aid minority school children in 
overcoming the educational disadvantages they faced. In order to get ESAA funds, 
however, school districts had to follow strict standards that reflected sincere efforts at 
integration. The Fact Finding Committee suggested that the district hire a federal project 
manager with grant writing experience to apply for ESAA funds, in addition to other state 
and federal monies.
dxxvii
  
Administrative behavior did not escape the Fact Finding Committee’s critique. 
Committee Members testified that Ernest Stokes used “extremely poor judgment,” as an 
administrator and specifically critiqued him for allowing two white homecoming queens 
to be selected among a majority African American population. Committee members 
recommended from that point on that the homecoming queen, student council, and other 
student elections be selected by the student body, not picked by the school administrator. 
In addition, the Committee recommended that Funderbrook be charged with a 
misdemeanor for collecting illegitimate student funds. The Committee mandated that an 
auditor be assigned to the schools in the district to audit all school funds and fee 
collection. They recommended that books, uniforms, and other school supplies be given 
to students without charge. Lastly, the board stated, “It is strongly recommended that the 
Board of Trustees assign Thad Ott, Mr. Ernest Stokes, and Mr. Walter Funderbrook to 
special tasks, and temporarily reassign them from their present positions until these tasks 
have been completed and the Board has made a complete assessment of all data 
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concerning the district provided to them. Time should be allowed for the three men to 
answer to the charges placed against them in the affidavits.”dxxviii  
On December 22, in response to the Fact Finding Committee’s report and under 
pressure from the State Department of Education, the Calhoun County Board of Trustees 
granted some concessions to boycotters and amended many County school policies. 
Every administrator had to attend a two week-long state leadership training program at 
the State Development Center. The conference, developed by the South Carolina State 
Department of Education, emphasized curriculum development, human relations, and the 
benefits and ways to access Emergency School Aid Act funds.
dxxix
 The Board of Trustees 
agreed to encourage Parent Teacher Organizations and to write a set of guidelines in 
conjunction with the State School Board Association. Despite these changes, Ott, Stokes, 
and Funderbrook remained in their previous positions as Superintendent, Principal of St. 
Matthews, and Principal of St. Johns, respectively. 
Unhappy with the three administrators retaining their jobs, the Concerned 
Citizens Organization of Calhoun County petitioned the School Board to make further 
changes. The group suggested that Ott, Funderbrook, and Stokes be suspended pending a 
hearing before the Board of School Trustees. The CCO requested the right to suggest the 
administrative substitutes used to replace those at the State Development Center. The 
CCO also demanded that a bi-racial student group be created to encompass a discussion 
of student school problems generally, and that the group’s membership be comprised of 
students from each of the County’s two high schools.dxxx  
As negotiations between the Board of Trustees and CCO continued, State 
Superintendent of Education, Cyril Busbee interceded in an effort to quickly end the 
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boycott: he wrote a letter to the School Board of Trustees, which made it clear that he 
was in communication with the CCO, and suggested that the Board do a formal hearing 
addressing the grievances of students.  He stated, “I have had conversations with 
Superintendent Ott, Principals Stokes and Funderbrook, with Senator Gressette and 
Representative Felder, and yesterday with your Concerned Citizens group who were 
accompanied by Attorney’s Franchot Brown and Hemphill, Busbee stated. “I promised 
the Concerned Citizens group that I would encourage you and your Board to hear their 
charges against the school system, including against individuals therein. I am very much 
interested in seeing this near two-month old boycott ended and a strong public school 
system established in Calhoun County. “dxxxi Following Busbee’s letter, the Board of 
Trustees agreed to the bi-racial student group and promised to honor the CCO’s 
suggestions as to who should fill-in for the nine school administrators while on 
assignment to the State Department of Education’s Leadership Development Center. But 
in a letter to the CCO, the Board refused to dismiss any administrator, claiming “such 
action is beyond the pale of tolerance and good sense; and this Board of Trustees will 
have no part of it.”dxxxii  
The Board of Trustees’ response caused a rift among students, parents, and 
NAACP leaders. Students started to doubt the possibility of the administrative dismissals, 
while NAACP leaders grew more adamant about their importance. Like the Board of 
Trustees, lawyer Franchot Brown questioned the legality of what the CCO and boycotting 
students were asking for, and by early January urged students through Means and 
Williams to take lesser terms. Brown believed that South Carolina law protected the 
administrators from being summarily dismissed, regardless of student accusations, but 
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boycotting students never received his advice. When Brown realized his opinion was 
being blocked from the students he represented, he resigned. He told the press that he 
“could not, in good conscious continue to represent students in legal counsel.” Means, 
frustrated with Brown and working for a total victory for students, told the press that the 
“parting was mutual.” He explained, “Mr. Brown told us he had exhausted all avenues on 
our behalf, so there was no reason to keep him.”dxxxiii  
While Means and Williams remained confident that administrators could and 
should be dismissed, students, shaken by Brown’s resignation, disagreed. Students hoped 
to stay committed to the boycott until all their grievances were addressed, but a large 
majority of students feared their futures would suffer if the boycott continued.  Public 
opinion also put great strain on students. An article published in The State, at the end of 
December counseled “Now the black boycotters should give the school district a second 
chance by going back to school. They have successfully focused wide attention on the 
real deficiencies in the district. They have gotten action in substantial compliance with 
their demands if their real motive was improved education. A continued boycott would 
only focus attention on themselves and their unwillingness to compromise in the interest 
of racial harmony.”dxxxiv Students, anxious about the repercussions of a continued 
boycott, unanimously voted for its end. They returned to school on January 11, 1977, 67 
days after the boycott began. The Board of Trustees and South Carolina Department of 
Education allowed students to makeup all missed schools days, even though conflict 
between the Board and students forced the State Department to repeatedly intervene 
throughout Spring 1977 to ensure that students who lacked transportation to make-up 
classes would be provided with a means to attend.
dxxxv
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When the boycott ended, many students and parents felt their efforts had failed 
because the School Board of Trustees did not meet their full demands. In order to express 
their frustrations and continue their activism, the Concerned Citizens of Calhoun County 
published a newsletter entitled The People’s Voice, on Feb. 25, 1977. In the issue, student 
boycotter V. Coulter reflected, “I think the boycott should not have ended for several 
reasons. My main reason is after we walked out, we said that under no conditions would 
we go back to school with the same administration. I feel that we had come too far to turn 
around, and never in our lives would we get this change again- never!”dxxxvi Another 
student, Phyliss Larrymore reflected, “I feel that the students who participated in the 
Calhoun County Boycott should not have returned to school because they stated that they 
would not return until their grievances were met and the three administrators relieved of 
their duties. I believe one should say what he means and be able to accept the 
consequences whether they are good or bad.
dxxxvii
 While Coulter and Larrymore lamented 
what they saw as an abandonment of the student movement and student power, others 
disagreed. In fact, many students found the boycott to be immediately successful. 
Another student quoted in The People’s Voice affirmed, “What has the boycott done? It 
has made the board recognize its responsibility to conduct the business of the school 
system in the manner that it should.”dxxxviii  
Even though the impact of the boycott was unknown on the morning of January 
11, 1977, the student activists in Calhoun County had powerfully contributed to a climate 
of education reform in Calhoun County Schools and other districts around the State. 
Within Calhoun County, the Department of Education monitored and developed new 
curriculum standards throughout the late 1970s. These changes included new standards 
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regulating academic testing, pupil placement, and curriculum design. The State 
implemented stricter regulations on race ratios in classes so that black students would no 
longer be academically tracked into lower level classes. Administrators launched new 
school community programs which empowered students and gave them a voice in the 
day-to-day operations of their schools. Schools in Calhoun County developed bi-racial 
student councils and Parent Teacher Associations.
dxxxix
  
In addition, the South Carolina Department of Education audited district finances 
well into the 1980s. After they inspected school facilities in Calhoun, the Department 
encouraged the Board of Trustees to build a new high school, Calhoun County High 
School, which incorporated students from St. Johns and St. Matthews. The school opened 
in 1981.
dxl
 Under pressure from the state department of education, no students were 
suspended, expelled, or held back for their participation in the boycott. And during the 
academic school year of 1977-1978, the district transferred Ernest Stokes from his 
position of principal to the new Director of Programs and Administration at the District 
Office; his primary job was to apply for federal funds for the County. Thad Ott took an 
early retirement at the end of the 1976-1977 academic year.
dxli
 
Community activism continued after the boycott’s end. Parents, who fully backed 
their children’s demands, built on gains made during the boycott to carry on battles over 
school board election, discipline policies, and school facilities. The black community’s 
newsletter, The People’s Voice, discussed racial injustice in the community and plans for 
continued activism. Parents renewed their resolve to strengthen African American voting 
power and vowed to elect a new, more effective school board. Oscar Means, speaking on 
the behalf of the CCO threatened, “If they-the present members of the board-think they 
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will be re-elected, they are mistaken. If they stand for reelection, they will never be 
reelected as school trustees or any other office in Calhoun County.”dxlii Students also 
successfully exercised a larger voice in their schools after the boycott. In an interview in 
1978, Means stated, “Parents are taking greater interest in school activities and students 
are less reluctant to talk to their principals when there is a problem.” In his new position 
as director of programs and administration, even Ernest Stokes admitted the boycott was 
effective. “It did awaken the school district,” he reflected.dxliii  
By late 1977, as plans were being designed for Calhoun County High School, St. 
Matthews High received new carpeting, new paint, and new lights. The School Board of 
Trustees hired more black staff members and faculty. In fact, during the boycott, no black 
employees worked at the District Office. During the 1977-78 year, the District employed 
a black director of finance, black supervisor of the federal Title 1 program, and black 
bookkeeper. The Board of Trustees also hired a more racially diverse administrative staff 
with two white and six black principals, one white and two black assistant principals, and 
two black teachers for every white teacher throughout all Calhoun County Schools. 
Before the student boycott, white teachers and administrators accounted for 85 percent of 
the teaching and administrative faculty.
dxliv
 
Calhoun County’s need for funds from the Emergency School Aid Act 
contributed to revamped school regulations. In the 1977-1978 school year, Calhoun 
County applied for ESAA funds but the Office of Civil Rights rejected the county for its 
lack of compliance to desegregation standards, particularly because of racial segregation 
within classroom assignments.
dxlv
 Through applying for these funds, the county opened 
itself up to more federal regulation and had to meet more stringent desegregation 
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standards. Activists still critiqued the system, for instance a year after the boycott, the 
Calhoun NAACP argued the school district needed to implement black studies courses, 
but education standards in Calhoun County were markedly improved.
dxlvi
 
Not only were Calhoun County schools altered by the boycott, but student protest 
contributed to a climate of statewide education policy reform. Indeed, Calhoun County’s 
student campaign came at an integral time in legislative decision making on public 
education. In July of 1976, South Carolina launched statewide education reform in an 
effort to raise the bar for teachers, standardize achievement goals, and assist 
impoverished South Carolina school systems.
dxlvii
 In the final months of 1976, the State 
Department of Education organized forums across the state to hash out problems and put 
forth suggestions for South Carolina’s schools. Educators and reformers discussed the 
limitations of public education in South Carolina at precisely the same time that Calhoun 
County’s boycott took root.  
The level of Calhoun County student resolve shook the State Department of 
Education and further highlighted the needs for regulation of school budgeting, school 
teaching standards, and disparate funding between counties. Since the Spartanburg 
Times, The State, Spartanburg Herald Journal, The Carolina Reporter, affiliated with the 
University of South Carolina, Osceola, The Calhoun Times, and the Charlotte Observer, 
among others, all reported on Calhoun County’s protest, the boycott almost certainly 
weighed in the minds and on the hearts of public education reformers as they discussed 
problems and formulated suggestions for South Carolina schools.  
Legislation that resulted from the 1976-1977 discussions directly addressed many 
of the problems publicized by the Concerned Students Organization, and centralized and 
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standardized many aspects of South Carolina education policy. The Education Finance 
Act (1977), the Basic Skills Assessment Act (1978), and the Educator Improvement Act 
(1979), altered the very fabric of education in the State. The Education Finance Act 
(EFA) assured a minimum foundation of educational resources to every child regardless 
of his or her county residence. Legislators intended the EFA to provide a basic level of 
support for school operations in all districts and to distribute a larger share of the funds to 
poorer districts. Before this legislation, students living in wealthy school districts had 
distinct advantages over those living in districts with small tax bases, which was 
particularly a problem in Calhoun County, because they lowered their tax rates in the 
1970s during desegregation.
dxlviii
  
Legislators designed the EFA to ensure that counties contributed an appropriate 
amount of revenue to their public school systems. The EFA introduced the Defined 
Minimum Program, which regulated what each state should contribute based off of the 
proportion of all taxable property located in each district. Districts with a higher property 
tax base had to provide more money for education than poorer districts. Another 
regulation presented in this Act was the Weighted Pupil/Base Pupil calculation, designed 
to determine the funding each district should receive according to the program needs of 
each type of student. Higher risk students, according to this policy, received more funds 
in an effort to guarantee equal educational opportunities regardless of location or 
socioeconomic background.
dxlix
  
In addition to the EFA, the General Assembly passed the Educator Improvement 
Act (EIA), which created the Educator Improvement Task Force, a separate state agency 
responsible for implementing new teaching standards through the late 1970s and early 
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1980s. The Educator Improvement Act increased standards for individuals entering the 
teaching profession and provided for the annual evaluation of contract teachers. Steps 
were taken to discontinue the use of the National Teacher Examination, which was 
considered to be racially discriminatory by many civil rights activists. The state 
restructured teacher certification to include both a state-devised test and annual 
evaluation system, and the law made tenure for South Carolina teachers more difficult to 
attain. Prior to the EIA, tenure was granted during the first year of employment in most 
South Carolina counties and no state system of teacher evaluation existed.
dl
  
Lastly, the Basic Skills Assessment Act provided for diagnostic testing in specific 
grade levels to determine and improve skill mastery in reading, mathematics, and 
writing.
dli
 Education legislation in South Carolina continued throughout the 1980s to 
ensure that South Carolina students obtained a minimum level of mastery in subjects. In 
fact, by the late 1980s, South Carolina was at the forefront of United States development 
of public educational goals and national curriculum standards.
dlii
 While State curriculum 
standards have been controversial among educators, by implementing these standards, the 
State aimed to ensure that all South Carolina counties offered students appropriate 
curriculums, and hoped that situations like what transpired in Calhoun County schools 
could be avoided in the future. To be sure, designers of South Carolina education reform 
in the late 1970s instituted many changes in South Carolina education legislation that 
directly addressed the multiple problems in Calhoun County schools. By boycotting in 
the midst of education reform, student activists expanded their reach and shaped the 
future of public education in South Carolina. When the boycott ended, even Governor 
Edwards wrote to Cyril Busbee that “The solution of the problems of Calhoun County 
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Schools were perplexing and complicated. The solution was extremely important, not 
only to the citizens of Calhoun, but to the entire State.”dliii 
In 1976, black student activists in Calhoun County risked their futures to fight 
against a Southern culture and education system still fashioned by Jim Crow policies. The 
culture of segregation in South Carolina could not be erased by the Civil Rights Act in 
just a few years, or even a decade. But black students, determined to implement federal 
civil rights legislation in Calhoun County, convinced parents, community activists, their 
own administrators, legislators, and state educators that every South Carolina student, 
regardless of race, deserved a quality education. While the boycott was a victory for the 
black community, it required sacrifice on the part of many students who forever lost 
academic and sports scholarships, and parents who lost jobs and underwent threats 
because of their students’ involvement. Students had to work hard to make-up missed 
school hours when the boycott was over and swallow their pride as they returned to the 
same halls as Ernest Stokes and Walter Funderbrook, despite the administrators’ 
undoubted misjudgment, inappropriate actions, and abuse. But through those sacrifices, 
students built on the tradition of protest established in 1952 in Clarendon County, South 
Carolina and continued to demand quality public education and equity for black students 
in the state. Yet, the fight for quality education for black students in South Carolina was 
far from over. Two generations later, a group of poor and minority school districts in 
South Carolina built on the victories of the 1970s protestors and the achievement of 
South Carolina’s Education Finance Act, to challenge the constitutionality of the state’s 
public school finance system and demand a minimally adequate education for poor and 
minority children across the state.
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Epilogue 
“They Should March Until Victory is Won:” South Carolina’s Dual Public School 
System Sixty Years after Brown 
In 1993, 40 of South Carolina’s 90 school districts sued the state because they did 
not have enough money to provide a quality education for their students. At the time of 
the suit, Abbeville County School District v. the State of South Carolina, minority 
students constituted almost 90 percent of the total number of students enrolled in the 
plaintiff districts. 88 percent of those students received free and reduced lunch, an 
indicator used by educators to judge the poverty level of a school, and 75 percent of 
plaintiff school districts received unsatisfactory and below average ratings by South 
Carolina’s Department of Education, compared to only 17.4 percent of schools across the 
state. While 16 percent of students in South Carolina failed state reading and math 
assessment tests designed to gauge student achievement, a majority of students in 
Abbeville’s plaintiff districts failed, and their dropout rates reached as high as 67 percent. 
South Carolina based individual school district funding on local property taxes, creating 
great ranges in the sources available to districts within the state. In 2009-2010, for 
instance, local per pupil annual expenditures varied from $1,593 dollars in Dillon 2 to 
$10,018 in Beaufort. Students from wealthy school districts in South Carolina had access 
to state-of-the-art facilities, highly qualified teachers, and cutting-edge technology; while 
its poorest school districts struggled to provide students with facilities that had working 
central heat and air units, functional plumbing, and library books.
dliv
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The majority of school districts that initiated Abbeville are located in South 
Carolina’s rural Piedmont region, stretching from North Carolina down to Georgia on 
Interstate 95. These communities are some of the poorest communities not only in South 
Carolina, but in the United States. In Dillon County, one of the eight lead school districts 
chosen to represent the plaintiff districts in Abbeville, 33 percent of residents fall below 
the national poverty line and the median household income in the county is $26,668. On 
average, 22.3 percent of plaintiff residents live below poverty and 29.7 percent of 
children come from single parent homes. 12.8 percent of residents over the age of 25 in 
the plaintiff districts have less than a 9th grade education. In 2002, the 8 lead plaintiff 
communities had 1,450 homes without plumbing, 1,127 homes without kitchens, and 
over 10,000 homes without phones. Journalists and educators began referring to South 
Carolina’s I-95 region as the Corridor of Shame during the Abbeville trial.dlv  
While many of the rural, majority-black school districts in this region historically 
ranked as the poorest in the state, desegregation in South Carolina exacerbated the 
poverty levels of the region’s schools. Many white students in majority-black school 
districts enrolled in private schools, creating a drain on the state’s already underfunded 
public school system. School districts in communities with large private school 
enrollments faced the obstacle of obtaining the necessary tax increases needed to 
maintain quality public schools. Parents who paid private school tuition opposed 
increases in local property taxes and had little invested in their communities’ public 
schools. In 1993, when districts in the Corridor of Shame filed Abbeville, 10 percent of 
school aged children in the plaintiff districts attended private schools, compared to the 
state average of 7 percent. In some counties, the percentage was much higher. In Lee 
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County, whose public school student population was 63 percent black, 19 percent of 
district students attended private schools. 18 percent attended private school in Lee 
County which had a black public school student population of slightly more than 50 
percent.
dlvi
 
Throughout the pre-desegregation period in South Carolina, white school districts 
had lower tax rates than black school districts. Predominantly black school districts, 
which in general had less property-wealth than white districts, set a higher tax rate than 
white districts to overcome the revenue deficiencies caused by property wealth. 
Community leaders taxed local property more heavily because funds supported the 
segregated system. As gradual desegregation began to occur, this relationship reversed. 
Beginning in 1967-1968, higher tax rates shifted to districts with higher populations of 
white students. Despite lower levels of property-wealth, authorities in predominantly 
black districts stopped setting above-average tax rates. Instead, they kept tax rates 
relatively constant, while tax rates in more heavily white districts increased. After 1970, 
differences in tax rates between black and white districts became very pronounced; rates 
in predominantly white districts increased by over 20 mills, while tax rates in majority 
black districts increased by only 7.5 mills. By 1979, majority-white districts taxed at a 
rate of approximately 28 mills more than majority-black districts.
dlvii
  
Decreased enrollment also diminished the funds available to local districts 
because federal and state education departments based school district funding on average 
daily student attendance. Many school boards in majority-black school districts, like 
those in Bowman, Dorchester, and Calhoun counties, often supported all-white private 
schools in their communities and neglected their own public schools. The loss of public 
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school support among affluent white residents in communities across the state proved 
detrimental. In 1970, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) completed a 
study that found a definitive correlation between majority-black school districts in South 
Carolina run by school officials supporting the private school movement and districts that 
scored poorly in state accreditation. These districts provided poor individually guided and 
special education opportunities, usually had no PTA affiliation, and failed to implement 
compulsory attendance laws, contributing to reductions in daily average attendance 
funds. The AFSC listed Orangeburg School Districts 2, 3, and 7; Sumter 2; and Barnwell 
19 and 29 as examples of failing majority-black schools in its study. All of these districts, 
except Sumter 2, filed suit against South Carolina in the 1993 Abbeville case.
dlviii
  
 Judge Thomas Cooper first heard Abbeville on July 3, 1995 at the Clarendon 
County Court House in Manning, the same location that Thurgood Marshall tried Briggs 
v. Elliot in 1952. Briggs later became one of the five landmark cases that culminated into 
Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas (1954). The hearing in Manning took 
one day, but Judge Cooper’s decision took over a year to deliver. In 1996, Cooper ruled 
that the South Carolina constitution did not mandate that the same educational 
opportunity be provided in each school district, ruling in favor of the state of South 
Carolina.
dlix
  
In response, plaintiff superintendents filed a claim with the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, who heard the case in 1997. The state Supreme Court ruled that while the 
state’s constitution did not guarantee each child an equal education, that it did guarantee a 
standard for a “minimally adequate education.” Before remanding the original case back 
to the circuit court to be considered again, it defined the standard “to include providing 
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students adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to acquire: the 
ability to read, write and speak the English language, and the knowledge of mathematics 
and physical science; a fundamental knowledge of economic, social and political 
systems, and of history and governmental processes; and academic and vocational 
skills.”dlx As a result, Judge Thomas Cooper retried Abbeville again in 2003, but a year 
later he ruled that the state provided a minimally adequate education to all students in 
South Carolina. His ruling found the state to be at fault only in early childhood education, 
and directed the state to fund early childhood intervention programs to satisfy 
constitutional requirements under the “minimally adequate” standard. During the trial, 
Cooper denied the plaintiffs the ability to discuss race as a contributing factor for the 
state’s inequities.dlxi  
 Cooper’s ruling dissatisfied both the state and plaintiff districts who both filed 
motions to get the court to change its 2006 order. Cooper denied those motions in July 
2007. The following month, plaintiffs appealed Cooper’s decision to the state Supreme 
Court. In turn, it heard oral arguments on June 25, 2008, but never reached a decision. In 
2012, South Carolina’s Supreme Court heard the case again, but has not yet provided a 
verdict.
dlxii
  
More than twenty years after the original filing of Abbeville, an entirely new 
generation of students in the Corridor of Shame is awaiting a decision for the Abbeville 
suit. With little industry, tourism, or economic growth, and generations of parents and 
students who never had access to quality education, students in the Corridor have little 
hope for a more promising future. The 2006 documentary film Corridor of Shame drew 
nationwide attention to the poverty of the region’s schools, even prompting President 
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Barack Obama to visit the then-111-year-old J.V. Martin Middle School in Dillon during 
his 2008 presidential campaign. But little has changed for students in the region since the 
1993 suit began. Since the original trial started, several school buildings in the Corridor 
have literally collapsed on children during school hours, over 50 percent of students 
continue to fail state exams and drop out of the Abbeville districts before graduating, and 
districts continue to turn away at-risk pre-Kindergarten students because they do not have 
the funds to support early childhood education, despite Cooper’s 2006 ruling.dlxiii  
Even though Brown v. Board of Education (1954) outlawed dual public school 
systems based on race, another dual system evolved in South Carolina after Brown’s 
passage: one with districts that enrolled a majority-white student population with great 
resources and wealth, and another that had majority-black student populations and few 
resources available to provide quality education for their students. Sixty years after 
Brown and fifty years after the Civil Rights Act and Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, 
poor and minority students in South Carolina still lack a public education on par with 
many white and more affluent students in the state. 
The origin of education finance reform in South Carolina and throughout the 
nation was closely tied to school desegregation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Early 
finance litigation cases in the late 1960s built on the legal argument, established in Brown 
v. Board, that public education should be equal to all students and that states had an 
obligation to make education equal on all terms in accordance with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Many civil rights advocates argued that racial 
discrimination caused the inequities in school district resources, reasoning that state 
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funding formulas typically produced higher funding levels per pupil in predominantly 
white school districts than minority school districts.
dlxiv
   
In 1971, the California Supreme Court supported school finance reform in 
Serrano v. Priest and challenged the inequities created by the U.S. tradition of using 
property taxes as the principal source of revenue for public schools. The Court ruled that 
wide discrepancies in school funding based on local property wealth represented a denial 
of equal opportunity for students in poor districts. States around the South, including 
South Carolina, rushed to examine their own school finance formulas in the aftermath of 
Serrano, but in 1973, the US Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, struck down a constitutional guarantee of school finance equality, arguing 
that inequitable school funding formulas did not violate the US constitution’s equal 
protection clause. The Court argued that poor children in Texas received a minimum 
education, even if it was inferior to the education offered in wealthier districts.
dlxv
  
 After San Antonio v. Rodriguez, advocates of school finance shifted their 
argument to a state level, arguing that funding formulas violated state constitutional 
provisions, in part, because all state constitutions had provisions providing for a free 
public education, unlike the United States constitution. Court cases around the country 
developed challenging state educational provisions; 45 out of 50 states passed school 
finance reform by the late 1970s. In 1975, for instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
ruled in Robinson v. Cahill that equal opportunity for education should be provided but 
should be judged as the attainment of equal achievement levels, not the amount of money 
schools received to operate. In 1978 in New York, a group of property-poor school 
districts, joined by the five large urban New York districts, filed Levittown v. Nyquist, to 
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challenge the state's education finance system. In its 1982 decision, New York's Supreme 
Court ruled that while substantial inequities in funding did exist, the state constitution did 
not require equal funding for education. However, the court also held that the state 
constitution guaranteed students the right to the opportunity for a "sound basic 
education."
dlxvi
  
National school finance reform prompted an examination of South Carolina's 
system for financing education. Governor John West, who campaigned on reforming the 
state’s struggling public school system in his 1970 gubernatorial election, asked the 
South Carolina General Assembly in 1972 for a special committee to study the possible 
implications of such court decisions as Serrano and Rodriguez in public education. When 
West took office in 1970, the state’s public education system was in demonstrably bad 
shape. In 1972, South Carolina’s student population ranked as ninth largest in the United 
States, with 26 percent of South Carolina’s population of school age. But its public 
schools were chronically underfunded, and the state suffered from staggeringly high 
dropout rates. In 1969, the state’s dropout rate fell below 50 percent for the first time in 
the state’s history. Per pupil expenditure in South Carolina ranked below most states and 
was 25 percent under the national average. In 1971, teacher salaries were also 25 percent 
under the national average and fell 10 percent below Georgia and North Carolina, South 
Carolina’s neighboring states. South Carolina’s teacher salary ranked 44 in the United 
States. The University of South Carolina reported that 54 percent of its teacher graduates 
left the state for higher pay and of those that stayed, 13 percent left the profession each 
year in the state due to low pay.
dlxvii
  
230 
 
A root of the problem for South Carolina was its inefficient tax structure. In 1971, 
South Carolina collected $41 per capita in taxes, only 1.3 percent of personal income, 
against a national average of $69. Sales tax on the other hand was very high and the ninth 
highest in the nation. In addition, South Carolina was only one of three states with an 
assessment average of under 10 percent; its average assessment of real property was only 
5.8 percent, making South Carolina the state that received the least amount of local 
property tax revenue in the nation. The broken tax system, the private school movement, 
and white resistance to desegregation impacted the entire public system in South 
Carolina, making education reform a top priority for the Governor and General Assembly 
in the early 1970s.
dlxviii
 
Many civil rights organizations including the South Carolina Conference of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the League of 
Women Voters, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) formed the Citizens Coalition on South Carolina School 
Financing in an effort to reform the state’s school funding system, arguing that South 
Carolina’s funding formula discriminated against minority children. They spoke at 
organizational meetings throughout the state, working to educate and involve parents and 
local community leaders, and lobbied state legislators for their support. Dr. William 
Dufford, a former high school principal who worked with the University of South 
Carolina’s Desegregation Center and the Citizens for Creative Discipline, served as the 
Coalition coordinator. After the General Assembly passed the Education Finance Act 
(EFA) of 1977, which worked to equalize public school finance, the Coalition published 
educational material to more clearly explain the bill and established EFA advisory 
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councils in school districts across the state which included parents, educators, and 
community leaders.
dlxix
  
In 1972, the South Carolina Community Relations Program of the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) launched an investigation completed by the Syracuse 
University Research Corporation and found that school districts with the greater need 
actually received less from the state of South Carolina. “Our examination on income, race 
school revenues yielded one clear conclusion; poor people and non-whites must pay more 
to receive less from the system.”dlxx Researchers found that South Carolina’s poorest 20 
school districts in the state had a market valuation of less than $20,000 per pupil and 
enrolled a 57% black student population. 38% of students in those districts qualified for 
Title I services. On the other hand, the 13 wealthiest school districts in the state had 
market valuations of more than $50,000 and those districts averaged a 26% black student 
population. An average of 16% of their student population qualified for Title I.
dlxxi
  
Not only did great wealth discrepancies exist, but in 1972 the state did little to 
help mend the gap. Before the EFA, the state did not fund local districts on a per pupil 
basis, but instead relied on a flat grant system according to each district’s academic 
programs and the years of experience of its teachers. The Syracuse study found that 
Greenwood 52 was the wealthiest district in the state. It had a per pupil market valuation 
of $138,367. Sumter 2, the poorest, had a market valuation of $9,600. As a result, 
Greenwood 52 was able to produce revenue per pupil at a tax rate of $2.63 per $1000 and 
still produced $365 per pupil. Sumter 2 taxed itself at a rate of $6.66 and could only raise 
$64 dollars a student. Despite the disadvantage Sumter’s school district faced, the state 
actually provided more aid to Greenwood, contributing $284 per pupil and only $240 per 
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pupil in Sumter. The same study found that a starting teacher would receive a local 
supplement of $925 dollars in Marion School District 1, $610 in Marion 2, $400 in 
Marion 3, and $270 in Marion 4, emphasizing the challenges that poorer districts had 
recruiting quality teachers.
dlxxii
 
The Citizen’s Coalition on South Carolina School Financing and the many 
organizations that placed membership in the Coalition put great pressure on both the 
General Assembly and the State Board of Education to restructure the state’s public 
school finance system. In 1974, Governor West held a Governor’s Conference on 
Education which focused on school finance reform and launched a campaign to more 
equitably fund the state’s schools: “A Fair Chance for Every Child.”dlxxiii After this 
conference State Superintendent Cyril Busbee promoted the idea of a minimum 
foundation program for financing public education; speaking to district superintendents 
during an annual summer conference in 1976, he said, "A new system for financing 
education— a minimum foundation program, if you please— is an idea whose time has 
come in South Carolina.”dlxxiv  
The South Carolina General Assembly passed the Education Finance Act (EFA) 
in 1977 and designed the bill to redistribute money to districts whose property taxes, 
though taxed at a higher rate than many wealthier districts, could not adequately support 
their school system. While local property taxes remained the largest single source of 
funds for South Carolina’s public schools, EFA funds provided about 30 percent of total 
operating funds for the state’s schools. The General Assembly designed the distribution 
of EFA funds with a three part formula including: a base student cost, the weighted 
number of pupils, and the index of taxpaying ability. The General Assembly defined the 
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base student cost as the amount deemed necessary to fund a minimum educational 
program for an elementary student in grades 4-8. The Act's weighted pupil system then 
accounted for the relative cost differences between educational programs for different 
students. After the formula established each district’s funding based on BSC and 
weighted pupil expenditure, the formula then determined the amount of funding a school 
district received from the State according to each district's ability to raise local revenues 
for schools, or its index of taxpaying ability. Districts with a smaller amount of property 
wealth received a larger percentage of state funding. This was supposed to enable each 
district to provide a required minimum educational program for each student, with a more 
equitable tax burden for taxpayers, and should have reduced inequities in education 
funding caused by variances in property wealth.
dlxxv
 
 Although the EFA improved the state’s funding formula, it did not fundamentally 
solve the problems faced by poorer districts. A study done by South Carolina’s 
Legislative Audit Council in 1984 found that while poorer districts received more funds 
under the EFA, the amounts did not fully compensate for the differences in wealth across 
the state. In 2009, for instance, when Dillon 2 raised only $1500 per pupil in local funds 
and Beaufort provided over $10,000, the state contributed $3,518 per pupil in Beaufort 
while supplying $4,447 to Dillon 2. While the state granted Dillon 2 more based on need, 
it still left  an over $7500 difference in the two counties’ per pupil expenditures, a figure 
larger than Dillon 2’s total per pupil budget. In addition, problems emerged with EFA’s 
funding formula. While preschool and lower elementary students received higher weights 
because of required smaller class sizes, and students with physical, mental, or emotional 
disabilities also received higher weights, the EFA weight system took no account of the 
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socio-economic level of students. Because children from poor homes and poor 
communities often entered the school system at great disadvantages, communities with 
large populations of poor children required more resources to support those students.
dlxxvi
  
One of the most problematic issues regarding the EFA was how to establish the 
Basic Student Cost. The EFA initially outlined the standard BSC, but when South 
Carolina experienced budget shortages, the General Assembly revised the BSC, making it 
an arbitrary number. For instance, in 2009-2010, the General Assembly established 
$2,334 for the BSC-- several hundred dollars less than the 1977 inflation adjusted base 
student cost of more than $2,700 per pupil. In 2010-2011, with a very tight budget and a 
lack of federal stimulus funds, the General Assembly chose $1,630 per pupil. The 2010-
2011 base student cost of $1,630 per pupil roughly equaled the 1995 level of funding 
without any adjustment for inflation or acknowledgement of changing needs in classroom 
technology.
dlxxvii
  
In addition, the Education Improvement Act (EIA) of 1983, which 
indiscriminately pumped money into South Carolina’s schools to promote higher student 
achievement, diminished the equalizing power of the EFA. By 1989, South Carolina 
granted $850 million to school districts across the state with no regard to the district’s 
ability to pay or local property taxes. In the early 1990s, the state of South Carolina also 
stopped funding pupil transportation and employee fringe benefits at 100 percent. The 
state implemented a requirement that forced the local school districts to pay 30 percent of 
these expenses, freeing up state dollars for other programs, with no consideration of 
school districts’ ability to pay. Faced with budget cuts, decreased state funding, and 
growing demands in their own school districts, South Carolina’s poorest school districts 
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could no longer provide their students with a quality education and filed suit against the 
state.  Their letter to the General Assembly detailing the reasons for the suit closed by 
saying, “We regret having to take the time and money to pursue a judicial remedy. 
However, for our children’s sake, we cannot do less.”dlxxviii 
Upon filing their declaration in 1993, the plaintiffs in the Abbeville case 
contended that the General Assembly and state of South Carolina were not meeting their 
obligation to South Carolina’s school districts according to the EFA. The plaintiffs 
contended that the state’s funding formula also violated the equal protection clause of 
both the state and the federal government and the education clause of the South Carolina 
Constitution because it failed to provide all South Carolina students with an equal 
education. After the South Carolina Supreme Court denied the Abbeville districts’ equity 
claims in 1996, the plaintiff lawyers refocused their argument on adequacy, according to 
the Supreme Court’s definition of minimally adequate education. They argued the state 
did not provide the minimally adequate education required by the state constitution 
according to the South Carolina Supreme Court. In 2003, while preparing for its retrial 
with South Carolina’s Third Circuit Court, attorneys for the plaintiffs selected eight of the 
then 39 representative school districts involved in the suit as the “trial plaintiffs” or lead 
school districts. They included: Allendale County School District, Dillon County School 
District 2, Florence County School District 4, Hampton County School District 2, Jasper 
County School District, Lee County School District, Marion County School District 7, 
and Orangeburg County School District 3.
dlxxix
 
The retrial by Judge Cooper at the Third Judicial Circuit Court lasted for 102 days 
between July 2003 and December 2004. During that time, 112 people offered testimony, 
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either in person or by deposition, and lawyers submitted over 4,400 documents as 
evidence. Lawyers representing the plaintiff districts argued that the facilities, student 
opportunity and performance, teacher quality, and transportation were not adequately 
supported by the state. They used low student performances on the state’s accountability 
tests and high dropout rates as indicators that the state was not providing students a 
minimally adequate education. Over half of the students in plaintiff districts were not 
meeting the basic standards, and the plaintiffs asserted that such a high failure rate clearly 
demonstrated the opportunity for a minimally adequate education did not exist.  
The plaintiffs also submitted an extensive amount of evidence regarding the 
dilapidated conditions of school facilities in the rural areas of South Carolina. Evidence 
included early twentieth century school buildings still in use, moldy bathrooms, 
condemned auditoriums, crumbling walls and ceilings, and leaky roofs that impeded the 
educational opportunities of students. Poor facilities influenced teachers’ decisions to 
move to different school districts where equipment was far superior, and poor school 
conditions distracted students from their coursework. Plaintiff lawyers also argued that its 
school districts struggled to hire teachers, let alone highly qualified ones for the complex 
needs of their students. These school districts lacked the funds to attract the best teachers 
and the ones they hired often transferred out after a few years to attain a higher salary in 
neighboring districts. In addition, lawyers argued that transportation in Abbeville’s 
districts was particularly expensive because 90 percent of students depended on public 
transportation to get to school. Paying the full cost of transportation also overburdened 
the district and left few funds to invest in its schools.
dlxxx
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In defense, South Carolina claimed that it met the state constitutional standard of 
providing a minimally adequate education to all of its students. Defense attorneys argued 
that state assessment tests could not be used as a gauge for minimal adequacy, because 
they were not a minimum expectation. Furthermore, the state argued that any student 
success, no matter how small, indicated minimally adequate educational opportunity. 
Defense attorneys for the state used the same assessment test scores as the plaintiff 
districts to prove that the state provided a minimally adequate education.  They argued 
that a small percentage of students meeting expectations proved that opportunity existed, 
and that the state could not be held responsible for students who chose not to take 
advantage of the opportunity provided. Similarly, the state argued that all of the plaintiff 
districts’ teachers held South Carolina teacher certification, and therefore were minimally 
adequate. The state cited the mismanagement of money for the plaintiff districts’ 
dilapidated buildings. To support this argument, the defendants compared the per pupil 
expenditures of the plaintiff school districts to some of the highest performing school 
districts in the state. The plaintiff school districts received, in some cases, twice as much 
as the other school districts from the state, and still struggled to produce the desired 
results.
dlxxxi
 Cooper agreed with the state and only required them to more adequately 
support early childhood education in the Abbeville districts.
dlxxxii
 
In response to Cooper’s 2006 ruling, the state immediately decided to develop a 
four-year pilot program to study the effectiveness of a pre-kindergarten program. The 
General Assembly dedicated $24 million to this pilot study and placed pre-kindergarten 
programs in each of the eight lead school districts in the Abbeville lawsuit. The estimated 
cost of the program equaled $3,077 per child. The state also made available grants to the 
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school districts for equipment expenses that could not exceed $10,000.
dlxxxiii
  According 
to state regulations, however, before the school districts could operate a pre-kindergarten 
program certain steps had to be taken. First, districts had to secure classroom space, 
which proved difficult since inadequate facilities were one of the concerns raised in the 
Abbeville case. For instance, those charged with implementing the pre-kindergarten 
program in Dillon 2 identified 280 students who qualified for their program, but could 
only offer it to 140 students based on space limitation.
dlxxxiv
  
In addition to classroom space, the school districts had to meet various 
requirements to obtain a Department of Social Services license authorizing the pre-
kindergarten program. To meet these requirements, school districts had to have a fire 
inspection, sanitation inspection, fingerprint teachers and administrators, pay various 
fees, provide extensive documentation on those who would work with the students, and 
provide training to teachers and administrators where the pre-kindergarten programs 
would be housed. All of this required district money not covered by the early childhood 
grant. Due to this underfunded mandate and lack of facilities, many pre-Kindergarten 
students in the Corridor of Shame continue to be turned away from early childhood 
programs.
dlxxxv
 
During the Abbeville trial, on May 15, 2004 thirty-five hundred marchers 
assembled at the Zion Baptist Church in Columbia, South Carolina to support the poor 
and minority school districts in South Carolina that had filed suit. Marchers, led by Pat 
Conroy, whose experience as a teacher in a poor, black community on a South Carolina 
barrier island resulted in his book, The Water is Wide; Dick Riley, former Democratic 
Governor of South Carolina; and Ernest Finney, the first African American South 
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Carolina Supreme Court Justice, marched through Main Street in Columbia onto the State 
Capital steps. Connecting Abbeville to the historic Supreme Court Case that overturned 
legal segregation, Brown v Board of Education, a bus full of students from Clarendon 
County School District 1 students followed Conroy, Riley, and Finney, connecting black 
South Carolinians historic struggle to achieve quality education in the state to the 
Abbeville struggle. Levi Pearson’s granddaughter, Alfreda Pearson and Nathaniel Briggs, 
son of Harry and Eliza Briggs, children of parents who initiated Briggs in the Clarendon 
community, also marched behind the bus. Protestors carried signs that said, “50 Years 
Later, Still Separate, Still Unequal.” The march ended as protestors assembled on the 
Capitol listening to various activists give speeches in support of Abbeville. At the close of 
the protest Dick Riley said, “We’re here because we know the future of every single child 
in South Carolina is directly tied to their education. No child should be subjected to the 
tyranny of low expectations.”dlxxxvi  
In 2014, South Carolina still struggles to overcome the deep-rooted vestiges of 
Jim Crow in the state, particularly economic inequality in education and the tyranny of 
low expectations for its minority students. This continued inequity and denial of quality 
education to poor and minority students has hindered the potential for so many black and 
minority South Carolinians, and has also impeded the quality of public education for the 
entire state. In 2013, The American Legislative Exchange Council ranked South 
Carolina’s schools 50 out of 51 for its educational achievement. South Carolina also 
ranked 49 out of 50 in school dropout rates, only graduating 61.7 percent of its public 
school students and ranking as the lowest southern state in the nation. According to the 
results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) –40% of fourth-
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graders in South Carolina now score below basic proficiency in reading and only 28 
percent scored proficient or above. These figures have drastic implications for economic 
growth and industry in the state, influence state incarceration rates, and affect the 
standards of state colleges and universities. Most importantly these numbers reflect the 
restricted opportunity and quality of life attainable for South Carolina residents and a 
failed commitment to so many children. In the Brown v. Board ruling, Justice Earl 
Warren stated that “Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an 
education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”dlxxxvii Sixty years after Brown, South Carolina is still 
struggling to fulfill Brown’s mandate. 
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